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ABSTRACT 
This study compared key aspects of freedom and control of the press in two 
nations: the United States and my native country of Turkey. Three major media control 
areas were examined: prior restraint, seditious libel, and broadcast licensing. These 
control areas were compared in the United States and in Turkey in both historical context 
and as matters stand in 2002. One useful book underlying this study was Fredrick S. 
Siebert' s Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776, which brilliantly discusses the 
ancient enemies of freedom-- framework for repression -- that were struggled against in 
England and in England's North American colonies from the late fifteenth century 
through the late eighteenth century. In his book, Siebert offered two propositions that 
characterized governmental control of the press: 1 
Proposition I. ''The extent of government control of the press depends on the 
nature of the relationship of the government to those subject to the government." 
Proposition Il. ''The area of freedom contracts and the enforcement of restraints 
increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and of the structure of society 
increase." 
Using the framework suggested by Siebert, this study attempted to determine the 
nature of relationship between governments and the media throughout histories of both 
Turkey and the United States. In this context, illustration of international terrorism 
proved a significant point. Both in Turkey and the United States, governments have 
1 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 10. 
V 
limited freedoms as a result of incidents of terrorism, in line with Siebert's Proposition II, 
which asserted that the more insecure the government, the more restraints are put on 
freedoms. Although these two countries are geographically apart and the development of 
the media is quite different from each other, there are still some similarities between 
them. The most important similarity is that both countries, under pressure of terrorism, 
justified their actions in limiting freedoms by asserting the imperative need to make their 
nations secure by eradicating terrorism. 
For this study, it was concluded that those media controls including prior restraint, 
seditious libel, and broadcast licensing have been effective tools of governments 
throughout histories of both the United States and Turkey. Although the origin and nature 
of the documents protecting freedoms, particularly freedom of speech and press, are quite 
different in those two countries, the limitations on those freedoms have been fairly the 
same. Governments limited freedoms in both these countries by issuing laws, decrees, 
and with judicial decisions. This research revealed that, consistent with Siebert's first 
insight, as governments proceeded from monarchical regimes to more democratic ones, 
freedom of expression and press expanded. It also showed that, consistent with Siebert' s 
second insight, as the stresses on the stability of the government and society increased, 
enforcement of restraints on freedoms increased as well. The events of late 2001 alone 
were sufficient to prove this proposition. 
vi 
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INTRODUCTION, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
AND OUTLINE OF STUDY 
This study compares key aspects of freedom and control of the press in two 
nations: the United States and my native country of Turkey. Three major media control 
areas are examined: prior restraint, seditious libel, and broadcast licensing. These control 
areas are compared in the United States and in Turkey in both historical context and as 
matters stand in 2002. Because of my bi-lingual background, I am able to translate from 
Turkish into English. This study appears to be the first of its kind where someone has 
translated key documents on media law from Turkish into English to make information 
readily available for English-language scholars interested in comparative studies of media 
liberty and media constraint. 
As a student who came to the United States for graduate study, my fascination 
with mass media roles has grown. Freedom of the press is at the heart of modem 
democracy. As world press scholar Pnina Lahav has written, "The roles of press are seen 
as a vehicle for self-expression, as an informer of the public, as a participant in the 
formation of public opinion, and as a watchdog of the govemment." 1 And governments, 
when realizing what has been called in recent times the checking function of media, have 
attempted throughout history to place some controls on the media. 2 
1 Pnina Lahav, ed., Press u:zw in Modern Democracies (New York: Longman Inc., 1985), 339. 
2 See Vincent Blasi, "The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,'; American Bar Foundation 
Research Journal 3, (1977): 523-649; and Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive 
History of the Law of Libel (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1986). 
The evolution of the press and the emergence of the theories of freedom of the 
press in the United States had roots in England three hundred years before the creation of 
the United States of America. Printing in England grew slowly in social and political 
power. After printing was introduced into England in 1476, those in power gradually 
came to see that the press, unless controlled, could threaten the existing order. As more 
and more printing presses were put to use over the next half-century, government 
regulations on the press began to appear, first as a few printing trade regulations. Controls 
were expanded with promulgation of the first list of prohibited books in 1529. A system 
of licensing the press in and around London began in 1530, and additional controls were 
developed such as the granting of printing monopolies, and the establishment of the 
Stationers Company under Queen Mary in 1557. The Stationers Company was a guild 
organization. Printing was not a right, but a privilege; to have the privilege, one had to 
belong to the Stationers Company. The members of the Company were in effect licensed 
by that privilege, and often informed to authorities about illegal unlicensed printers, 
showing an unfortunate mindset of choosing membership in a monopoly over free 
expression.3 
During the Tudor period (1476-1603) the Court of the Star Chamber -so named 
because it met in a room with a star decoration on its door - was established. In 1586, the 
Court of the Star Chamber issued a decree which limited the number of printers, 
apprentices, and presses and authorized the Stationers Company powers to make search 
and seizure.4 
3 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 2. 
4 Siebert, 62. 
2 
The law of seditious libel was put into operation during the early Stuart period 
(1603-1640). Professor Teeter and his colleagues define sedition as criminalizing 
"expression attacking government's form, laws, institutions, or officers."5 The law of 
seditious libel was developed and applied by the common-law courts in Seventeenth 
Century England. Printers and publishers were being constantly searched by the officials 
whose job was to find all seditious printing and tum it over to the crown prosecutor. The 
penalties for seditious libel were severe, ranging from indefinite imprisonment and heavy 
fines to large bonds for good behavior.6 
The period of the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Protectorate (1640-
1660), brought significant changes for the control of the press by government. During 
those periods, the Printing Acts of 1649 and 1653, and Cromwell's orders of 1655 were 
put into effect. Cromwell's especially threatening orders, which included the suppression 
and prosecution of all unlicensed printers and suppression of all news-books except those 
licensed by the Protector or his Council, were successful in controlling the press.7 
During the later Stuart Period (1660-1714), controls on the press were enforced 
by the office of the Surveyor of the Press. On June 10, 1662, the "Act for preventing the 
frequent abuses in printing seditious, treasonable, and unlicensed books and pamphlets, 
and for regulating of printing and printing presses"8 was put into operation, and it became 
the basis for the regulation of the press from 1662 to 1694 with the exception of the years 
5 Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and 
Broadcast Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 28; Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of 
Suppression (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), chapter 1 
(1-17); and Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel, 3. 
6 Levy, 11, 16; and Siebert, 269,270. 
7 Siebert, 230-231. 
8 Ibid., 238. 
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between 1679 and 1685.9 Under the Act of 1662, only the master printers of the 
Stationers Company of London and the printers of Cambridge and Oxford universities 
were allowed to print.10 The Regulation of Printing Act was allowed to expire in 1694, 
primarily due to failure to operate an enforceable system of regulation under a two-party 
parliamentary government. The advisability of freedom of the press was not one of the 
reasons that led to expiration of that Act.1 1 From 1694 until the first Stamp Act of 17 12, 
the only controls were the law of seditious libel and the regulation by Parliament of the 
reporting of its activities, allowing only printers approved by Parliament to print carefully 
and self-protectively edited.12 
In the eighteenth century, taxes on publications replaced the licensing system as a 
form of control. Without paying taxes, and without affixing tax stamps on publications, 
publishing would not be allowed. V arious forms of taxes on publications, including a 
stamp tax, a paper tax, and an advertising tax, emerged. Subsidization of press and 
writers replaced the controls previously applied through the Stationers Company. 
Parliament also continued its insistence on punishing seditious libels, but the press 
received help in 1792 when Parliament passed Fox's Libel Bill, which gave juries the 
right to decide whether or not a publication was of a criminal nature. Fox's Libel Bill also 
provided for truth as a defense, doing away with the pernicious old doctrine of "the 
greater the truth, the greater the libel." 13 
9 Ibid., 238. 
10 Ibid., 239. 
11 Ibid., 260-61. 
12 Levy, 13-17, and Siebert, 4. 
13 Levy, 203. 
4 
In the early years of the nineteenth century, seditious libel prosecutions still were 
effective despite Fox's Libel Act, and taxes on publications increased dramatically. The 
freeing of the press of England from objectionable controls by the government did not 
take place until the 1860s. 14 
During these years, the extent of control mechanisms varied according to different 
social and political changes that had taken place. For example, the decline of government 
regulations on the press in the eighteenth century was attributed to the growth of private 
capitalism, the growth in the number of printing presses ("licensing fell of its own 
weight" with the rapid increase in printing facilities), and the increase in democratic 
process in government. 15 On the other hand, during those three hundred years from 1476 
to 1776, government increased its efforts to control the press whenever it perceived 
threats from societal tensions or from external sources. 
Fredrick Siebert, in his Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776, offered two 
propositions to characterize government control of the press: 16 
Proposition I. ''The extent of government control of the press depends on the 
nature of the relationship of the government to those subject to the government." 
This relationship, which in its specific nature poses greater or lesser degree of 
accountability of government to those who are governed, was variably categorized as 
Monarchy (absolute or enlightened), Democracy (more or less direct), and 
Totalitarianism, including communist or fascist totalitarianism. 17 
14 Siebert., 5. 
15 Ibid., vi. 
16 Ibid., 10. 
17 Ibid. 
5 
One idea underlying this proposition is that governments present themselves as 
being responsible for welfare and safety of their peoples. The more direct the 
accountability of governments to their masses, the greater the freedom of the press. So, as 
governments proceeded from monarchical regimes to more democratic ones, freedom of 
expression and of press expanded. In democratic societies, press took on an extra-legal 
function by providing information to the public and serving as a watchdog of government 
and public affairs. 18 But even in democratic societies, press freedom is not absolute, and 
can be restricted by governments. This situation led Siebert to his second proposition: 
Proposition Il. "The area of freedom contracts and the enforcement of restraints 
increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and of the structure of society 
increase." 
This proposition seems valid for all types of government regimes. For example, 
especially in war times with other nations, or if any internal attack on the structure of 
government is perceived, the restraints on the freedom of press are increased. The more 
secure the existing government, the fewer restraints are imposed on the press. 19 The 
events of late 2001 seem to bear this out once again. 
September ll t\ 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States brought home a level 
of threat that the country (unlike Turkey and Middle Eastern countries and Ireland) had 
not dealt with since the attack on Pearl Harbor in Honolulu on December 7, 1941. During 
those years of World War II, as at the other times of national distress, constraints on 




September 1 1 , the United States began its biggest military mobilization since the Gulf 
War in 199 1 ,  naming the campaign against terrorism "Operation Enduring Freedom. "20 
Within this context, the George W. Bush administration ordered the use of military 
tribunals to try non-U.S. citizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, and 
proposed some changes to federal immigration laws. According to proposed changes, the 
attorney general would be given "the authority to certify based on attorney general ' s  
belief that a non-citizen i s  a danger to the United States, or might be someone who might 
engage in terrorist activities . . .  Under the law, a person certified by the attorney general 
must be taken into custody, and can be incarcerated."21 This gives government a power to 
detain based only on mere suspicion. 
These actions of the government brought criticisms from some quarters. 
Arguments based on differing principles were made whether it is better to sacrifice 
individual freedoms at the expense of defeating terrorism or whether individual freedoms, 
which most Americans today accept as naturally as breathing,
22 cannot be sacrificed, no 
matter what. The critics of government's actions have claimed that the Bush 
administration exercised tremendous power in the name of security and violated civil 
liberties. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has objected to the use of military 
tribunals and has claimed that "the scope of the executive order allowing these tribunals 
is so broad as to undercut basic international and constitutional ideals of fairness and 
20 Jonathan Weisman, ''Pentagon renames campaign Enduring Freedom," USA Today, 25 September 2001 ,  
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/200 1/09/25/name.htm. 
21 "ACLU's Lucas Guttentag: Immigrants and civil liberties." 
http://www.cnn.com/200 I/COMMUNITY/ l 0/17 /guttentag/index.html (October 17, 2001 ). 
22 Teeter and Loving, 5. 
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justice."23 Arguing that the government's  report on individuals arrested and detained after 
September 1 1  was "incomplete and inaccurate," the National ACLU and a coalition of 16  
other civil rights and human rights groups filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request on December 5, 2001 .24 Those rights groups observed that "there are credible 
indications that the government itself has determined that most of the detainees are not 
connected to terrorism and that the Attorney General no longer has any national security 
rationale for withholding information about these individuals."25 Attorney General John 
Ashcroft strongly rejected those criticisms against the actions of the government and in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in December 2001 said, 
To those who pit Americans against immigrants, citizens against non-citizens, 
to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message 
is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists for they erode our national unity and 
diminish our resolve . . .  26 
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld noted the information-sensitive nature of 
this war, and appeared as "a disciplined holder of secrets"27 regarding the U.S . military 
actions in Afghanistan. He stated at a September 1 2  briefing, "We are . . .  seeing the 
definition of a new battlefield in the world, and it is a different kind of conflict."28 
23 "ACLU Submits Recommendation for Military Tribunals; Urges Adherence to Bush Demand for 'Full 
and Fair' Trials." http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n0l l602b.html (January 16, 2002). 
24 ''Rights Groups Seek to Question Government Officials on 'Incomplete and Inaccurate' Records of 
Detainees." http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n0l2302a.htm1 (January 23, 2002). 
25 Ibid. 
26 "Ashcroft: Critics of new terror measures undermine effort." 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/06/inv.ashcroft.hearing/ (December 7, 2001). 
27 Nina J. Easton, "Blacked Out," American Journalism Review (March 2002): 39. 
28 Ibid., 38 .  
8 
Governments under normal circumstances are not likely to interfere with press 
freedom. But if they are attacked or believe that they are seriously threatened, 
governments with their supporting public opinion (if any) are likely to exert control of 
various kinds. 29 Within this context, national security concerns were, and still are a 
reason given by governments to justify limiting freedoms. Alexander Hamilton 
understood this more than two hundred years ago, as he wrote in The Federalist Number 
8 in 1787: 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. 
Even the ardent love of liberty will after a time, give way to its dictates. 
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual 
effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations 
the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which 
have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they 
at length become wiIJing to run the risk of being less free. 30 
Siebert' s propositions seem sound and are applicable to a large extent of 
situations in nations' histories. However, before taking them for granted, it is useful to 
test their applicability by evaluating the relationship between the government and the 
press in different periods of history in the United States, and in my native land, Turkey. 
Testing Siebert's generalizations in changing periods helps to frame my comparative 
study of media controls in Turkey and the United States. 
29 Donald L. Shaw and Stephen W. Brauer, "Press Freedom and War Constraints : Case Testing Sieberfs 
Proposition II," Journalism Quarterly 46 (2) (Summer 1969): 243-44. 
30 Edward Mead Earle, ed., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States Being A 
Collection of Essays Written in Support of the Constitution Agreed upon September 17, 1787, by the 
Federal Convention (New York: The Modem Library, n.d.) 
9 
Turkey, my native land, is a country between southeastern Europe and 
southwestern Asia with a population of more than 67,000,000 in early 2002. Ankara is 
the capital city with a population over four million. The biggest city of the country, 
Istanbul, has a population more than twelve million, and with this population, it exceeds 
more than 128 countries' populations in the world. 
Turkey has a history showing both similarities to and differences from the 
historical foundation of the United States. Built on the lands once ruled by the Ottoman 
Empire, Turkey was founded in 1923 as a new republic by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
During the periods of Ottoman Empire from 1288 to 1918, the lands of Empire covered 
most of today's  European and Middle Eastern countries. Within the borders of this 
Empire was a highly cosmopolitan population, including people from different 
nationalities, ethnicities, and races. 3 1  
The emergence of the press in the Ottoman Empire was the product of Jews at the 
end of the fifteenth century. This was followed by the foundation of the Armenian press 
in 1 567 and the Greek press in 1627. On 5 July 1727, the Turkish press was established 
and the printing of Turkish books 'in the high, God-guarded city of Constantinople' was 
permitted. 32 The control of the press came mostly under the form of prior restraint and the 
emperor was the only authority to make decisions about regulations on the press. 
31 For more information about the Ottoman Empire, see Douglas A. Howard, The History of Turkey 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2001); A.L. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923 
(London, NY: Longman Inc., 1998); W.S. Cooke, The Ottoman Empire and its Tributary States 
(Amsterdam: B .R. Gruner Publisher, 1968); and Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey 
(London, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
32 Lewis, 50-51 .  
10 
The first Turkish newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi [Calendar of Events] was published 
in 1831. Takvim-i Vekayi was a type of official newspaper, and its contents were limited 
to announcements of official appointments, verdicts of judicial trials, and descriptions of 
the Sultan's progress on state occasions. 33 Around the same time of the publication of this 
first Turkish newspaper, several brilliant thinkers began to emerge such as Ibrahim Sinasi 
( 1826-71), Ziya Pasa (1825-80), and Namik Kemal (1840-88), brave men who first 
discussed the idea of free speech and press in Turkey. Emperors (sultans) who feared free 
expression as destabilizing to their regimes tended to send such threatening persons to 
jail , to exile them, and sometimes even executed them,34and the punishments they 
suffered will be described at some length in the dissertation. 
The Republic of Turkey and the principles of press freedom in it had a different 
evolution from the ones in the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, by 
overthrowing the last emperor (sultan) of the Ottomans, founded the Turkish Republic on 
principles new to Turkey. He did not become the only ruler of the new country. I nstead, 
he guided the establishment of the National Assembly as "the only real representative of 
the people, and as the holder of both legislative and executive power" in Ankara in July 
1920. 35 On 29 October 1923, declaration of the Turkish Republic was symbolized with 
these words: "The form of government of the state of Turkey is a Republic . . .  the 
President of Turkey is elected by the Grand National Assembly in plenary session from 
33 Charles White, Three Years in Constantinople, 3 vols. (London, 1846), 218, quoted in Bernard Lewis : 
The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 95. 
34 See Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey; Ahmet Emin Yalman, The Development of Modem 
Turkey as measured by its press (New York: Co lumbia University Press, 19 14); and Alpay KabacaJi, 
Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to 
Present] (Istanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayinlari:29, 1990). 
35 Quoted in Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 256. 
1 1  
among its own members . . .  The President of Turkey is the head of the state . . .  and appoints 
the Prime Minister ... 36 
As the president of the new republic, Ataturk led to the emergence of modern 
Turkey by abolishing religious laws in which the Islamic faith was used mostly as a 
political instrument and by adopting a new legal system and laws whose roots were based 
on the ones in Western democracies. With a reform program launched, "Turkey 
abandoned much of its Ottoman and Islamic heritage"37 and inside the country, a secular 
and nationalistic environment was created under a new doctrine called "Kemalism" to 
honor Ataturk. With the way that Ataturk followed, republican principles came in effect, 
and as in the history of England, political changes gave leeway needed for the evolution 
of press freedom in Turkey. Unfortunately, after Ataturk's death in 1938, struggles 
between the left and right wings of the country resulted in military intervention several 
times in Turkey's history and during those times, basic rights and freedoms were 
seriously hurt. The restrictions brought on the media by government in those periods 
which although strict were not as severe as the ones under Ottomans. 
Transferred from earlier generations, ancient enemies of freedom have surfaced in 
the laws of the United States under the form of prior restraint and what Norman L. 
Rosenberg termed political libel (in various guises as seditious libel, criminal libel or 
civil libel).38 Other old enemies imported from England included licensing, taxation, the 
contempt power of courts and legislatures, and forcing communication to occur. In the 
36 Quoted in Lewis, 261 .  
37 "Freedom House Country Report on Turkey for 2000-2001 ." 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/countryratings/turkey.htm (2001 ). 
38 See Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel, 1 .  
12 
twentieth century, "forcing communication to occur" emerged in the form of the equal 
opportunity provision for political candidates (still effect in 2002) and the Fairness 
Doctrine, which required every broadcaster to devote a reasonable amount of time to the 
coverage of important public issues, and to provide this coverage in a fair and balanced 
manner. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) repealed the Fairness Doctrine 
in 1987. When the FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine, claiming that it was "inconsistent 
with public interest and First Amendment because of the growth of new and alternate 
media outlets, it left standing the Personal Attack and Political Editorial rules."39 These 
rules provided that "when a broadcast attacked the integrity or character of a person or 
group, or an editorial supports or opposes a political candidate, stations were required to 
promptly notify the person with the content of the attack, and offering air time to 
respond."40 In October 2000, a panel of the D.C. Circuit of Appeals ordered the FCC to 
repeal both the Personal Attack and Political Editorial rules. 41 
In Turkey, transferred from the Ottoman Empire, those same enemies of freedom 
--similar processes-- existed as prior restraint, licensing, seditious libel, the contempt 
power of courts, forcing communication to occur, and restrictions brought through a 
series of changes in constitutions and the penal codes. Contrary to the United States, 
taxation of the media has not been used in Turkey as a media control. 
A two-nation study on governmental controls of the media can provide a better 
understanding of the similar and different actions of governments in this arena. In the 
39 Teeter and Loving, 703. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C.Cir.2000), 28 Med.L.Rptr. 
2465. 
13 
context of comparison of those key media control areas between the two countries; 
excerpts from their constitutions, their laws, statutes, acts, and decrees regarding the prior 
restraint, seditious libel, and broadcast licensing have been analyzed along with important 
judicial decisions involving these areas, and similarities and differences have been 
discussed en route to the drawing of conclusions. 
2. Statement of Purpose 
As a citizen of the Republic of Turkey who has developed an interest in media 
law and regulation in the United States during my doctoral studies in Knoxville, 
Tennessee, from 1999 to 2002, I have wished to compare some major systems of media 
control in my native land to those in the United States. I was interested in governmental 
interaction with the freedom and control of mass media of communication . One useful 
book underlying my study was Fredrick S. Siebert' s Freedom of the Press in England, 
1476-1 776, which brilliantly discusses the ancient enemies of freedom--framework for 
repression--that were struggled against in England and in England' s  North American 
colonies from the late fifteenth century through the late eighteenth century. After the 
creation of the United States of America late in the eighteenth century, those same old 
enemies of freedom often could be found in what is often called "the land of free.
,
, I have 
done a portion of my graduate work at the University of Tennessee with Professor 
Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., who has used the framework of controls discussed in Siebert' s 
path-breaking book to organize his own thinking about media law and regulation in the 
United States.42 
42 See Teeter and Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and Broadcast 
Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001). 
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Using the framework suggested by Siebert, I have compared media law in the 
United States and Turkey under these topic areas : 
1 .  Prior restraint 
2. Seditious libel 
3. Licensing in its modem form of broadcast licensing. 
Although comparative studies may be valuable, this study has been undertaken 
with the knowledge that comparative studies across many years, many miles, and 
differing cultures run the risk of misleading as wel1 as informing. For instance, when 
freedom of expression is generally recognized as fundamental and universal human right 
in Western democracies, the same freedom is still in the evolution stage in most Eastern 
European countries because of long time Communist rule. 43 Although the Communist 
regimes fell in the 1 990s in most of those countries, the long time living under 
Communism was deeply engraved in the cultures and traditions of these countries and 
made it hard the adoption of Western rooted values. Therefore, if one wishes to compare 
the Western democracies with Eastern European governmental structures in terms of laws 
and theories of freedom of expression and press , it must be done with an awareness of the 
differences in those countries ' understanding of those freedoms. 
So while this study adopts a framework of controls over the press borrowed from 
a leading historian of the press and First Amendment lawyer, Fredrick S .  Siebert, it is 
recognized that the Anglo-American frame provided by Professor Siebert can not be an 
exact fit for Turkey. 
43 James Miller, .. Democratizing East-Central Europe: Is Western Journalism Universal? Ahistorical? A 
Human Right," paper presented at the 2002 ASJMC/ AEJMC/ AJE International Conference in London, 
England, 5-8 January 2002. 
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For example, seditious libel was long a major threat in English history and in the 
early national history of the United States, but there was no wording equivalent to 
"seditious libel" in Turkey, and there is no such wording there today. However, the 
function of seditious libel may be found in the history of Turkey as well as in England 
and America. In the Ottoman Empire, sultans (emperors) were believed to have sublime 
power (passed from God), and they were able to imprison people or put them to death for 
criticizing govemment.44 
In modem Turkey, Article No.28 of the Constitution says: 
Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal 
or external security of the state or the indivisible integrity of the State with its 
territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, riot or insurrection, or which 
refer to classified State secrets and anyone who prints or transmits such news or 
articles to others for the above purposes, shall be held responsible under the law 
relevant to these offences . Distribution may be suspended as a preventive measure 
by a decision of a judge, or in the event delay is deemed prejudicial ,  by the 
competent authority designated by law . . . 45 
Turkey also has Penal Code item no. 158 ,  making it a crime to insult the president, 
and no. 159, making it a crime to insult the authorities, which includes Parliament, the 
government, and military.46 The penalty for violating item no. 1 58 can result in 
imprisonment for a term ranging from one to three years, while the violation of item 
no. 159 can be punished from one to six years in prison. For example, in October 2001 ,  
44 See Howard, The History of Turkey; and Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey. 
45 1982 Turkish Constitution, Article 28. 
46 Turk Penal Code, Articles No. 158 and 159. 
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Burak Bekdi], a journalist for English-language Turkish Daily News was charged with 
ridiculing the judiciary of Turkey, which was a violation of item no. 159 of the Turkish 
Penal Code. He is now facing a maximum prison term of six years. 47 
3. Limitations 
My study is limited to the comparison of three key media control areas--prior 
restraint, seditious Jibe], and broadcast licensing--in the United States and Turkey. Other 
media controls such as contempt power of courts, taxation, and forcing communication to 
occur are not inc1uded in this study. 
4. Comparing Nations 
Dogan and Pelassy state the importance of comparative studies in finding 
similarities and isolating differences in discussions involving various subjects. The 
comparativist wants to acquire knowledge through reference extending the limits of one 
environment. When comparing nations, scholars look for reference frames which wi11 
provide common or comparable explanation of actions, situations, and outcomes. These 
commonalities, in tum, allow exploring meaning and understanding of the now en]arged 
environment. As a result, knowledge is extended.48 
Blumler, McLeod, and Rosengren make the same point, and Jist three significant 
contributions of comparative research to knowledge. The first occurs at the level of 
observation, "comparative inquiry cosmopo]itanizes, opening our eyes to communication 
patterns and problems unnoticeable in our own spatial and temporal milieux." The second 
is that "only comparative research can overcome space-and time-bound limitations on the 
47 "Turkish journalist pokes fun at judiciary, may go to jail." www.freedomforum.org. (October 3, 2001). 
48 Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics 
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990), 3-4. 
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generalizability of our theories, assumptions, and propositions." The third contribution is 
comparative studies ' ability to " . . .  explore and reveal the consequences of differences in 
how communication is organized at the macro societal level."49 In a way of proving the 
second contribution that Blumler et al. indicated, my comparative study has tried to 
overcome some space and time boundaries on the generalizability of Fredrick Siebert' s 
propositions that characterize government control over the press. 
Gurevitch and Blumler observed that comparative research also plays a more 
creative and innovative role - "opening up new venues, shifting the intellectual focus, 
forcing a redefinition of existing concepts and fashioning of new ones transportable 
across space and time, and a framing of new problems and questions."5° From this 
perspective, according to Gurevitch and Blumler, comparative research extends 
knowledge in two respects -"in level (from the microindividual toward the 
macrosocietal) and in scope ( extending the number of sites to which theoretical 
propositions might apply and in which they might be tested)."5 1  
Gurevitch and Blumler also argued that comparative studies help us to counteract 
"nai've universalism" and "unwitting parochialism."52 This is important in my study of 
key media controls in the United States and Turkey. Freedom of expression and press, 
Western-derived concepts, are considered as universal human rights by those Western 
democracies. This approach sometimes creates a danger of distortion that "lies in 
49 Jay G. Blumler, Jack M. McLeod, and Karl E. Rosengren, eds., "An Introduction to Comparative 
Communication Research," in Comparatively Speaking: Communication and Culture Across Time and 
Sface (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), 3-4. 5 M. Gurevitch and Jay G. Blumler, "Comparative Research: The Extending Frontier," in New Directions 
in Political Communication: A Resource Book, eds. D. L. Swanson and D. Nimmo (Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage, 1990), 305-325. 
51 Ibid.,3 19. 
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applying Western ideas indiscriminately in speaking of other political systems."53 But in 
non-Western societies, the emergence, evolution and understanding of those freedoms are 
different than the Western societies. The contribution of comparative studies arises at that 
point. They offer a real picture of the world and allow us to explore significant aspects of 
different cultures and cultural diversity. In relation to that, Gordon Smith asserted that the 
use and attraction of comparative studies lies " . .  .in the sensitivity the process gives in 
properly comprehending the history, culture and politics of individual countries."54 
The objective of this study is to find commonalities and differences between the 
two nations (Turkey and the United States) through the discussion of some key media 
control areas. Although these two countries are geographically apart and the development 
of the media is quite different from each other, there are still some similarities between 
them. The most important similarity for the purposes of this paper is the role of terrorism 
as a justification factor in limitation of freedoms by governments in both countries. 
Terrorism has been all too commonplace in Turkey since 1984 when the Kurdish 
Workers Party (the PKK) began its armed struggle against Turkey. In Turkey, a country 
with roughly one-fifth of the population of the United States, nearly 40,000 lives have 
been lost in terrorism incidents in less than 20 years. Consequently, the government of 
Turkey has found--as is happening to some degree in the United States--that defending 
against terrorism is a sufficient reason for curtailing liberties. In the United States, on the 
other hand, terrorism from an overseas enemy had not been a major concern until the 
52 Ibid. ,308-390. 
53 Roland Young, "Political and Legal Systems of Order," in Approaches to Comparative and International 
Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966) , 295. 
54 Gordon Smith, "Seeking to Understand European Politics," in Comparative European Politics: The Story 
of a Profession, ed. Hans Daalder (London, Washington : Pinter, 1997) , 160. 
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terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 1 1 , 200 1 .  As 
a result of the terrorist attacks of September 1 1 , the United States government has 
followed the same path as the Turkish government and attempted to bring some 
restrictions on freedoms that Americans long took for granted. 
These recent acts of terrorism in the United States provided a new backdrop for 
investigation of some key media controls in both Turkey and the United States. Now, we 
are capable of comparing one nation with a history of terrorism to a nation that has 
suffered recently from the acts of terrorism.55 
5. Outline of the Study 
Chapter one of this study includes the introduction, statement of purpose, 
limitations, and the logic underlying the comparison of the two nations. In this context, a 
brief summary of the nature and evolution of theory of freedom of press and restrictions 
over this freedom in the United States and Turkey are given. Then, Fredrick Siebert' s 
propositions regarding the nature and extent of government control over the press are 
explained and their applicability to this study is discussed along with the statement of 
purpose and limitations of this study. Chapter one also includes an explanation of the 
contribution of comparative studies. 
Chapter two reviews the literature that discussed those key media control areas: 
prior restraint, seditious libel and broadcast licensing. Then, the literature examining the 
condition of press freedom and restrictions on this freedom in several countries of the 
55 Dr. Kenneth Killebrew used this logic in the comparison of Great Britain and the United States in his 
unpublished doctoral dissertation "Critical Events and Agenda Building in the U.S. and Great Britain: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Communication Effects of Terrorist Acts on Elite Newspaper Coverage and 
Policy Statements," University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1998, p. 16. 
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Western democracies, Continental Europe, non-Western democracies, South America, 
and Eastern Europe, Middle East, are reviewed. The documents securing freedoms in 
those countries also are briefly surveyed. 
Chapter three outlines the methodology of this dissertation in addition to research 
questions. 
Chapter four discusses prior restraint of the media in the United States. The 
chapter starts with origins of prior restraint in early England. The laws and organizations 
responsible from prior restraint of the media are examined with the discussion of 
important court cases about prior restraint of the media before the foundation of the 
United States. Then, prior restraint in the United States is investigated. The discussion of 
guarantees against prior restraint of the media, along with the discussion of some 
important court cases of the history about this area are made, in addition to the 
recognition of some exceptions to no prior restraint rule by the U.S . Supreme Court. 
Chapter five begins with the discussion of the emergence of prior restraint in the 
Ottoman Empire, laws and constitutions of Ottomans that made prior restraint possible 
over the media, and some important figures in the Ottomans that first talked about and 
defended the idea of freedom of expression and press. Then prior restraint of the media in 
modern Turkey is studied. Various laws and penal code of Turkey that made prior 
restraint of the media possible are examined. At the end, similarities and differences 
between the United States and Turkey in the area of prior restraint are analyzed. 
Chapter six discusses seditious libel in the United States. Definition of seditious 
libel is made followed by the discussion of its emergence and laws that made seditious 
libel a crime in early England. Some important seditious libel court cases in the history of 
2 1  
early England before the foundation of the United States also are examined. Then, the 
transition of seditious libel to the lands of the United States is investigated with the 
examination of laws that made seditious libel a crime in the United States, and important 
seditious libel court cases of the United States. The chapter also discusses criminal and 
civil libel with the important court cases in the United States occurred in those areas. 
Chapter seven begins with the origins of seditious libel in the Ottomans, laws and 
constitutions of the Ottomans that made seditious libel a crime, and some important 
seditious libel court cases of the country. Then, seditious libel in Turkey is examined with 
the discussion of various laws and penal code of Turkey that made seditious libel a crime, 
and important seditious libel court cases . At the end, similarities and differences between 
the United States and Turkey in the area of seditious libel are revealed and analyzed. 
Chapter eight includes the discussion of broadcast licensing in the United States. 
It is argued that prior restraint appears in broadcasting in the form of licensing. The 
development of broadcasting in the United States and the requirement for broadcasting 
stations to get a license from Federal Communications Commission to operate in the 
United States are the highlights of this  chapter. 
Chapter nine discusses the emergence of broadcast licensing in Turkey after the 
establishment of the first private television station in 1990, the establishment of the Radio 
Television Supreme Board and its sanctions on private broadcasting stations through the 
"Law No. 3984." At the end, similarities and differences between the United States and 
Turkey in the area of broadcast licensing are discussed. 
Chapter ten presents the answers of the research questions based on the 
discussions of previous chapters. 
22 





Press freedom and protections and restrictions on this freedom have been the 
subject of many scholarly books, professional and popular journal articles. Press freedom 
is considered vital to democracies, and any restriction on this freedom can be described 
as damaging. Over the years, governments have used various mechanisms in their 
attempts to control the media. Prior restraint has been one of those key media controls. 
Through much of history in recent centuries, all countries witnessed some degree 
of government control over expression. In early England, prior restraint existed as 
licensing by the government . In early America, printing presses were licensed. But in late 
colonial times, prior restraint declined. England's own licensing system had expired in 
1694. In addition to that, the publication of Commentaries in on the La,ws of England by 
William Blackstone in 1765 helped the development of late colonial and early national 
law on the North American shores. 1 According to Blackstone, the liberty of the press 
consisted in the absence of pre-publication censorship but he encouraged post-publication 
punishments. 2 
Siebert has categorized Blackstone's ideas as one of the three theories of the 
liberty of the press, and called it "the Blackstone-Mansfield theory."3 The other two 
theories, according to Siebert, are "Tudor-Stuart theory" and the theory that emerged 
1 Dwight L. Teeter Jr. ,  "The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial : Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 
Journalism Quarterly 69 (Spring 1992) : 20. 
2 Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel (Chapel Hill: 
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1986), 13- 14; and Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), 14. 
3 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: Universjty of IJlinois 
Press, 1965), 7 .  
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under the views of Thomas Erskine, Chancellor Camden, and in the United States, 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.4 The Tudor-Stuart theory of the function of the 
press proposed that "as long as the responsibi lity for protecting and advancing the public 
interest rested on the crown, it was a necessary corollary that the press should be 
regulated so as to ensure the success of the royal policies."5 The third theory of the 
function of the press that emerged under the views of Erskine, Camden, Jefferson and 
Madison claimed that freedom of the press was "one of the natural rights of man as 
derived from the law of God and incapable of infringement by any man-made power."6 
According to this view, the king of Parliament has a limited power. 
Those three theories of liberty of the press have one assumption in common . That 
is, freedom of press i s  not an absolute right. Therefore, all agreed that some forms of 
restraint are necessary and that the government has a legitimate function to apply these 
restrictions. 
In the early years of the United States, the government attempted to use pre­
publication censorship especially during troubled times - the Abolitionist period, the 
Civil War, the period of political and labor unrest during the late 1 890s and early 1900s.7 
During the Abolitionist period, prior restraint existed in the form of southern states' 
postmasters' refusal to deliver mails from Northern anti-slavery societies.8 During the 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 Ibid., 7. 
7 Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and 
Broadcast Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 39. 
8 See Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom - Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy 1830-1860 
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1963); and Harold Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from 
Hamilton to the Warren Court (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. ,  1967), chapter 
4 ( 168-21 8). 
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Civil War, pro-South ("Copperhead") publishers occasionally were shut down by 
northern generals since they wrote that the war was a failure and accused the leaders as 
being corrupt and demagogic.9 During the period from the late 1 890s through the first 
third of the twentieth century, postal and customs officials used prior restraint to control 
the publication and distribution of materials discussing "sex" in peacetime, and to stop 
"sedition" in wartime. 1 0  
One of the most important decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the twentieth century was Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 1 1  in 193 1 ,  which portrayed the 
repression of press freedom in prior restraint form. 1 2  In its decision, even though the five­
member majority in Near held that prior restraint was unconstitutional, it made some 
exceptions: for example when the nation was at war so that troop movements might be 
endangered, or if there was dangerous incitement to violence or governmental overthrow, 
or impending publication of obscenity. 1 3 
Almost 40 years after the Near case, government again attempted to use prior 
restraint. In New York Times Co. v. U.S. ,
14 
known as the "Pentagon Papers" case, the 
Times and, subsequently, other newspapers including the Washington Post, were 
temporarily restrained by a federal judge after they printed stories based on a leaked ''Top 
Secret" government report about United States involvement in the Vietnam War. The 
9 Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court, chapter 5 (221 -247). 
10 Vincent Blasi, "Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint," 66 Minnesota Law Review 1 1  (November 198 1): 
14- 15 �  and Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court, chapter 6 and 7 (269-
320). 
1 1  283 U.S. 697, 5 1  S .Ct. 625, 630 ( 193 1). 
12 Fred Friendly, Minnesota Rag (New York: Random House, 1981) . 
13 283 U.S. at 7 16, 51 S.Ct. at 63 1 .  
14 403 U.S. 7 13 ,  7 14, 9 1  S.Ct. 2140, 2 141  ( 197 1). 
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Pentagon Papers case made history as one of the most serious pre-publication censorship 
cases, and it became the subject of several books. 1 5  
Prior restraint also was the most common form of censorship over the media 
during the Ottoman Empire period before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. 1 6  
That mechanism was used mostly to silence the critics of emperors and their policies in 
the Ottoman Empire, and after the foundation of Turkey, prior restraint was legitimized 
with a series of laws enacted by the Parliament including a State of Emergency Laws and 
Laws for Maintenance of Order. 
In the new republic, pre-publication censorship was the most extensive in the 
years before 1985. Thousands of books were banned by the Council of Ministers, 
provisional governors, and by the police. For example, between the years of 1980 and 
1983, 195 books, 106 periodicals, 46 pamphlets, 22 newspapers, seven newsletters, 32 
communiques, three postcards, one poster, five calendars, two maps, six albums, eight 
poems, two music cassettes, two tourist guides, one article and thirteen other publications 
were banned. 1 7  
A second mechanism that governments use to control the press has been seditious 
libel Seditious libel existed as one of the major threats against freedom of speech and 
press in English history and in some periods of the United States history. Although there 
is no wording equivalent to "seditious libel" in Turkey, its function can be found in the 
15 See David Rudenstine, The day the presses stopped: A history of Pentagon Papers case (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996); and Lloyd Chiasson Jr., The press in times of crisis (Westport, 
Conn. :Greenwood Press, 1995). 
16 Hamza Cakir, "Osmanli lmparatorlugu Donemi 'nde Basin [The Press in the Period of Ottomans]," The 
Magazine of Istanbul University School of Communication VII (September 1998): 15;  and Murat Ozgen, 
"Basin Ozgurlugu Kurami [The Concept of Press Freedom]," The Magazine of Istanbul University School 
of Communication VII ( 1998): 53. 
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history of Turkey. For example, freedom of the press is governed by many laws enacted 
by the Parliament, in addition to the Constitution, in Turkey. One of these laws, the Press 
Law, including a number of amendments added in 1983, provided that a public 
prosecutor may, without securing a court order, stop distribution of a newspaper or 
magazine containing material that constitutes an "offense against the state"-- a vaguely 
defined offense that includes political expression and is the functional equivalent of 
seditious libel. After distribution has been stopped, a public prosecutor must apply to a 
state security court in 24 hours for an order approving his action. The public prosecutor 
can also seize publications already distributed. Additionally, where a state of emergency 
exists, the government has a right to ban published material. 1 8  
Prior restraint is at work in broadcasting in many countries through the use of 
licensing. 19 Licensing of broadcast stations in the "public interest, convenience or 
necessity" in the language of the United States' Communications Act of 1934 is a widely 
accepted form of control, but nevertheless is a form of prior restraint.20 Broadcasters 
have to have a license to operate a radio or television station in the United States. Within 
this perspective, broadcasters claim that they do not have the full protection of the First 
Amendment that the print media has because the federal government, through the Federal 
Communication Commission, puts restraints on them. It is true that licensed broadcast 
17 ''Yasaklilar [The Forbidden]," Cumhuriyet [Republic], December 4, 1987, p. 5. 
18  1980 Basin Yasasi [The 1980 Turkish Press Law), and Paying The Price: Freedom of Expression in 
Turkey, The Report of U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1989, p. 14. 
19  See Teeter and Loving, 650-659; Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Regulating the media: The licensing and 
supervision of broadcasting in six countries (New York: Guilford Press, 1996); and David J. Clark with 
Earl R. Hutchison, eds., Mass media and the law: Freedom and Restraint (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 
1970). 
20 Teeter, ''The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial: Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 21.  
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stations have the freedom to criticize government, but they are also aware that broadcast 
re-licensing by the FCC has been a routine matter.2 1  
Licensing in broadcasting was not in existence in Turkey before the emergence of 
private television and radio stations. Until the 1990s, radio and television were owned 
and run by the state. The Turkish Public Radio and Television (TRT) was the single 
station of the time, and televised as a voice of government. In 1990, the first private 
television station was established: "ST AR l ." The years following the establishment of 
that first private television, many new private televisions and radio stations took place in 
Turkish broadcasting. When government realized the power of this new sector, it began 
to apply restrictions on broadcasting. 22 With this aim, Radyo Televizyon Ust Kurulu (the 
RTUK) [Radio and Television Supreme Council] was established in 1994. The 
restrictions and punishments of the RTUK on broadcasting have been operated through 
the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Riidio Stations and Television 
Channels No. 3984. This law put the operation of licensing into effect, by stating that "all 
public and private radio and television enterprises shall get a broadcasting permit 
(license) to operate. The power to issue broadcasting licenses as well as the power to 
revoke them lies exclusively with the Radio and Television Supreme Council ."23 
21 Teeter and Loving, 64. 
22 See Gursel Ongoren, Legal Remedies in Libel Cases for Plaintiffs Who Are Attacked by Private Radio 
and Television Stations (Istanbul: Der Publishing Co., 1996); and Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz and Osman 
Dogru, Freedom of Press in Turkish Broadcasting (Istanbul: Press Council Publications, 1990). 
23 The Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio Stations and Television Channels in Turkey 
No.3984, Article 16, http://www.rtuk.org.tr/engl4.htm (2001). 
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Today many countries recognize freedom of the press as a viable value, but the 
commitments to this freedom vary greatly among them. Countries' commitments to press 
freedom can be underlined in various documents they designed. 
In her introduction to Press Law in Modem Democracies, Pnina Lahav discussed 
the commitments to press freedom in several countries by dividing them into the Anglo­
American, the Continental, and the non-Western groups. This same discussion could also 
be made, as Killebrew suggested in February 2002, by placing the nations in cultural, 
constitutional, or geographical context.24 But for the purposes of this study, Lahav' s  
categorization will be taken as a prime generalization. 
In the Anglo-American group, meaning the United States and the United 
Kingdom, there is a common-law tradition in which the judiciary plays a key role in 
developing the law through interpretation, and the consideration of the Blackstone's  
doctrine against prior restraint as the foundation on which their press laws are built. 25 
Although they are in the same group, there are some differences in press laws between 
England and the United States. As Supperstone stated, the United Kingdom has neither a 
constitution nor a special regime of law regulating the press. Under English law, press 
offenses are tried and convictions are made by ordinary courts. 26 On the other hand� a 
written constitution--including the First Amendment to the United States Constitution--is 
the foundation of press freedom in the United States. The United States Constitution 
offers guarantees for the protection of fundamental freedoms including the freedom of 
24 Kenneth C. Killebrew, Jr., e-mail correspondence, February 8, 2002. 
25 Pnina Lahav, ed., Press Law in Modem Democracies (New York: Longman Inc. , 1985), 2. 
26 Michael Supperstone, "Press Law in the United Kingdom," in Press Law in Modem Democracies, ed. 
P. Lahav, 9. 
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speech and press. From that aspect, as Professor Soifer has written, the United States 
whose constitution possess both the power to invalidate statutes and the wi ll to give the 
value of free speech a preferred status seems to be more permissive toward the press than 
the United Kingdom.27 Some simi larities and dissimilarities distinguishing the 
commitments to press freedom in the United States and the United Kingdom have been 
illustrated in the essays by Ian Loveland in Importing the First Amendment, 28 and by 
Robert Trager and Donna Dickerson in their prologue of Freedom of Expression in the 
2r' Century. 29 
The Continental group, which includes France, Germany, and Sweden, differs 
from the Anglo-American group in regard to their legal systems, which are part of the 
civil law tradition. Contrary to common law tradition, the judiciary is not central in 
developing the law in civil law approach. Instead, legal codes created by the legislature 
serve that purpose in civil law systems. In the Continental group, there are also a special 
statutes devoted to the press, which is different than the Anglo-American group.30 One of 
the countries of the Continental group, Germany rewrote its constitution in 1949 and 
included a guarantee for freedom of expression in the document. A related item in 
Germany's Constitution states that "there will be no censorship," but then it lists 
27 Aviam Soifer, "Freedom of the Press in the United States," in Press Law in Modem Democracies, ed. P. 
Lahav, 79. 
28 Ian Loveland, ed., Importing the First Amendment - Freedom of Expression in American, English, and 
European Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), 1 -23. 
29 Robert Trager and Donna L. Dickerson, Freedom of Expression in the 2P' Century (Thousand Oaks, 
London: Pine Forge Press, Inc. , 1999), 2. 
30 Lahav, 2. 
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exceptions to that statement: "Expression that is offensive, injurious, or indecent can be 
censored. "3 1  
Pnina Lahav discussed press laws of I srael and Japan, categorizing them under the 
non-Western group. I srael, Lahav stated, carries the mix of the British common law 
tradition and an authoritarian colonialist approach to the press which is in contradiction 
with the formal commitment to freedom of the press. Japan, after the World War II, 
adopted a democratic form of government and followed the traditions of the American 
model in its laws, including press law. 32 However, the existence of an unwritten code in 
Japanese culture concerning what can and what cannot be said in public places puts 
limitations on the operation of Japanese press despite that nation's laws. 33 
I n  some other non-Western countries, for example in I ndia, a constitution includes 
the guarantees of freedom of expression but also gives list of exceptions to that freedom: 
Expression that interferes with the "sovereignty and integrity of I ndia, the security of the 
state, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in 
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence."34 I n  I ran, besides a 
general limitation clause to freedom of expression in the constitution, there is also a list 
of special limitations to that freedom.35 I n  another non-Western nation, Singapore, the 
government has been able to extend its restrictions even to some of the world's largest 
media organizations including the International Herald Tribune, Time magazine, and 
31 German Basic Law, Article 5, quoted in Trager and Dickerson, Freedom of Expression in the 21st 
Century, 8. 
32 Loveland, 96. 
33 Lahav, 4. 
34 Trager and Dickerson, 94. 
35 Ibid. 
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many others through court cases, libel suits, restrictions on circulation, and through 
limitation on reporters.36 Although new media ventures have seemed to contribute the 
development of press freedom in Singapore, longstanding restrictions remain because the 
government still takes the position, as Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said in 2000, "the 
media should not set the national agenda. "37 
In South America, press freedom continued to be threatened as in those non­
Western nations. In Mexico, although the government does not own the press or censor it, 
and although freedom of expression is protected under the Mexican constitution, the 
Mexican press does not seem entirely independent yet. According to Eduardo Ruiz 
Healy, who is the one of the country's  radio commentators, "the relationship between the 
government and the press is a sick one. In many cities, the owners of the radio and the 
newspaper is a person who had a big position in the ruling party of the country." 38 The 
government, through an agency called PIPSA, supplies the newsprint for almost all 
except a few Mexican newspapers. Those newspapers also get most of their revenues 
from government advertising. The government, in the form of news stories, buy space, 
and not all newspapers advise their readers that what they read is paid propaganda. If 
newspaper publishes something that the government finds objectionable, the delivery of 
newspapers can be stopped.39 Recently, there are some positive signals towards the 
36 Charles P. Wallace, "Singapore's gript Columbia Journalism Review 34(4) (November 1995): 19. 
37 Assif Shameen, "Singapore: And then there were two: The government allows a bit of media rivalry," 
Asiaweek, June 9, 2000, p. l .  
38 Diana Solis, "Mexican Press still on the take," Nieman Reports 5 1(3) (Fall 1997): 76-77. 
39 See Raymundo Riva Palacio, ''The kept Mexican press," Nieman Reports 53-54 (4/1) (Winter 1999-
2000) : 208-2 10; and Trager and Dickerson, 85 . 
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development of free press with the efforts of President Vicente Fox. Fox is calling for 
open ("transparent") government for the public and the press in Mexico.40 
In Brazil, although press freedom has increased significantly since the military 
regime ended in 1985, there are still attempts of government to restrict the press. Those 
attempts include proposed press laws that would curtail press freedom by making media 
organizations convicted of libel, slander or defamation liable for a fine of 10%-20% of 
their annual gross revenues, depending on the severity of the offense.41 
Looking at the other parts of the world at the start of the twenty-first century, 
ancient enemies of freedom are at work there as well. For example, recovering from the 
long period of Communist rule, many Eastern European country presses are in search for 
their freedoms. Most of those Eastern European countries, after the fall of Communist 
regime, rewrote their constitutions with the intention to secure basic rights and freedoms. 
Although the document like First Amendment did not exist in those countries to protect 
freedoms, some international norms concerning free expression such as Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) became a guide for them. Since the membership 
or potential membership in the North America Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU) is very important for those Eastern European countries, they have 
realized that their legal and media systems should adhere to those international human 
rights norms including free expression.42 
40 Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., interview by author, Knoxville, Tennessee, 30 October 2001 .  
41 Michael Kepp, "Brazil :  From Violence to Press Laws," IPI Report (August-September 1996): 18 .  
42 See Clifford Jones and Lynda Lee Kaid, "Political Television, European Human Rights, and the First 
Amendment: A Comparative Study of Political Broadcasting Regulation in the EU and the USA," and 
Kenneth C. Killebrew, Jr., "When Actions Speak Louder than Words: Motivating Eastern Europe to 
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Section 1 of Article 19 of the ICCPR states, "everyone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference." Section 2 of the same act covers the scope of the right to 
free expression: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of al l 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, through any other media of his choice. 
Section 3 of Article 19 of the ICCPR specifies the limitations on the right to free 
expression and press under the certain circumstances including "for the respect for the 
rights and reputations of others," and "for the protection of national security or of public 
order ( ordre publique) or for the public health or morals." 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights also includes guarantees 
for the right to free expression and press. Section 1 of Article 10 of the ECHR states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless to frontiers. This 
article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
While section 1 of Article 10 defines protections for basic freedoms with a broad 
language, section 2 of the same article notes the limitations on the right of free expression 
with more specific statement: 
Embrace Constitutional Guarantees of Free Expression," papers presented at the 2002 
ASJMCI AEJMC/ AJE Conference, London, England, 5-8 January 2002. 
35 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it canies with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of crime and disorder, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in 
confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
Most of the Eastern European countries, whose constitutions were rewritten after 
the fall of communism, took into consideration international norms including Article 19  
of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR for the protection of freedom of expression 
and press in their constitutions .  But in theory, although those countries adopted those 
international norms for the protection of free expression and press, the application of 
these protections in practice generally failed and the ideals of democracy grew slowly in 
those eastern and central European countries. 43 For example, according to the 200 1 
Annual Report of the Reporters Sans Frontiers, although the significant progress can be 
observed in some of those countries, "the promise of democracy that blossomed ten years 
ago at the end of the Cold War has not borne fruit everywhere."44 Similarly, Freedom 
House' s "End of the 20th Century Freedom in the World Survey" announced Kosovo 
43 Killebrew, "When Actions Speak Louder than Words: Motivating Eastern Europe to Embrace 
Constitutional Guarantees of Free Expression," 3. 
44 
.. The 2001 Annual Report of the Reporters Sans Frontiers."http://www.rsf.fr/rsf/uk/rap2000/introduction 
(2001). 
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(Yugoslavia) as the worst-rated territory in the world in regard to freedoms.45 In other 
words, winds of democracy that swept over Central and Eastern Europe following the fall 
of communism did not completely blow away the controlled press because "the two 
major forces keeping the press in check are still in operation: news sources 
commandeered by governments and repression condoned by laws that deprive media of 
their freedom."46 Trager and Dickerson have written that the main reasons for the 
continuance of suppression on expression in the Eastern European countries are the fear 
of loss power or money for governments, and the absence of tolerance and understanding 
of ethnic, religious, and political differences in their history and culture.47 
The most reported reason for governments to restrict the freedoms has been to 
protect the safety of their citizens and the welfare of the state. In relation to that, during 
the times of ethnic violence and political repression, individual freedoms were set back to 
a great degree. Under that atmosphere, freedom of press has suffered significantly. 
Although only totalitarian states defended censorship, nowhere in Eastern Europe, the 
former Soviet Union, or most of Africa was the press free of threats to enforce 
responsibility as defined by government. When the Freedom House's "End of the 20th 
Century Freedom in the World Survey" found that "85 of the world's 1 92 countries are 
free, 60 countries are partly free, and 47 countries are not free" in terms of freedoms, it 
also reported that press-freedom violations continued even in the freest nations.48 
45 "Freedom in the World 2000-2001 Survey." 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/essayl f.htm (2001 ). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Trager and Dicke rson, 72-73. 
48 "Freedom in the World 2000-2001 Survey." 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/200 I/essay 1 f.htm (2001 ). 
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The Freedom House Committee, until 1999, listed Turkey as one of the most 
dangerous countries in the world for journalists critical of government policies and rated 
it as "not free." After 1999, Turkey was promoted to a category of "partly free," but was 
mentioned that "Kurds and political Islam are still sensitive subjects that frequently earn 
journalists criminal penalties.''49 
It is true that dozens of books and publications were banned, many journalists 
were arrested, sentenced or fined by government officials in previous years in Turkey­
mainly because they supported the appeal of the autonomy of Kurds in the eastern region 
of Turkey. Control was based on government's  opposition to Kurdish autonomy, and 
what is officially regarded as the "pro-Kurdish terrorist movement" in the lead of the 
Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK. In the last 18 years, as a result of this campaign of 
terror against Turkey, nearly 40,000 people lost their lives, "more than in the conflicts on 
the West Bank and in Northern Ireland combined."50 Among the ones who died were 
women, elderly, children and in many instances even infants. One of the main targets of 
the PKK was school teachers "since it was judged that PKK's subversive views could be 
most easily imposed on the uneducated and the ignorant."5 1  
With a population of 25  million, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the 
world today without their own state. After the First World War, they hoped to establish 
their own state from the leftovers of the Ottoman Empire, but those hopes vanished when 
49 "Freedom House: Press Freedom Survey 2000: Country Report on Turkey." 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/reports.html (2000). 
5
° Kevin McKieman, ''Turkey' s  War on the Kurds," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (March-April 
1999) : 2. 
51 "What is the PKK?" Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh0l/pkk3.htm (2001). 
38 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923 . With Ataturk' s 
principle of nationalism, all the minorities in Turkey, including the Kurds, were given a 
single identity, everybody became a "Turk," while the rights of those minorities were 
preserved and respected. In the first 25 years of the Republic, dozens of Kurdish 
uprisings broke out, but all were crushed. Finally in 1 978, a Marxist-led group called the 
PKK, the Kurdish acronym for the Kurdish Workers Party, was founded by Abdullah 
Ocalan (known as Apo), and in 1984, it began an armed struggle against Turkey 
characterized by terroristic threats and incidents.52 
The PKK was recognized as one of the 30 main terrorist organizations in the 
world by the U.S. Secretary of State in October 1997. In its attempts to fight against this 
terrorist organization, Turkey made a series of operations against PKK facilities in 
northern Iraq and restored law and order throughout the southeastern provinces. 53 
Following the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, by Turkish security 
forces in Nairobi , Kenya in February 1999, PKK' s actions against Turkey declined 
although occasional uprisings still occur from time to time in southeastern provinces. 
Terrorism continued into 2002 as one of the most serious violations of human 
rights, particularly the right to live, since terrorist acts in Turkey had claimed 40,000 
victims in less than 20 years. Most recently, the United States of America experienced the 
worst kind of terrorism when the September 1 1th, 2001,  terrorist attacks claimed the lives 
of thousands. After the attacks, the world saw the United States go from a nation paying 




Center bombing in 1993 was part of a larger pattern. Now, in line with Siebert's insight, 
stress on government and society--and a wartime footing if not actually a declared war--is 
beginning to limit freedoms Americans took for granted. Under pressure of terrorism, 
President Bush ordered the use of military tribunals "to try non-U.S. citizens suspected of 
terrorism, the detention of hundreds of immigrants in connection with the terrorism 
probe, the 'voluntary' questioning of thousands of men mostly from Middle Eastern 
countries, and eavesdropping between attorneys and their clients in terrorism cases."54 
Turkey lived with terrorism for many years, and witnessed the loss of thousands 
of lives. As a true determination, Turkey stated that the PKK has violated the right to 
live. As seen, when threatened with terrorism, every nation, including the one recognized 
as the freest nation in the world, United States, has claimed the right to take appropriate 
measures to protect themselves from violence and eradicate terrorism. Turkey's fight 
against PKK terrorism was of this nature and aimed to maintain security and protect its 
citizens.55 
During those efforts against terrorism, freedoms were limited, and this situation 
raised questions from human rights advocates. Governments both in the United States 
and Turkey tried to justify their actions by claiming that their primary duty is to protect 
and respect the rights of innocent civilians. The Turkish government could also be able to 
justify its actions under some international standards. As one of the oldest members of 
54 "Ashcroft: Critics of new terror measures undermine effort." 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/06/inv .ashcroft.hearing/ (December 7, 2001). 
55 "What is the PKK?" Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh0l/pkk3 .htm (2001) .  
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NATO in 1952, one of the 5 1  founding members of the United Nations, and now as a 
primary candidate for full membership to European Union, Turkey complies with the 
international norms concerning the fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, what 
the Turkish government did was not in violation of section 2 of Article 10, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which states the certain limitations on the right to free 
expression and press. From this aspect, the Turkish government has been able to curtail 
freedom of expression and press "in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, and for the prevention of crime and disorder" as was stated in section 2 
of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
When human rights advocates such as the Freedom House Committee criticized 
the Turkish government regarding its actions to limit freedoms, they sometimes 
overlooked some positive developments about the Turkish press and legal system over 
years, including the removal of the government monopoly on newsprint supply, creating 
the foundation for private broadcasting stations in years following 1990, legalization of 
Kurdish printing after the Gulf War, and permit to HADEP, a political party claiming to 
represent Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, to compete in the 1995 parliamentary 
elections with other ten political parties. 
Since being formally declared a candidate for European Union (EU) membership 
in 1999, Turkey increased its momentum to expand the area of freedoms. When 
announcing Turkey as a candidate for membership, the European Union identified the 
steps necessary for Turkey to become a full member, including the rule of law, freedom 
of expression, human rights, constitutional reform and respect for the rights and 
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protection of minorities.56 In accordance with the EU membership requirements, Turkey 
adopted a set of political and economic goals and tasks. Accordingly, 28 items in the 
1982 Constitution of Turkey, which include restraints on freedom of thought and 
expression, the freedom and security of the individual, the privacy of the individual life, 
the freedom of communication, the freedom of residence and movement, and freedom of 
association, have undergone profound changes in late 2001. The broadcasting in Kurdish 
language, which was illegal previously, also was allowed by the new Turkish 
Constitution of 2001 (see Appendix A for the complete set of constitutional amendments 
made in late 2001). 
As it can be seen, freedom of expression and of the press are guaranteed with the 
First Amendment in the United States, while international norms including the Article 19 
of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR played a significant role in the protection of 
those freedoms in European countries. But there is one significant difference between the 
First Amendment and the international norms that shed a light to European countries in 
their constitution-making process. The First Amendment does not state any limitations or 
restrictions on the right to free expression and press, while the Article 19 of the ICCPR 
and the Article 10 of the ECHR state certain limitations and restrictions on those 
freedoms with a specific language. In the United States, the same concerns that were 
stated in the section 2 of the Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR can be 
the reasons for a limitation on freedom of expression and press, but only with judicial 
decisions in the courts. From this perspective, then the question arises as to whether 
56 "Introduction," The 1999 Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey 's Progress towards 
Accession, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report IO 99/pdf/en/turkey en.pdf ( 1 3  October 1999), 
10. 
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Europe is more ready to accept governmental justifications for restricting these 
fundamental rights and freedoms than is the United States. 
In the introduction of this study, it was noted that Fredrick Siebert' s propositions 
that characterize government control over the press would be used as framework. There 
were other authors who examined governmental interaction with the press by using 
Siebert' s proposition. Donald Shaw and Stephen Brauer tested one of Siebert' s 
propositions, which stated that "the area of freedom contracts and the enforcement of 
restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and of the structure 
of society increase" in their article "Press Freedom and War Constraints : Case Testing 
Siebert's Proposition Il." In the study, the authors analyzed the threats against an 
outspoken North Carolina editor, William W. Holden of the North Carolina Standard, 
during the Civil War period. At the end, they concluded that the analysis of the threats 
against a North Carolina editor proved "the proposition that official and unofficial 
pressures on press freedom increase in times of governmental stress."57 In other words, 
their study supported Siebert' s proposition II. 
John D. Stevens examined press freedom by focusing on another time period, 
World War I. He investigated the threats against Wisconsin papers during World War I 
period and found that the legal and extra-legal controls against the press were the 
strongest in that period. 58 
57 Donald L. Shaw and Stephen W. Brauer, "Press Freedom and War Constraints: Case Testing Siebert's 
Proposition II,'' Journalism Quarterly 46 (2) (Summer 1969): 243. 
58 John D. Stevens, "Press and Community Toleration: Wisconsin in World War I," Journalism Quarterly 
46 (2) (Summer 1969): 255-59. 
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The literature discussed above has made significant contributions to this study. As 
it can be seen, the authors of those studies examined different aspects of my topic, but 
none of them made a study comparing the governmental regulations on media in Turkey 
with those in the United States. The reason for the selection of the United States in this 
comparative study is that the United States constitution is considered one of the strongest 
documents promoting democracy and free speech. Because of the U.S. Constitution's 
strong ties to democracy, republicanism, and free speech, its merits are used as a 
comparative tool when examining the free speech practices in other nations.59 The reason 
for the selection of Turkey, beyond its being my native country, is to show the evolution 
of democracy and freedoms in accordance with the requirements that the European Union 
demanded from Turkey before it would be granted full membership status. Once it 
declares a country as a candidate for membership, the European Union prepares an 
Accession Partnership document, in which it identifies economic and institutional 
requirements for that country to comply. Then this particular country produces a national 
program for accession that mirrors the Accession Partnership, and progress is monitored 
by means of the annual "Regular Report from the European Commission on Progress 
towards Accession." Turkey now is making a significant progress in the areas identified 
by the Union to gain a membership. Turkey wants to comply with the requirements of the 
European Union both for the reasons of Commerce and a concern for freedom. 
Unlike the United States ( once the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 ), the 
Turkish constitution was not protective of free speech rights when it was first adopted. 
59 Kenneth C. Killebrew, Jr. ,  e-mail correspondence, February 8, 2002. 
44 
But some positive steps were taken in Turkey over the years, and recently, constitutional 
amendments were adopted toward the way of expansion freedoms and relaxation of 
restrictions. This study discusses those positive steps which were taken in regard to 
freedoms in Turkey. 
Additionally, the illustration of international terrorism proves a significant point. 
Both in Turkey and the United States, governments have limited freedoms as a result of 
incidents of terrorism, in line with Siebert' s proposition which claimed that the more 
insecure the government, the more restraints are put on freedoms. From this perspective, 
the comparison of some key media controls by governments in the United States and 
Turkey relates the terrori sm movements to governments' actions in limiting freedoms. 
Both the United States and Turkey, as countries that have suffered from terrorism, prove 
good examples in their illustration of how governments could justify themselves in 
limiting freedoms by showing the reason for protecting their nations and eradicating 
terrorism. 
This dissertation reports on some regulations of Turkish and American 
governments over the media, and examines the past and current situations of press 
freedoms in those countries. As a responsible academic, my aim is to provide a study to 
guide communicators, journalists, broadcasters, and media law scholars all around the 
world who want to study or practice in or/and about Turkey. 
One of the challenges for United States scholars in comparative media law is 
finding English translations of statutes and court decisions from other lands. As a citizen 
of Turkey who did doctoral studies in the United States, I did substantial reading about 
media law in the United States. When I wished to compare features of U.S . law with 
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those in Turkey, I found that substantial amount of materials are not available in English. 
So, while pursuing my comparative study, it fell to me to have to translate Turkish laws, 
decrees, and court decisions from Turkish into English. It is my hope that my translations 
of excerpts from those laws, decrees, and court decisions from Turkey over the last 150 
years will provide useful information for other students of international controls over-­
and efforts to gain freedom by--the press. Throughout this dissertation, material 




This study examines some key media controls based on Siebert's propositions 
regarding the explanation of governmental control of the press. In the past, some other 
authors examined Siebert' s propositions by focusing on specific time periods, for 
example the Civil War,1 and World War 1.2 These studies, as they noted, were limited in 
the scope of data because they examined the problem by selecting specific time range and 
specific aspect of the issue, while there are other periods and other conditions of pressure 
that will be tested.3 Since some of the key media controls, particularly--prior restraint 
and seditious libel--are centuries old, the discussion of their origins and evolution can 
only be made with a historical study. On the other hand, since governments construct 
their limitations on the media with a variety of legal documents including constitutions, 
laws, decrees, or with judicial decisions, it was also necessary to engage in legal research 
for the purposes of this paper. Then, my study about government regulations over media 
in Turkey and in the United States has been both a historical and a legal study. 
For the purposes of historical research, primary historical sources such as 
published official documents and published personal documents can be considered useful 
materials, so they have been used in this study. Primary sources are raw materials of 
history that carry close proximity to the events of interest, and therefore, they are more 
valuable in historical research. Secondary sources are not contemporaneous with the 
1 Donald L. Shaw and Stephen W. Brauer, ''Press Freedom and War Constraints: Case Testing Siebert's 
Proposition II,U Journalism Quarterly 46 (2) (Summer 1969): 243-54. 
2 John D. Stevens, "Press and Community Toleration: Wisconsin in World War I," Journalism Quarterly 
46 (2) (Summer 1969): 255-59. 
3 Shaw and Brauer, 254. 
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events of interest. In this study, secondary historical documents such as pamphlets and 
periodical literature, monographs, and biographies have been used to strengthen the 
understanding about the content and time of the events. 
As James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan have written, in historical research, one 
needs to understand personalities and circumstances related to a study. One also needs to 
understand historical movements, changes, and their causes pertaining to a study. The 
researchers must avoid present-mindedness, and try to understand the events as they were 
in the past. When evaluating sources, internal and external criticism must be used. 
Scholars can encounter exaggerated contemporaneous records, forged papers, or invented 
interviews at the various stages of the research. External criticism determines the 
authenticity of the record. In order to determine that, collation (comparison of various 
documents with an original source), identification, and textual verification must be done. 
Determination of the credibility of the author of the source and understanding the content 
fall under internal criticism. Questions like "how near was this person to the event in 
terms of time and space? how available was the evidence to this person?, and, how 
competent was this person to interpret the event?" can be helpful.
4 
Suggestions of Startt 
and Sloan have been taken into consideration in this study, and have been complied to 
them whenever it has been necessary. 
Legal research also has been conducted for the purposes of this  study. For this 
aim, primary legal materials such as constitutions, statutes, court cases, and judicial 
opinions involving government regulations over the media in both countries have been 
4 James D. Startt and Wm. David S1oan, Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1989), 42-45, 1 17. 
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examined. By using traditional legal research methods and descriptive techniques, the 
nature and extent of these primary legal materials have been evaluated. Secondary 
sources have also been used to provide better understanding about the issue discussed and 
for interpretive purposes. Legal dictionaries, legal encyclopedias, academic law reviews 
and other scholarly journals have been cited, whenever it has been necessary. At the end, 
differences and similarities between Turkey and the United States have been revealed 
under those areas including prior restraint, seditious libel , and broadcast licensing, and 
suggestions have been offered for future studies involving similar issues. 
In this comparative study, court cases, constitutions, and statutes involving the 
topics outlined above have been investigated for the United States by using "digests (to 
locate cases discussing similar points of law), annotations in annotated statutes and 
codes, Shepard's Citators, and legal periodical indexes."5 Computer-assisted legal 
research systems such as WESTLA W and LEXIS have been the other important finding 
tools. 
In Turkey, unfortunately, there are no sources such as Shepard's Citators or 
digests of the United States. Some major legal documents such as the Constitution of 
Turkey and Anti-Terror Law are available online at the government's  official website in 
English. Other legal documents such as the Press Law, a State of Emergency Laws, or 
Laws for Maintenance of Order are available in TurJdsh in secondary sources. Therefore, 
it was necessary to translate them into English. Other legal documents before the creation 
of the Republic of Turkey are available in Arabic. Since I cannot read Arabic, their 
5 J. Myron Jacobstein, Roy M. Mersky, and Donald J. Dunn, Fundamentals of Legal Research, 7th ed. 
(New York: Foundation Press, 1998). 
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Turkish translations have been taken from secondary sources and translated into English 
for this study. 
Research Questions: 
1 .  What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the United States and Turkey in 
the media control area of prior restraint? 
a. How did prior restraint of the media emerge in the United States and Turkey? 
b. Does prior restraint exist in both printing and broadcast media in both countries? 
2. What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the United States and Turkey in 
the media control area of seditious libel? 
a. What were the circumstances under which seditious libel crimes appeared in the 
history of both countries? 
b. Which legal sanctions did the governments of those two countries use to punish 
seditious libel? 
3. What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the United States and Turkey in 
the media control area of broadcast licensing? 
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a. How do governments in the United States and in Turkey license the broadcasting 
media? 
b. What was the reasoning behind broadcast regulation in the two countries? 
CHAPTER IV 
PRIOR RESTRAINT IN THE UNITED ST A TES 
Prior restraint, as a form of media control, can be defined generally as any form of 
restraint or censorship prior to publication. Scholars and free-press advocates 1 agree that 
prior restraint is the worst of an media controls. As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized in its decision of Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart,2 "if it can be said that a 
threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 
'freezes' it . . .  "3 
Sir William Blackstone defined freedom of the press as "to be free from previous 
restraints upon publications" in his 1765 Commentaries.4 Blackstone 's ideas had become 
a guide for future generations, and the primary meaning of freedom of the press has been 
understood as "freedom from previous restraints upon publications" throughout 
American legal history.5 The U.S. Supreme Court, in its historic decision of Near v. 
Minnesota,6 1ega1ized Blackstone' s ideas about prior restraint, by stating that previous 
restraint upon publication is "what the First Amendment most certainly was intended to 
protect against."7 Leading First Amendment historian Leonard W. Levy, however, 
reached another conclusion, arguing that the First Amendment was not intended to stop 
1 See, e.g., Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of 
Print and Broadcast Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 44;and John D. Zelesny, 
Communications Law, 2nd ed. (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), 4 1 .  
2 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 279 1, 2803 ( 1976), 1 Med.L.Rptr. 1064. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Teeter and Loving, 16. 
5 See Pnina Lahav, ed., Press Law in Modem Democracies (New York: Longman Inc., 1985), 2; and 
Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1960), 309. 
6 283 U.S.697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 ( 1931) .  
7 Zelesny, 41 .  
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prior restraint. He claimed, " . . . the First Amendment was hardly as libertarian as we have 
traditionally assumed . . . There is every reason to believe that the Bill of Rights was more 
the chance product of political expediency on all sides than of principled commitment to 
personal liberties."8 
The Court in Near also modified the Blackstone's ideas about prior restraint in 
two ways. First, while Blackstone stated "no prior restraint" in any circumstances, the 
Court in Near found that statement as too broad, and allowed prior restraint under certain 
limited circumstances such as war, incitement to violence or overthrow of government 
and obscenity.9 
Second, while Blackstone had approved the punishment of criticism of 
government, the Court in Near recognized the right of the press to discuss the character 
and conduct of public officers by stating, in Justice Hughes's words, that 
[T]he administration of government has become more complex, 
the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, 
crime has grown to most serious proportions, and danger of its protection 
by unfaithful officials and the impairment of the fundamental security of life 
and property by criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary 
need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities. 
The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors 
of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from 
previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for 
8 Levy, vii-viii. 
9 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 7 16, 51 S.Ct. at 63 1 .  
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such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional 
privilege. 1 0  
Prior restraint of the media emerged three hundred years before the founding of 
the United States. In early England, prior restraint existed as licensing by the government. 
When printing gained its social and political power fifty years after its introduction into 
England in 1476, printing was seen as a threat by the government, and a system of 
licensing the press began in 1530 in and around London. With the establishment of the 
Stationers Company under Queen Mary in 1557, more effective controls started, and all 
printing was prohibited with the exception of the members of the Company. During those 
years, printing was not a right, but it was a privilege which was gained by becoming a 
member of the Stationers Company. The main duty of the members of this Company was 
to inform authorities about illegal unlicensed printers. 1 1  
During the years of Queen Elizabeth (1 558- 1603), the Court of the Star Chamber 
was established. The 23 June 1586 decree of the Star Chamber was the most extensive 
regulation of the entire Tudor period, staying in effect until 1637. The Star Chamber 
Decree of 1 586 limited the number of presses, printers, and apprentices, and confirmed 
the Stationers Company's power for search and seizure. The decree also wrote that all 
books (with the exception of law books and the ones printed by the queen's printer) must 
be licensed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London. 12 
10 Ibid . at 719-720, 5 1  S.Ct . at 632-633. 
11 Fredrick S. Siebert , Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 68. 
12 Levy, 8; and Siebert , 6 1 ,  62. 
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When the Army under Oliver Cromwell took control of the country between the 
years 1 647 and 1649, a series of Printing Acts were put into effect. The Printing Act of 
1649 expired in 165 1 .  Following that, the Printing Act of 1653 and then the Cromwell ' s  
orders of 1 655 passed. Both Printing Acts of 1649 and 1653 limited printing to the city of 
London, prohibited all 'scandalous' and 'seditious' publications, and all books and 
pamphlets were required to be licensed. 13 The Printing Act of 1653 offered additional 
restrictions by giving authority to determine the number of printing houses, apprentices, 
and presses to the Council of State, and by requiring all the printers to get the permission 
of the Council of the State. 14 Cromwell ' s  orders of 1655 were especially threatening since 
they gave the following duties to the three commissioners for the regulation of printing: 15 
1 .  to secure names and location of master printers, their servants, workmen and 
apprentices, to see how many presses each operated, and to inquire "of what fame, 
quality, conversation, or condition of every such master printer is and how he, and his 
servants and workmen stand affected to the present Government," 
2 .  to suppress and prosecute all unlicensed printers, 
3 .  to prosecute all those printers who having entered into bonds may have broken the 
condition of the bond, 
4. to suppress all news-books except those licensed by the Protector or his Council ,  
5 .  to execute the acts suppressing street hawkers and mercury women, 
6. to send all offenders to Bridewell to undergo "corporal and pecuniary punishment," 
and to appoint deputies to assist in the enforcement. 
13 Siebert, 222, 223. 
14 Ibid., 228, 229. 
15 British Museum E. 1064.58 (28 August 1 655), quoted in Siebert, 230, 3 1 .  
54 
The most important regulation of the later Stuart period ( 1 660-17 14) was the 
Regulation of Printing Act. The Act was put into effect on 10 June 1662 in order to 
prevent "the frequent abuses in printing seditious, treasonable, and unlicensed books and 
pamphlets," and to regulate "printing and printing presses." 1 6  The Regulation of Printing 
Act became the major regulation of the press from 1662 to 1694 except the years 1679-
1685. 17 
Like the previous printing acts, the Regulation of Printing Act of 1662 offered 
special privileges to the stationers and printers if they cooperated in enforcing the state 
regulations. This Act also put the licensing system under authority of the Parliament. It 
prohibited the printing of all unlicensed and unauthorized books and pamphlets. 18  The 
Regulation of Printing Act expired in 1694 due to inability of a two-party parliamentary 
government to arrange "an enforceable system of regulation capable of achieving the 
results desired." 1 9  
In early England, as discussed above, the licensing power allowed government to 
put a prior restraint on publications by making it crime to publish without license. After 
the expiration of England' s licensing system in 1694, freedom of the press from licensing 
began to be recognized. The publication of Commentaries on the Laws of England by 
William Blackstone in 1765 helped the development of late colonial and early national 
law on the North American shores. 20 Blackstone wrote: 
16 Siebert, 238. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Levy , 8. 
19 Siebert, 260. 
20 Dwight L. Teeter Jr . ,  ''The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial: Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 
Journalism Quarterly 69 (Spring 1992): 20. 
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The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; 
but this consists in laying no previous restraint upon publication, and 
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every 
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he 
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the 
consequence of his own temerity. 2 1  
With these words, Blackstone advocated the removal of prior restraint from 
publications, while he left the door open for post-publication punishments. Blackstone's 
ideas shed light to future generations in interpretation of press freedom as being free from 
prior restraints. 
Colonial Americans broke their ties connecting them to Britain in 1776 with the 
Declaration of Independence. Those Americans were aware of a long history of struggle 
against arbitrary power, and this sense of history compelled them to set frameworks of 
government in writing after the War for Independence. Those frameworks were first set 
in emerging states after the Declaration of Independence, then in the Articles of 
Confederation, and finally in the Constitution of the United States.22 
Freedom of expression was still not an absolute right in the late eighteenth 
century, but nation's founders wanted to set up a principle expanding freedom of 
expression beyond that in England. As a result, a broad principle was stated in firmly 
21 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, IV, p. 15 1, 152, adapted by Robert Malcolm 
Kerr, Boston, 1952. 
22 Teeter and Loving, 14. 
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protective terms, and it was left to future generations for interpretation.23 On December 
15, 1791, state ratification of the Bill of Rights gave force to these words protecting free 
expression in the First Amendment:24 
Congress shall -make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
As David Anderson stated, before the adoption of the First Amendment, freedom 
of the press--not freedom of speech--was seen as a separate right, in most of the state 
constitutions except Pennsylvania 's constitution. Freedom of the press gradually had 
begun to be treated as a part of a larger net of related rights, and in the ratifying 
conventions, its relationship to freedom of speech was recognized.25 Despite this 
recognition, nearly all state constitutions agreed that those freedoms could be abused, but 
the definition of 'abuse' was not made and it was left to later generations to be defined.26 
Post-revolutionary leaders framed the First Amendment as "a cluster of distinct 
but related rights, complementary means by which thought, belief and expression are 
protected from governmental interference. "27 The men who created the First Amendment 
believed, "however dimly, naively, or incompletely, that freedom of the press was 
23 Ibid. ,  15. 
24 U.S. Constitution, Amendment I .  
25 David Anderson , ''The Origins of the Press Clause," 30 UCLA Law Review No.3 (February 1983): 484. 
26 Teeter and Loving, 15. 
27 Anderson, ''The Origins of the Press Clause," 484. 
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inextricably related to the new republican form of government and would have to be 
protected if their vision of government by the people was to succeed."28 
If specific attention is paid to the language of the First Amendment, it can be seen 
that it does not say freedom of press and speech shall not be abridged. All it says is that 
Congress (not the States) "shall make no law."29 Since the boundaries of the freedoms 
named in the First Amendment are open to interpretation, there were attempts throughout 
history to limit the freedoms defined in the First Amendment. And especially until the 
First World War, those attempts had resulted with success, since "the overwhelming 
weight of judicial opinion in all jurisdictions offered little recognition and even less 
protection of free speech interests."30 As David M. Rabban pointed out, during that 
period, "the Court repeatedly denied that cases implicated freedom of expression, and 
often made no reference to the First Amendment. "3 1  
In its early years, the United States used prior restraints on publications especially 
in times of national stress. During the Abolitionist period, the postmasters of the South 
refused to deliver mails from Northern anti-slavery societies.32 During the Civil War, 
northern generals would occasionally shut down pro-South publishers. During the period 
of political and labor unrest in the late 1890s and early 1900s, prior restraint was 
frequently used by imposing restrictions on publication and distribution of obscene 
materials. In the first third of the twentieth century, postal and customs officials used 
28 Ibid., 537. 
29 Teeter and Loving, 25-26. 
30 David M. Rabban, ''The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years," 90 Yale Law Review ( 198 1) :  557. 
31 Ibid., 542. 
32 Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom - Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy 1830-1860 (Michigan: 
Michigan State University Press, 1963); and Harold Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to 
the Warren Court (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967), chapter 4 ( 168-218). 
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prior restraint in peacetime to control materials discussing sex, whereas in wartime to 
prevent sedition. 33 
Near v. Minnesota34 is considered as the most important decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the media control area of prior restraint. After publishing nine issues of 
the Saturday Press, in which the Minnesota public officials charged with neglecting their 
duties to control bootlegging, gambling, and other crimes, defendants J.M. Near and 
Howard Guilford were charged under Minnesota law that permitted prior restraint of 
"nuisance" or ''undesirable" publications. This law permitted a single judge, without a 
jury, to enjoin a newspaper from publication forever if he considered it to be "obscene, 
lewd and lascivious . . .  or malicious, scandalous, and defamatory.35 When the local county 
attorney asked the court to issue an injunction to prohibit publication of future issues of 
the Saturday Press, Judge Baldwin did not hesitate to do it. Temporary injunction against 
the Saturday Press prohibited Near and Guilford "from producing, publishing, editing, 
circulating, having in their possession, selling and giving away" a publication known as 
the Saturday Press. 36 After the hearing, the temporary injunction against the Saturday 
Press that had lasted for 26 months was made permanent by a state judge. 
Near and Guilford appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, but the court upheld 
the injunction on the ground that the Public Nuisance Law was constitutional, and that 
the protections of free expression did not exist to protect publications that were 
33 Vincent Blasi, ''Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint ," 66 Minnesota Law Review 11  (November 1981 ): 
14- 15; and Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court, chapter 6 and 7 (269-
320). 
34 283 U.S. 697 (193 1). 
35 Fred Friendly, Minnesota Rag (New York: Random House, 198 1), 22. 
36 Ibid. ,  51. 
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scandalous and defamatory.37 As a final remedy, Near and Guilford went to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In its ruling in defendants' favor by the margins of five to four, the Court 
found the Minnesota law as prior restraint-"the essence of censorship,"38 and declared 
that law unconstitutional. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the majority: 39 
[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal 
Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity 
from previous restraints or censorship. 
Looking at one hundred and fifty years of American history, Chief Justice Hughes 
had found "almost an entire absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon 
publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers."40 
In its Near decision, the Court also recognized some exceptions to "no prior 
restraint" rule, saying that "prior restraint was allowable in dealing with matters of 
wartime security such as troopship movements, with obscenity, or with incitements to 
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly govemment."41 
Despite its limitations, Near provided a protected status for criticism of 
government, and the press received the First Amendment protection against actions by 
states. Near v. Minnesota also became the precedent for protecting the press against 
government's demands for suppression.42 
37 Teeter and Loving, 46-47. 
38 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 707, 7 1 3, and 5 1  S.Ct. at 627, 630. 
39 Ibid., at 697. 
40 Ibid., at 7 18. 
41 Ibid., at 7 16, 51 S. Ct. at 63 1 .  
42 Teeter and Loving, 48. 
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During the stressful years of World War I and I I  and the Cold War period in the 
late 1950s through the 1970s, national security was used as a legitimate reason for 
governments to restrict the actions of the media. For example, just before World War I 
started, postmaster Albert S. Burleson was given "the authority to determine what could 
and what could not be sent through the second-class mail. .. "43 These activities of the post 
office to control the press were affirmed by the Espionage Act of 1917.44 
The restrictions of the government during the World War I years were not limited 
to the postal regulations on the press. I n  April 1917, President Wilson led to the 
establishment of the Committee on Public Information - which became known as the 
"Creel Committee." The main duties of the committee were "to change antiwar attitudes 
to enthusiasm for an organized military operation and to intensify a general feeling of 
national solidarity."45 Among its activities, the committee mailed thousands of news 
releases to American newspapers, supported propaganda films, sponsored thousands of 
speakers who sought to raise the ire of Americans toward the Germans, monitored the 
foreign language press, and engaged in propaganda activities overseas. 46 
Soon after George Creel was appointed to head the committee, he issued 
regulations to the press requesting voluntary self-censorship. He divided news into three 
categories: "dangerous," or not to be published, news that contained material about 
military actions and threats against the president; "questionable" news that included 
43 Jean Folkerts and Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., Voices of a Nation -A  History of Mass Media in the United 
States, third ed. (Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon, 1998), 324. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 326. 
46 Ibid., 326, 327. 
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technical discoveries and rumors, to be published with caution and with the affirm of the 
Committee; and "routine" news that required no authorization.47 
Despite the criticisms made, the committee was successful to orchestrate "press 
coverage of the war and the effort to positively influence public opinion"48 in 1917 and 
1918. 
During World War I, there were a number of experimental wireless stations, 
although commercial radio broadcasting had not really begun before the end of the war. 
With the intent of controlling this new medium, the United States Navy took over the 
operations of all private wireless stations which were found useful and ordered other 
transmitters to shut down.49 In 1917, the number of coastal stations that the Navy took 
over from American Marconi Company was 53, and 28 of them were closed immediately 
by the Navy.50 In 1919, President Wilson gave the approval for the return of radio 
stations to their former owners effective March 1 ,  1920.5 1  
Government restrictions on the media continued in World War II through the 
Office of Censorship, which was established by the First War Powers Act in 1941,52 and 
the Office of War Information.53 "On January 1 5, 1942, the Office of Censorship 
published the Code of Wartime Practices for American Press. Although compliance with 
the Code was voluntary, it worked quite well, with few breaches of security."54 
47 Ibid., 328. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America, 2nd eel. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 1 30. 
50 Lawrence W. Lichty and Malachi C. Topping, American Broadcasting (New York: Hastings House, 
1975), 14. 
51 Ibid. ,  15. 
52 Steven Livingston, "Mass Media and the Military," in Margaret A. Blanchard, ed., History of the Mass 
Media in the United States (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1998), 378. 
53 Folkerts and Teeter, 4 1 1 .  
54 Livingston, 378 .  
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Throughout World War II, the Office of War Information sent advisories to print 
media and radio stations on sensitive matters and requested restraint in presentation of 
that information.55 
The restrictions of government exercised on radio broadcasting also were 
substantial in the World War II years. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 gave the 
President (President Franklin Roosevelt, in this case) the power to take control of radio in 
a national emergency. Benefiting from that rule, the government took over all short-wave 
stations in the United States and used them to send American propaganda to people 
overseas. The stations then became the basis for the "Voice of America." The 
government also forbade all "live-microphone" broadcasts to which the public might 
have access (such as popular man-on-the street interviews) because of concerns that a 
someone (enemy or friend) might get on the air and divulge information that would be 
useful to the enemy - also possible was that an enemy agent might get on the air and 
speak code words that would be intercepted by enemy agents.56 Furthermore, most 
powerful radio stations near the coasts (Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific) were protected by 
military guards during World War II because of fear that an enemy might take over the 
transmitters and send detrimental messages that could be received by enemy submarines 
in the coastal waters.57 
During the Korean conflict in the early 1950s, "General Douglas MacArthur 
initially resisted the use of censorship, relying instead on the sort of voluntary restraint 
55 Folkerts and Teeter, 411. 
56 Herbert H. Howard, interview by author, Knoxville, Tennessee, 2 April 2002. 
51 Ibid. 
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seen during World War II."58 But in a short time, it appeared that voluntary restraints 
were not working and the reporting from the battlefield was hurting the war effort. This 
situation led to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and media representatives' 
eventual decision that "the military would take responsibility for reviewing media reports 
from the battlefield. On December 23, [1950], the Eight Army headquarters in Korea 
required journalists to submit all dispatches, photographs, and radio broadcasts for 
clearance. "59 
During the Cold War period, when Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in 1952, 
President Kennedy requested about 10-12 powerful 50,000 watt radio stations in the 
South to turn over their facilities to the government for nighttime broadcasts beamed to 
Cuba. The idea was to beam in the American position on the crisis with Cuba. This 
relates to the Communications Act which gives the President the power to take over radio 
in a national emergency. This move was suggested to the President, by J. Leonard 
Reinsch, President of Cox Broadcasting, Atlanta, a leading broadcaster and advisor to 
Presidents.60 
As seen, in the face of developing lethal weapon technologies, the rationale for 
limiting freedoms holds that when national security is at stake, some exceptions must be 
allowed for governments in their attempt to apply censorship over the media. The 
boundaries of those exceptions, however, at times have seemed indefinite under that 
perspective. 
58 Livingston, 378. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Howard, interview by author. 
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New York Times Co. v. United States61 was one of the best examples symbolizing 
the government's attempt to restrict publications due to national security reasons. The 
case arose when Daniel Ellsberg, a consultant who had worked for the Pentagon, leaked a 
47-volume "Top Secret" history of Vietnam War to New York Times reporter Neil 
Sheenan. On June 13, 1971, the New York Times began to publish a story titled: "Vietnam 
Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. I nvolvement." Within 48 
hours after publication, Attorney General John Mitchell asked the Times to stop the 
publication of those documents, but the newspaper chose to ignore his plea. 62 
The Nixon Administration then, through the Department of Justice, asked a 
federal judge to suspend the publication of the stories involving U.S. decision making in 
the Vietnam War. Judge Gurfein issued a temporary injunction halting the Times' 
publication of the stories. When the Washington Post began to publish the same story, a 
temporary restraining order became effective against this newspaper as well. This was the 
first time in United States history that "genera] circulation newspapers had been 
restrained by court order from publishing material that the government claimed would 
endanger national security."63 
The U.S. Supreme Court, moving with unprecedented speed, heard the case 
within 14 days and lifted the temporary injunctions, ruling against the government. In an 
unsigned per curiam decision, the Court's six to three decision said that the government 
61 403 U.S. 7 1 3, 9 1  S.Ct. 2140 (197 1) . 
62 Teeter and Loving, 48-49. 
63 James Lofton, The Press as Guardian of the First Amendment (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1980) , 258. 
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"carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition"64 of prior restraints 
and concluded that the burden had not met by the government in this case. 
Justice William 0. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Hugo 
Black, and asserted Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Near: ' 'The fact that liberty of the 
press may be abused . . .  does not make any less necessary the immunity of the press."65 
Justice Douglas continued: "The stays in these cases that have been in effect for more 
than a week constitute a flouting of the principles of the First Amendment as interpreted 
. N M. * * * ,,66 m ear v. mnesota 
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. ,  although stating that " . . .  the First Amendment 
tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or 
conjecture," allowed the permissibility of prior restraints in an extremely narrow class of 
cases such as when the nation was at war or when troop movements might be 
endangered. 67 
Justice Harlan, reflecting the general opinion of his fellow dissenters, said: "I 
cannot believe that the doctrine prohibiting prior restraints reaches to the point of 
preventing courts from maintaining the status quo long enough to act responsibly in 
matters of such national importance as those involved here."68 
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the so-called Pentagon Papers case can 
be deemed a victory for the press. But although the Court declared prior restraint 
unconstitutional, "it did not establish the absolutism of the First Amendment against all 
64 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 14, 9 1  S.Ct. 2 141  (1971). 
65 Ibid., at 724, 91 S.Ct. at 2 146. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., at 725. 
68 Ibid., at 674. 
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prior restraints."69 Even one of the most liberal members of the Court, Justice Brennan, 
recognized the permissibility of prior restraint by government when the nation was at war 
or when troop movements might be endangered. From that aspect, it seemed that the U.S. 
Supreme Court legitimized the government's right to limit expression in wartime. 
National security became a primary reason again when military used its 
censorship mechanisms on the publication of U.S. actions in Grenada (1983), Panama 
(1989), and in the Persian Gulf War (1991). News access was denied to the media during 
the U.S. Marines' invasion of the Caribbean I sland of Grenada in 1983. Media 
organizations hired private boats to go to the island, but when they approached, they were 
ordered to turn back by military.70 Media complaints about the exclusion from Grenada 
incursion led to the designation of a "National Press Poor' which composed of sixteen 
pre-selected reporters who were ready to go a combat zone on a moment's notice in a 
time of a military emergency. The Panama pool did not work very well, the sixteen 
reporters did not land in Panama on time, and even a year after Noriega surrendered, 
basic facts about the U.S. attack still were unknown.7 1  
The debate over media access in wartime continued during the Persian Gulf War 
in 1991. Reporting of the Persian Gulf War was limited in accordance with the rules set 
by the Department of Defense. Only the members of selected media pools were allowed 
to report on combat. Pool members were required to share their products including 
videotapes. Before their dissemination, pool products were submitted for security review 
69 Friendly, Minnesota Rag, 177. 
70 Zelesny, 8 1 .  
71 Teeter, "The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial: Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 2 1 .  
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checks in case of the risk of containing any sensitive information about the military.72 
"This was the first official wartime censorship since the Korean War."73 Malcolm 
Browne of the New York Times described the situation: "Few corpses were seen - in part 
because for the first time since World War II, correspondents must submit to near-total 
military supervision of their work."74 Chicago Tribune columnist Clarence Page said that 
Carol Rosenberg of the Miami Herald and Susan Sachs of Newsday were not allowed to 
cover the First Marine Division in the Persian Gulf because they were thought to have 
asked "rude questions" of Marine officers.75 
The Department of Defense tried to justify itself in imposing such restrictions by 
stating that "the rules were necessary to protect reporters' physical safety, to prevent the 
release of information that might jeopardize soldiers, and to avoid having more than 
1,000 free-roaming reporters physically hamper operations."76 The media, on the other 
hand, claimed that those restrictions were used to limit the quality and quantity of the 
information reported to the American public. The U.S. Supreme Court did not have a 
chance to address the questions involving military restrictions over the media. But 
looking at their previous rulings on the similar issues, it may be sensed that the members 
of the Court are more inclined to favor such military restraints if those restrictions claim 
to protect life and national security interests. 
72 Zelesny, 82, and Livingston, 379. 
73 Livingston, 379. 
74 Malcolm Browne, "Conflicting Censorship Upsets Many Journalists," New York Times, 21 Jan. 1991, p. 
A8, quoted in Dwight L. Teeter Jr.: ''The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial: Necessary But Not 
Sufficient?" 21 .  
7 5  Clarence Page, "Gulf between military, media is so wide that truth has been put into choke hold," 
Milwaukee Sentinel, 22 Jan. 1991, p.8, quoted in Teeter: ''The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial: 
Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 22. 
76 Zelesny, 82. 
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Following the September 1 1  terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush administration 
imposed strict controls on the media and restricted the media's access to report combat 
zones. Some media members claimed that "the media's access to American military 
operations [in Afghanistan] is far more limited than in any recent conflict."77 On 
December 6, 2001 ,  "Marines locked reporters and photographers in a warehouse to 
prevent them from covering American troops killed and injured by bomb north of 
Kandahar."78 The Pentagon ordered American troops "to not allow photographers to 
transmit images of masked and chained prisoners in Afghanistan taken on January 10, 
2002,"79 and later the government discouraged news media outlets from airing videotapes 
of Osama bin Laden. The news media also were not permitted to travel with U.S. Special 
Forces during the fall campaign of military actions because Pentagon officials argued that 
"the covert, information-sensitive nature of this war made it impossible for reporters to 
accompany the Special Forces who did much of the early fighting. "80 As a result, the 
critical period involving "the buildup of American and alliance forces along the 
Afghanistan border following the September 1 1  attacks"81  and first wave of the United 
States attacks remained " a black hole, with little public knowledge or understanding of 
U.S. military actions in Afghanistan ."82 
Today, the use of the Internet to make information public at a moment's notice 
has turned the application of prior restraint unlikely and ineffective in some situations. 
77 Michael Gordon of the New York Times, quoted in Nina J. Easton: ''Blacked Out," American Journalism 
Review (March 2002): 38. Also see Leonard Downie Jr. of The Washington Post, quoted in Philip Taylor: 
"Pentagon unmuzzles media," The News Media & The Law (Winter 2002): 11. 
78 Philip Taylor, "Pentagon unmuzzles media," The News Media & The Law (Winter 2002): 13. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Nina J. Easton, "Blacked Out," American Journalism Review (March 2002): 39. 
81 Taylor, l 1 .  
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However, military action in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002 brought complaints 
from some quarters, as discussed above, about prior restraint by the military in over­
controlling correspondents. Although courts of the United States today discourage prior 
restraint of the government, the issue is still alive, and it can appear under so many 
different masks that we cannot say that efforts to prevent prior restraint will ever resu1t in 
whole success. 83 
82 Easton, 37. 
83 Teeter and Loving, 7 1 .  
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CHAPTER V 
PRIOR RESTRAINT IN TURKEY 
Printing came to the Ottoman Empire about the same time as in England. Ottoman 
people had no knowledge about printing until the end of the fifteenth century. Printing 
was first introduced to the Ottoman Empire by Jewish refugees from Spain. The first 
Jewish press was set up in Constantinople (Istanbul) around 1490, followed by the 
establishment of an Armenian press in 1567 and a Greek press in 1627. 1 
Although a government allowed religious minorities to establ ish their printing 
presses, it put a ban on printing in Turkish or Arabic. This ban remained in effect until 
the beginning of the eighteenth century when Ibrahim Muteferrika, the founder and 
director of the first Turkish press, convinced the emperor (sultan) of the usefulness of 
printing. On July 5,  1727, the establishment of a Turkish press and the printing was 
permitted by a government with the exception of "the printing of the Koran, of books of 
on Koranic exegesis, traditions, theology and holy law."2 From that aspect, it can be said 
that government control was put in place even before the establishment of the first 
Turkish press. 
The first non-religious book, the dictionary of Vankuli, was published in 1 729 by 
Ibrahim Muteferrika. The press was temporarily closed in 1742, but reopened in 1784 
when the development of printing in Turkey gained unstoppable momentum. 3 At the end 
of the eighteenth century, the impact of the French Revolution was largely felt in the land 
of the Ottomans, including on the press. The ideas behind the French Revolution were 
1 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 50. 
2 Ibid., 5 1 .  
3 Ibid. 
7 1  
new to Ottoman people, who wanted to see a model showing the power of the public . 
During that time, a large number of French publications, including newspapers, 
pamphlets, and bulletins were circulated in the Ottoman Empire.4 
The first Turkish newspaper, the Takvim-i Vekayi [Calendar of Events] , was 
established in 1 83 1 .  The central government limited the contents of this newspaper to "a 
reproduction of official appointments, extracts of judicial trials, and pompous 
descriptions of the Sultan's progress on state occasions. "5 The publication house of the 
newspaper, Takvimhane-i Amire [The Director of Calendar] , was required to get a 
license from a government to continue printing. 6 Similar to early England, printers of the 
Ottomans had to take a license from government to operate. In other words, prior restraint 
was at work in the Ottoman Empire as in England in the form of licensing by 
government. 
In 1 845, the "Police Regulation Act" was issued. Article 13  of this Act gave a 
privilege to the Police Organization to put pre-publication censorship on the press : "any 
printing material , if had a character to destroy general order and morals, can be censored 
and confiscated prior to their publication."7 
The Regulation of Publication Houses Acts of 1 854 and 1 856 were issued because 
of the increase in the number of private publication houses. These regulations again 
stated the requirement to get a license to open a publication house and to print, but added 
4 Ibid., 64. 
5 Charles White, quoted in Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 95. 
6 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Alpay Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye • de 
Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] (Istanbu]: Gazeteciler 
Cemiyeti Yayinlari 29, 1990), 15 .  
7 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1845 Tarihli Polis Nizami [The 1 845 
Po1ice Regulation Act], quoted in Kabacali, 15- 16. 
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one more thing: "every private house should give a financial deposit to the government 
proportional to their annual investment."8 This new requirement obviously stemmed from 
concerns of a government due to decreasing investment of state publication houses in the 
context of the increasing number of private presses. 
The 1 857 Regulation of Publication Houses Act stated the restrictions over press 
in a more orderly way and clearer language. Article 3 of the 1 857 Regulation said: "the 
permission to open publication house and to print will be given after the security check 
reviews of the Council of Education and Police Organization, and if they are decided not 
having a character to harm the state." Article 4-6 said: "minorities who live on Ottoman 
soil cannot be allowed to print books and newspapers if they do not have a license," and 
article 7 said, ''anybody who violates the stated requirements will be punished, and their 
publications will be confiscated."9 
In 1 858, Matbuat Mudurlugu [the Directory of Printing] was established by 
government and its members were employed in issuing licenses to newspapers for 
printing. 10 
In the years following the establishment of the first Turkish newspaper the 
Takvim-i Vekayi [Calendar of Events) , two other newspapers began publication, the semi­
official the Ceride-i Havadis [Journal of News] in 1 840, and non-official the Tercuman-i 
Ahval [Interpreter of Conditions] in 1 860. The Ceride-i Havadis was established by an 
Englishman William Churchill, and it played an important role in making the Turkish 
8 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1854 and 1856 Tarihli Basimevleri 
Iradeleri [The 1854 and 1856 Publication Houses Regulation Acts] , quoted in Kabacali, 17. 
9 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 19. 
10 Ibid., 22. 
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reader familiar with the news and features and in training a generation of journalists and 
printers. 1 1  Capanzade Agah Efendi, on the other hand, was the founder of the Tercuman-i 
Ahval, which was accepted by many as the starting point of real Turkish journalism in the 
Ottoman soil . Ibrahim Sinasi, who would be one of the first libertarians who discussed 
the concept of freedom of the press in later years, served as an editor and writer of the 
Tercuman-i Ahval. 1 2  From official records, it appears that these two newspapers began 
publication under licenses from the government. 13 
Ibrahim Sinasi was a poet and journalist. He was the son of an artillery officer, 
and in his student years, he stayed in France for four years as a part of a Turkish student 
mission to Paris. When he returned to Turkey, he entered government service as a 
member of the newly created Council of Education. During his career there, he was not 
viewed favorably because of his Westernized appearance (shaved skin without a beard, 
where a bearded face was the common style in Ottomans at that time) and thoughts. In 
the 1 860s, he began to develop an interest in literature and journalism. In 1 862, he edited 
the Tasvir-i Efka,r [Illustration of Opinion] , his own journal, which played an important 
role in the development of intellectuality in the country. In 1 865, hi s fear of official anger 
caused him to leave for Pari s again . He returned to Istanbul in 1 869, and died there in 
187 1 . 14 Although Sinasi ' s  political ideas were somewhat cautious and tentative, his 
1 1  Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 147 .  
12 Ibid. 




writings advocated freedom from oppression and tyranny, and described "life, property, 
and honor" as "the candles of our hearts." 1 5  
Ziya Pasa was the other libertarian who talked about the value of "freedom" in  the 
columns of the Tercuman-i Ahval [Interpreter of Conditions] . He was the son of a clerk in 
the customs house. Ziya Pasa began the civil service when he was seventeen, and in 
1 854, he was appointed third secretary to the Sultan. During that period, he began to 
study French, and in a short time, he became an expert translator of French books into 
Turkish. Like Sinasi , he was not liked in his governmental career, and eventually was 
removed from his official position. Ziya Pasa then joined, along with others , in the 
formation of Young Ottoman Movement. From 1 867 to 1872, he was first exiled to Paris, 
then London, and eventually to Geneva. During his years as an exile, he wrote some of 
his strongest criticisms about Sultan and his ministers. 16 As a result of his article that 
criticized education in the Ottomans, the Tercuman-i Ahval was closed by government 
for two weeks- by becoming as the first precedent in Turkey for government suppression 
of a newspaper. 17 One of Ziya Pasa's  most prominent ideas was constitutional 
government. He was allowed to return to Turkey in 1 876, and he died in Adana in 1 880. 
The concerns of the Ottoman government continued to grow as a result of a rapid 
increase in the number of presses. Within this environment, the first press law was 
adopted and put into effect on January 1 ,  1865. With this law, a Press Commission was 
15 Sinasi, Turk Klasikleri [Turkish Classics] (Istanbul : Varlik Yayinlari, 1952), 6, quoted in Bernard Lewis: 
The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 137. 
16 Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 138. 
17 Ibid., 148. 
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established, which would sit at the Sublime Porte* and support the police courts in the 
enforcement of regulations. 1 8  The first press law brought strict conditions for the conduct 
of the press, including "anybody who wishes to establish a newspaper should get a 
license, and in order to deserve a right to get a license, people with Ottoman nationality 
should be more than thirty-years old and should not have any committed crime in 
accordance with the Turkish Penal Code, people who have from different nationalities 
should not have press crimes, and the licenses given can be taken back any time." 19  This 
law remained in effect for 45 years, until 1909. 
In the 1 860s, the concept of freedom of expression and press began to be 
recognized through the efforts of four brave men: Ibrahim Sinasi, Ziya Pasa, Ali Suavi 
and Namik Kemal. They were the first ones to criticize the government in the newspapers 
of that time and to strive for the development of constitutional reform. Their first attempt 
was to establish a secret society in Poland, beginning with just six people, but the society 
gradually came to have 245 members.
20 This secret society named itself as "Yeni 
Osmanlilar [Young Ottomans]," and published its first newspaper called Hurriyet 
[Freedom] in 1 868. In 1 870, Namik Kemal, one of the founders of the Young Ottomans 
Society and the editor of Hurriyet, returned to Istanbul and took over the newspaper Ibret 
[Admonition] in 1 872. He created the play Vatan yahut Silistre [Fatherland or Silistria], 
with the theme of patriotism, a new concept to a Muslim. After a report of this play in 
* The office of Grand Vezir. Grand Vezir refers to "Prime Minister." 
1 8  Lewis, 149. 
19 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1 865 tarihli Basin Kanunu [The 1 865 
Press Law], quoted in Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye ) de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the 
Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 26-27. 
20 Lewis, 152- 153. 
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Ibret, Namik Kemal was exiled to Cyprus under close arrest, and his newspaper lbret was 
closed, "on the grounds of irresponsibility, sedition, and impudence." Kemal 's 
imprisonment continued until 1876.2 1  
Namik Kemal is deemed as the most gifted one among those literary innovators. 
He was born in Tekirdag in 1840, as a son of an aristocratic family. During his education, 
he learned French, Persian and Arabic. He assumed a position in the Translation Office of 
the Customs at the age of seventeen, then was appointed to the Sublime Porte. I n  the 
1860s, he began to be influenced by Sinasi, and when Sinasi left for France in 1865, he 
took over Sinasi's  journal, the Tasvir-i Efka,r. The second Polish revolution in 1863-4 and 
the Civil War in the United States helped to improve his ski11s as a political journalist and 
essayist. His essays on Ottoman affairs caused trouble with government authorities, and 
eventually resulted with his leaving for Europe in 1867, along with Ziya Pasa and other 
Young Ottomans. During his three years as an exile in London, Paris, and Vienna, he 
published opposition journals in which he advocated two characteristic ideas of the 
French Revolution: freedom and fatherland.22 He was the first to correlate human rights 
and parliamentary government in the Ottoman Empire, the first to achieve a clear vision 
of freedom and self-governance. He advocated political rights of the citizen, which 
government should respect and safeguard. 23 I n  1871, he returned to Turkey and resumed 
his journalistic activities. I n  1873, after a crisis as a result of his patriotic play Vatan 
yahut Silistre, he was exiled to Cyprus, where he stayed for three years. I n  1876, he was 
21 Ibid., 158, 159. 
22 Ibid., 141. 
23 Ibid., 143. 
77 
allowed to tum back to Turkey after the Sultan Abdulaziz was deposed. He died in Chios 
in 1 888.24 
On 10  May 1876, a famous "censor regulation" was put into effect. With this 
regulation, pre-publication censorship of newspapers by authorized government agents 
was authorized. Following passage of the 1876 censor regulation, protests of newspapers 
started. For example, the newspaper Sabah [Morning] was published by leaving its 
censored parts blank to protest this regulation . This type of protest became precedent for 
the newspapers that wanted to show readers the existence of government suppression .  25 
On 3 1  August 1876, Abdulhamid II became a sultan of the Ottoman State, and the 
bitterest censorship period began. At first, he seemed supportive of human rights when he 
declared the first constitution of Ottomans, Kanun-i Esasi , on 23 December 1 876. This 
first Ottoman constitution was similar to the Belgian constitution of 1 83 1  in regard to its 
promulgation by the sovereign power. The Sultan delegated his executive power when he 
appointed Mithad Pasa as the Grand Vezirate. 26 On March 19, 1 877, the first Ottoman 
parliament met. But it did not take long for Sultan Abdulhamid to reveal his real 
personality. He first dismissed Mithad from the Grand Vezirate and ordered him to leave 
the country. Sultan Abdulhamid tried to justify thi s  action by taking power from an 
article 1 1 3 of the new constitution, "which authorized the Sultan to expel from the 
territory of the Empire those who, as a result of trustworthy information gathered by the 
police administration, are recognized as dangerous to the security of the state."27 Then by 
24 Ibid. ,  141 .  
25 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 46. 
26 Lewis, 164. 
27 Ibid., 167 .  
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using the Ottoman-Russian war of 1 877 as an excuse, he closed the first Ottoman 
parliament in 1 878, basing that action on a privilege that was provided him by the 
constitution. The Parliament did not meet again for thirty years, and the famous Sultan 
Abdulhamid' s dictatorship started. 28 
During that period, the censorship was extended by government to almost all 
printed material from newspapers and books to price tags, bus tickets, and 
advertisements. Using the word "nose" in written materials was also forbidden for the 
reason that can remind readers of the Sultan Abdulhamid's big nose, as the forbiddance 
of the word "star," which could be a reference to Sultan ' s  property, "Star Palace."29 
The period of Sultan Abdulhamid II witnessed the most brutal challenges against 
any libertarian ideas. In such an environment, some of the Young Ottomans set aside 
their ideals, while the others faced deportation, imprisonment, and death. 30 Deportation 
was the lightest punishment for those brave enough to publish censorable material . 
Namik Kemal , who was one of the leader of libertarians, first was jailed in Istanbul for 
six months, then deported to Chios for two years, and finally given a minor government 
position in Aegean Islands. He stayed there until his death on December 2, 1 888. A night 
before he died, he received a government order forbidding him "to print or continue the 
history of the Ottomans on which he was then working. "3 1  
28 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 48. 
29 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Suat Gezgin, ''Turk Basinindaki Polemiklere Tarihsel 
Acidan Genet bir Yaklasim [The Historical Research of the Polemics in the Turkish Press]," The Magazine 
<;[.The University of Istanbul School of Communication VIII ( 1998): 5. 
Lewis, 173. 
31 Ibid. , 172. 
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Another leader of Young Ottomans, Ali Suavi, attempted to organize protest 
aiming at overthrowing Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878, but was caught and killed. The 
other protesters were either sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. 32 With this object 
lesson, other likely protests against the Sultan were silenced, and Sultan Abdulhamid 
continued to be the sole ruler, unrestricted by any legal or social checks. 
Ali Suavi, one of the founders of Young Ottomans Movement, had been the first 
to try to overthrow Sultan Abdulhamid. He was exiled to Europe, along with other Young 
Ottomans, in the 1860s. When he was an exile in London, he began to publish the 
newspaper Muhbir [Informer] on 31 August 1867. He was described as a "turbanned 
revolutionary and "man of the people ."33 He advocated making religious reform the 
starting point for a revived Islamic state and law, but Ziya Pasa and Namik Kemal did not 
support his viewpoints. After Muhbir had been closed in London, Suavi moved to Paris 
and began to publish a new journal Ulum [Science]. 
In 187 1, N amik Kemal and other Young Ottomans were allowed to return to 
Turkey but because of the ideological differences between them and Ali Suavi, Ali Suavi 
chose to stay in France. During that period, "he began to express, for the first time, the 
idea of a Turkish [loyalty] as distinct from an Islamic or Ottoman loyalty."34 His 
publication involving this thought reached to Turkey and received some attention from 
the Ottoman readers.35 He returned to Turkey eventually after Sultan Abdulaziz was 
deposed. He soon formed a political committee in Istanbul, the so-called Uskudar (a 
32 Ibid., 176. 
33 Ibid., 175. 
34 Ibid., 155. 
35 Ibid., 154-55. 
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region in Istanbul) Committee, which held its meetings in his house. He was killed during 
the protest aiming at overthrowing Sultan Abdulhamid in 1 878.36 
The new Printing Houses Regulation Act was put into effect in 1 888. This Act 
required all printing material to be licensed prior to publication . In 1 895, the Act of 1 888 
was revoked, and the new one was declared. The 1 895 Printing Houses Regulation Act 
brought stricter regulations by making the requirement of taking a license for every 
publication that entered to the Ottoman Empire from other countries. The government 
agency called "Encumen-i Teftis ve Muayene [The Surveillance Counci l]" was charged 
to review the publications prior to their approval for license.37 The publications that were 
seized by the members of the government agency were burned and destroyed in an iron 
fence enclosure in the back yard of that agency.38 
The severity of censorship increased throughout the years under Sultan 
Abdulhamid's reign, and as a result, most Turkish newspapers and books were published 
by the Young Turk exiles in England, Egypt, Switzerland and other countries because the 
fear of Sultan' s censorship made it impossible to publish on Ottoman soil. 
The Young Turk Revolution was mainly "a patriotic movement of Muslim Turks, 
mostly soldiers, whose prime objective was to remove a fumbling and incompetent ruler 
and replace him"39 by an able government which would function better so that it could 
protect the Empire's interests. From their origins, the Young Turks were divided into two 
36 Ibid., 175-76. 
37 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1888 and 1 895 Matbaalar 
Nizamnameleri [The 1888 and 1895 Printing Houses Regulation Acts] , quoted in Alpay Kabacali: 
Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to 
Present], 54-56. 
38 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Cevdet Kudret, Abdulhamid Devrinde Sansur[Censorship 
During the Period of Sultan Abdulhamid] (Istanbul, 1972), 21 -24. 
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groups. The first one was the liberals ,  who advocated decentralization and autonomous 
rights of religious and national minorities. The second group was the nationalists, who 
defended a central authority and supported Turkish domination in the Ottoman land. The 
Committee of Union and Progress was the instrument of the nationalists. 
Despite the repression of the government, the Young Turk movement continued 
to expand, and in 1906, it led to "the establishment of revolutionary cells among service 
officers in field formations."40 One of these organizations was the "Fatherland and 
Freedom Society." Mustafa Kemal, the future founder of the Republic of Turkey, was 
one of the founders of the Society. The primary aim of these Young Turk officers was to 
overthrow the Sultan and his government in order to achieve the ideals such as freedom, 
the nation, and the constitution. Threatened by these recent developments, the Sultan 
challenged the Young Turks, but this time, he was unable to succeed.4 1  
Young Turks reached their goal when the Sultan Abdulhamid II, in evident 
desperation, declared that the constitution was once again in force on July 23 , 1908. 
Following that announcement, celebrations were held in the streets for days and nights to 
welcome freedom. In the first six weeks following the declaration of the second 
constitution, the number of newspapers and magazines skyrocketed by reaching the total 
of 200. Within that environment, the Parliament met again on February 6, 1909. Article 
12 of the new constitution provided a statement that forbade prior restraint: "no written 
materials can be censored prior to their publication." In addition to that, the actions of 
39 Lewis, 212. 
40 Ibid., 205. 
41 Ibid., 205-207. 
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government for subsequent punishments of publications declined dramatically. It can be 
said that there was almost no censorship at all during that period.42 
On 12 April 1 909, "the Committee of Union and Progress published a statement 
in the press reiterating that it was no longer a secret association, but had become an 
ordinary political party. The same night, an armed reactionary mutiny broke out.43 The 
mutineers wanted the Seriat (canonical law) back, they did not want to see college­
trained officers in the government. At the end, they were silenced by the army forces, 
which came from Macedonia. As a result of this "reactionary mutiny,"44 a court martial 
was set to punish the protesters. A number of people who attended or provoked the 
mutiny were sentenced to death, and they were executed with public hanging.45 Sultan 
Abdulhamid was deposed, and Mehmet Resad became the new sultan. 
Following the army rebellion in April 1909, a new press law was issued on 16 
July 1909. The new law contained 37 articles, and described press crimes and specified 
punishments. The 1909 Press Law did not allow censorship, but if any newspaper 
published material that put the state' s security in danger and provoked the public, the 
government could close this newspaper until a court trial about could be held. 46 In other 
words, there was no censorship, but prior restraint, as in the famous American case of 
Near v. Minnesota (193 1  ). 
42 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 83. 
43 Lewis, 215.  
44 The mutiny is called "3 1 March Incident., in Turkish history books, since the old-style Greek calendar 
was in use in that period. 
45 Sir Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople (London: 19 16), 302-3, quoted in Bernard Lewis: The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey, 219. 
46 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 84-85 . 
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Nationalism, under the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
diffused rapidly throughout the country. Mehmet Resad was aware of the power of the 
Committee of Union. By taking advantage of the new sultan' s vulnerability, the 
Committee "made a clean sweep of the palace and put their own nominees into key 
positions there,"47 besides its manipulation of other government appointments. Between 
1909 and 19 1 1 , the Committee became the primary political force in the Ottoman 
Empire, "first through alliances with senior officers and elder statesmen, then through its 
own men in and behind the government." 48 When they won the general elections held in 
April 19 12, they took the control of the country with an "obedient parliament and a 
submissive Sultan',49 on their side. 
The opposition against the Committee of Union and Progress and measures to 
silence those who opposed the Committee' s supremacy began to grow in the following 
years. Hasan Fehmi was one of those who strongly opposed to the tyranny of the 
Committee with his articles in the newspaper Serbesti. Fehmi was mysteriously 
murdered on 5 April 1909, and he became the first martyr among Turkish journalists. 
Fourteen months later, on 9 June 1910, Ahmet Samim, the main writer of the newspaper 
Sada-yi Millet, was found dead. Following those deaths, Zek.i Bey of the newspaper 
Sehrar also was mysteriously murdered. Since those journalists objected to and criticized 
actions of the Unionists in their newspapers, it was widely believed that the Committee of 
Union and Progress was responsible for the murders of them. 50 
47 Lewis, 217. 
48 Ibid., 219. 
49 Ibid., 222. 
50 Trans]ated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali , 86. 
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In the period between 191 1 and 1912, many newspapers were closed by the 
Committee of Union and Progress. Sehrar, which was known as the spokesperson of the 
Liberal Union, gained a grim kind of record in the Turkish press history: it was closed 13  
times, and reopened 14  times with different names between 28 April 19 1 1  and 26 March 
19 12.5 1  
Then in 1 9 12, the Balkan War started, and suppression over the press increased. 
The Censorship Council was established during that period, and the military censor 
controlled all kinds of publications and communications. Military censorship continued 
with the entrance of the Ottoman Empire to the First World War in 1914 as an ally of 
Germany. In that year, the Censorship Regulation Act was issued. This Act brought 
censorship of the press by the military branch called "Harbiye Nezareti." Article 50 of the 
Act stated that all the press was responsible to comply with the rules brought by the 
government. The ones which violated the established rules can be closed permanently, 
and their editors tried by the courts of martial law. Article 5 1  of the Act prohibited the 
publication of the closed publications under different names. 52 
The regime of the Committee of Union and Progress ended with the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire in World War I in 19 18. With that defeat, the Unionist disbanded 
themselves. The defeat from World War I prepared the end of the Ottoman Empire. Now 
the lands of Ottomans were open to external enemies, and the Sultan's administration was 
51 ''Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from "Bir 'Evrak-i Muzirra ' :  Sehrar 
Gazetesi [The Newspaper 'Sehrar']," Tarih ve Toplum [History and Society] (January 1987): 37, quoted in 
Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey 
from its Origins to Present], 88. 
52 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Sansur Talimatnamesi [The Censorship 
Regulation Act], Matbaa-i Askeriye [Mil itary Publication], Istanbul, 19 14, quoted in Alpay Kabacali: 
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unable to take any measures to prevent it. On July 2, 1 9 18 , Sultan Mehmet Resad died, 
and Mehmet Vahdettin became the new sultan. Sultan Vahdettin first appointed Ahmet 
Izzet Pasa as Grand Vezir, after the resignation of Young Turk ministers . Over time, 
Sultan Vahdettin, like his older brother Abdulhamid, started to take personal control of 
the country. He dissolved the Chamber of Deputies in December 19 18, and made his 
brother-in-law Damad Ferit Pasa Grand Vezir. Damad Ferit Pasa served as Grand Vezir 
until October 1920. Damat Ferid was replaced by Ahmet Tevfik Pasa, who would 
become the last Grand Vezir of the Ottomans. 53 
During those developments in Istanbul, the nationalist movement was growing in 
power in the Anatolia. The leader of this movement was Mustafa Kemal . Angered by the 
Sultan's passive policies in throwing the enemy coups out of Ottoman lands, Kemal and 
his supporters decided to take action and established a new government called the 
"Ankara government." The first action of the Ankara government was to declare the 
administration of the Sultan V ahdettin and his policies invalid, and then to throw the 
enemy--other countries including Italy, Greece, France, and Britain--out from the land 
with "Independence War." During that period, the press which supported the nationalist 
movement became the major target of censorship by the Sultan' s administration. Then, 
the Ankara government organized the meeting of the Grand National Assembly on 23 
April 1920 in Ankara, which issued a Treason Act, making it a crime to challenge the 
Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to 
Present] , 95-96. 
53 Lewis, 240. 
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legality of the Grand National Assembly.54 The Treason Act of 1920 remained in effect 
until 25 October 1923. 
When the Sultan realized that the Ankara government was gaining more power 
every day, he chose to flee on a British warship to Malta on 17 November 1922. Next day 
the Grand National Assembly declared him deposed. Now the road to independence was 
clear. On 29 October 1923, the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed, and Mustafa Kemal 
was elected as first president of the new Republic. He appointed Ismet Inonu as the first 
Prime Minister of Turkey. 55 
After the declaration of the Republic in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal led to a series of 
revolutionary changes. First, the first Constitution of the Republic of Turkey was adopted 
in 1924. The new constitution of Turkey provided that legislative powers were held 
directly by Parliament, while only the President or the Council of Ministers could 
exercise executive powers. The 1924 Constitution also authorized independent courts to 
exercise judicial powers. After the promulgation of the first constitution, Mustafa Kemal 
led to "the abolition of the Caliphate and the banishment of all members of the Ottoman 
house from Turkish territory,,56 in March 1924 and to the establishment of independent 
courts for judicial function in April 1924. Then the new law issued in 1925 that required 
all people of the nation to wear modem hats and clothes and that abolished the fez, 
Ottoman traditional hat. This was followed in 1928 by the establishment of the modern 
Turkish alphabet replacing the Arabic alphabet. 
54 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali ,  107-108. 
55 Lewis, 26 1 -262. 
56 Ibid., 264. 
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Pressure on the stability of the Turkish government escalated on 13  February 
1925 , when the Kurdish rebellion began in the eastern part of the country. After silencing 
the uprising, Takrir-i Sukun [the Law for the Maintenance of Order] was declared 
through the Assembly, giving ex.tensive powers to the government. The statute had only 
one item, and this item gave direct power to the government in silencing any action 
which had the tendency to destroy the order and security of the nation.57 This law also 
authorized the government to set up independence tribunals whenever it wished to try the 
criminals. 
On 3 May 1925 , the new Censorship Regulation Act was issued. Article 15 of the 
Act stated that all newspapers and magazines in the regions where the Law for the 
Maintenance of Order was effective were subject to censorship prior to publication. With 
this Act, prior restraint came to Turkey one more time, and newspaper closings had again 
begun. First, Tevhid-i Efkar [Promise of Opinion}, Son Telgraf [The Last Telegraph] , 
Istiklal [Independence] and Toksoz [Filled Word] were closed with the order of 
Ministers' Council in Istanbul, followed by Millet [Nation] , Presse de Soir again in 
Istanbul, Yoldas [Colleague] in Bursa, Dogru Oz [True Essence] in Mersin, Kahkaha 
[Laugh] in Trabzon, Sayha [Sayha] in Adana, and at last, Tanin [Dawn] and Vatan 
[Fatherland] in Istanbul were closed. 58 
The period of the Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sukun) lasted five 
years ending in 1930. However, the government' s  power to establish independence 
57 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1925 Tarihli Takrir-i Sukun [The Law 
for the Maintenance of Order of 1925), madde ! [Article No. I], quoted in Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan 
Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present ] ,  1 14. 
58 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 1 15. 
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tribunals remained in effect until 1949. During the period between 1925 and 1 930, almost 
all publications opposed to government policies were silenced. But with the end of this 
period, the opposition press began to increase its publications. Mustafa Kemal was aware 
of and concerned about the disturbing effect of intolerance on the press. Therefore, in the 
beginning of 1930, his government showed some tolerance by allowing the publication of 
opposition newspapers including Son Pasta [Last Post] and Yarin [Tomorrow].59 
The beginning of the fortunate period for the press, however, was disrupted when 
another unfortunate development threatened Turkey: the impact of totalitarian regimes in 
Europe increasingly was felt in Turkey. In response to this pressure, restrictions over the 
press started again. Those restrictions mostly were in the form of statutes forbidding 
criticizing the government and its policies. On July 25, 193 1 ,  a new Press Law was 
accepted. The law was composed of total 70 articles and its 50th article brought the most 
important and most applied restriction over years: "Publications which put nation's  
security in danger can be closed temporarily by the Ministers' Council .  Publications 
closed this way cannot be reissued with different names during the closing period."60 
Article 5 1  of the same law also gave the Ministers' Council a power to stop the 
distribution of publications which entered Turkey from other countries.61 
On 27 June 1938, with changes of 8 articles of the 193 1  Press Law, the 
restrictions over the press increased. A change in the 9th article brought the requirement 
59 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Zekeriya Sertel, Hatirladiklarim [My Memoirs). 3nl ed. 
(Istanbul, 1977), 19 1 - 192. 
60 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1931  Matbuat Kanunu [The 193 1 Press 
Law}, madde 50 [Article No.50), quoted in Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present), 128. 
61 Ibid., madde 51 [Article No.5 1] .  
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of a financial insurance letter provided from the national bank for those who intended to 
publish a newspaper. Changes in lih and 21 st articles brought the requirement of not 
having a bad reputation for newspaper owners. A change in article 38 in effect 
decentralized prior restraint. It required journalists who intended to write about rebellious 
events occurring in institutions such as schools or universities to get permission of the 
responsible manager of that institution before writing about that event.62 
On November 10, 1938, Mustafa Kemal , the founder of the Republic of Turkey 
died. Next day the Grand National Assembly voted to appoint Ismet Inonu as the new 
president of Turkey. There was no direct censorship over the press during the 1940s, but 
the Ministers ' Council almost every day had given ultimatums to newspapers, and those 
which chose not to comply with those ultimatums had faced closings.63 On April 24, 
1940, one statement was added to article 30 of the 1 93 1  Press Law: "the history of 
Turkey cannot be interpreted except by official opinion ."64 The government had even 
taken possession of the nation 's history. 
During World War II, although Turkey remained neutral , the restrictions over the 
press again increased, including prior censorship of telegrams sent by foreign journalists 
to their newspapers , in order to protect government secrets .65 
62 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 1 33 .  
63 Ibid., 1 36. 
64 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 193 1  Tarihli Matbuat Kanunu [The 
193 1 Press Law], madde 30 [Article No.30], quoted in Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze 
Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] , 129. 
65 Translated and paraphrased by the author from The Aksam [The Evening], 1 May 1947, quoted in Alpay 
Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its 
Origins to Present], 149. 
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The end of the World War II was celebrated all around the world as the coming of 
freedom. In 1 946, one-party rule ended in Turkey and the first step to multi-party 
parliamentary government was achieved. In the same year, the Republican People' s  
Party, the party that had held power since 1923 , won the first multi-party election. 
Following that, on June 13  1946, a change was made in article 50 of the 193 1 Press Law 
by giving power to courts to close the newspapers for periods ranging from one month to 
two years.66 
On 10  June 1946, the Journalists Council was established by journalists, and 
Sedat Sirnavi was chosen as the first president of that Council . The Journalists Council 
celebrated 24 July 1948 as the 40th anniversary of the removal of the first censorship and 
declared that day as the "Journalists Day." In 1948, the government announced that anti­
democratic articles of the 193 1  Press Law would be changed. With this aim, a report was 
prepared with proposed changes, but before it was discussed in the Grand National 
Assembly, the election was held nationwide on 14 May 1950, and the Democrat Party 
won the election. 67 
The victory of the Democrat Party was recognized by the press as the starting 
point for new hope, and seen as an opportunity to address grievances felt during the 27 
years of People's Party ruling. The Democrat Party had promised to secure freedom of 
the press, and it did pass a new press law in 1950. The press law of 1950 is sti ll in effect 
in Turkey in 2002, although with some changes and provisions made in later years. This 
66 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Hilmi Uran, Hatirladiklarim [My Memoirs] (Ankara, 
1959), 459, quoted in Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of 
the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] , 158. 
67 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 162- 163. 
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law lifted the powers of the governments over the press that was provided by the 193 1  
Press Law. The most important item of the 1950 Press Law was removing the 
requirement on the press to get permission from the government prior to the publication. 
The only requirement left was to notify the governor of a province of the beginning of a 
new publication. 68 
The peaceful situation between the government and the press, however, lasted 
only two years. When the opposition press critical of the majority party increased its 
publications, the government began to restrain press freedom, which it once promised to 
secure, with a number of provisions that included heavy punishments for press crimes. 
Those provisions generally made it a crime to publish anything that would damage the 
order of the state and cause the panic among the public, or that talked about the 
disagreements among the members of the political parties. 69 Democrat Party also put 
some economic restrictions over the press during that period, by holding the paper 
monopoly in its hand. The Party was also the monopoly for official ads, so the 
newspapers which desperately needed the advertisements to survive, had to develop good 
relationships with the government. 
The restrictions over the press in the period between 1954 and 1960 were almost 
as severe as the ones in the Sultan Abdulhamid period ( 1 876- 1909). Because of the 
censorship that came at the last moment before the publication, many newspapers' front 
68 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 15 Temmuz 1950 Tarihli Basin Kanunu 
[The Press Law of July 15, 1950], quoted in Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru: Turkiye'de 
Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press Freedom in Turkey] (Istanbul: Hurriyet 
Ofset Matbaacilik, 1990), 106-1 13. 
69 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Hifzi Topuz, JOO Soruda Turk Basin Tarihi [Turkish 
Press History in 100 Questions] (Istanbul, 1973), 188. 
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pages were blank. For example, the headline of one of the most prominent newspapers in 
the country, the Cumhuriyet, was blank in its issue of 19 December 1959.70 
The struggle between the Republican and Democrat Parties resulted in a military 
intervention on 27 May 1960. The Democrat Party was overthrown, and on behalf of the 
military coup, Milli Birlik Comitesi [the National Unity Committee] took over the 
administration. The Committee dissolved the Turkish Grand National Assembly and 
claimed the legislative power. During the period from 1960 to 196 1  under military rule, 
the provisions that brought heavy charges for the press crimes were removed, and direct 
censorship was prohibited. However, advocating to overthrow the government still 
remained as a crime. 
Although the National Unity Committee prohibited direct censorship, some 
actions to limit press freedom still were in force. The Act No. 7648 gave the Committee , 
which was composed of 15 members of the Grand Assembly, a power to censor the 
publications whenever it felt to be necessary. The Act stated that the publication of 
newspapers which do not comply with the rules of the government can be stopped, and 
their distribution can also be prevented. If they continue to publish, they can be closed. 71  
In July 1961 ,  a new constitution of Turkey was adopted, and in October 196 1 ,  the 
military transferred the control back to civilians. The second chapter of the 1961 
constitution included the provisions about the press. Article 22 of the Constitution stated: 
''The press is free, and shall not be censored." But then the same article continued by 
listing some restrictions: 
70 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 179. 
71 Ibid., 1 82. 
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Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal 
or external security of the state or the indivisible integrity of the State with its 
territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, riot or insurrection, or which 
refer to classified state secrets and anyone who prints or transmits such news 
or articles to others for the above purposes , shall be held responsible under the 
law relevant to these offences. Distribution may be suspended as a preventive 
measure by a decision of a judge, or in the event delay is deemed prejudicial , by 
the competent authority designated by law . . .  
Article 23 stated that the publication of newspapers and magazines shall not be 
subject to prior permission or to the deposit of a financial guarantee. Article 24 provided 
the same thing for the publication of books and pamphlets .72 
The increase in terrorism and university riots over a number of years resulted in 
the declaration of martial law in 1 1  cities of Turkey on 12  March 197 1 .  About two 
months later, on 13  May 197 1 ,  the Law for the Maintenance of Order No. 1402 was 
issued. This law gave privileges to the martial law generals to make a search on private 
property, to close down political parties and organizations, to censor communications, to 
control the press, and to close publication houses without showing any reason.73 The 
government also issued the Act No. 1488 on 22 September 197 1 .  With this Act, the 1961  
Constitution' s  articles from 22 to 27, which secured the freedom of press, were changed. 
72 Translated from the Turkish by the author from 1961 T.C . Anayasasi ilgili hukumleri [The 1961 
Constitution of Turkey J. 
73 Translated from the Turkish by the author from 1402 Sayili Sikiyonetim Kanunu [The Law for the 
Maintenance of Order No. 1402] ( 197 1), quoted in Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru: 
Turkiye'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press Freedom in Turkey] (Istanbul: 
Hurriyet Ofset Matbaacilik, 1990), 161 .  
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When the previous form of Article 22 gave a judge a power to suspend the distribution of 
publications, a new version of the article gave this power to prosecutors.74 
During the period of Law for Maintenance of Order in 1 97 1 ,  strict restrictions 
applied on the press in Turkey. Many journalists and writers were arrested in that period 
including the prominent journalists of the late twentieth century, such as Dogan Kologlu, 
Ugur Mumcu, Can Yucel , Ilhan Selcuk, Oktay Kurtboke, Yasar Kemal, Cetin Altan, 
Ilhami Soysal, and Al tan Oymen. 75 They remained in prison for periods ranging from one 
week to eight months. During the same period, newspapers were also closed 39 times 
temporarily and permanently. As a result of these restrictions, the number of newspapers 
decreased significantly.76 
Ugur Mumcu, one of the prominent journalists arrested and imprisoned during the 
1970s, was born in Kirsehir in 1942. He was graduated from the Ankara University Law 
School in 1966. He began writing in a daily Cumhuriyet [Republic] in 1974. He was 
known for his acerbic political writings. On 24 January 1993, he was killed in an 
assassination.77 As of 2002, his murderers had not been apprehended. 
Ilhan Selcuk, another prominent journalist of today, was born in Aydin in 1 925. 
He was graduated from the Istanbul University Law School in 1950. His first writings 
74 Translated from the Turkish by the author from 1488 Sayili Yasa [The Act No. 1488] ( 197 1), quoted in 
Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey 
from its Origins to Present], 197. 
75 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 198. 
76 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Uluslararasi Hukukcular Birligi Turkiye Raporo 1971-
1973 [The Turkey Report of lnternational Lawyers Organization 1971 - 1973], Ceviren [Translated and 
edited by] Ince Pehlivan (Istanbul, 1973), quoted in Alpay KabacaJi: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de 
Basin Sansuro [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 199. 
77 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author, "Ugur Mumcu," www.biyografi.net (2001). 
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appeared in a humor magazine 41 Bucuk [Forty-one and a half] in 1952. From 1963 and 
into the twenty-first century, he has been writing in a daily Cumhuriyet.18 
Yasar Kemal was born in Adana in 1923. He started writing when he was in a 
secondary school. In the last year of a secondary school, he quit and began working in 
various places as a janitor and a laborer. During that period, five books of his poems 
appeared. He moved to Istanbul in 195 1 ,  and began writing for a daily Cumhuriyet. He 
published his first novel, Ince Memed, in 1955. He won an award from Varlik Publishers 
for Ince Mehmed [Thin Mehmed] . His novel, Yer Demir Gok Bakir (The Earth is Iron, the 
Sky is Copper) was selected as the best international novel in France in 1977. He was 
honored with Legion D'Honneur medal in France in 1984. His writings were published in 
29 languages. His theme of the novels and poems was mostly concerned with the life of 
poor people in Cukurova (a region in Mediterranean part of Turkey) and their 
sufferings. 79 
Cetin Altan was born in Istanbul in 1927. He was graduated from Ankara 
University Law School. He began his journalistic life as reporter for a daily Ulus [Nation] 
in 1946. He served as the governor of Istanbul between 1965 and 1969. He wrote for 
prominent newspapers including Milliyet [Patriotism], Aksam [Evening], and Hurriyet 
[Freedom] . He is in 2002 writing for another prominent newspaper Sabah [Morning]. He 
is the father of two other important journalists of Turkey today: Mehmet Altan and 
Ahmet Altan.80 
78 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author, "Ilhan Selcuk," www.biyografi .net (2001). 
79 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author, "Yasar Kemal," www.biyografi.net (2001). 
80 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author, "Cetin Altan," www.biyografi.net (2001) . 
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Over the years, struggles between fanatics of the left and right wings and 
university riots brought Turkey to the edge of civil war. Martial law was declared one 
more time on 12 September 1980. Five generals took all the authority and named 
themselves the "National Security Council." Those years were one of the most tragic 
periods for the press. Besides the control of the martial law, those five generals took upon 
themselves a privilege of directly controlling the press. Press freedom was suspended 
with the application of political, legal, and economical restrictions at the same time. This 
military government allowed the press to print only those stories approved by this 
government. Prior restraint was a common restriction of the period, and all the 
newspapers were reviewed by the martial law agents--censorers-- every day before their 
publication. I f  some of those newspapers were found harmful, they could be closed, their 
distribution could be suspended, and their editors could be arrested. Among the 
newspapers whose publications were suspended were Cumhuriyet [Republic], Tercuman 
[Interpeter], Milliyet [Patriotism], and Hurriyet [Freedom], the most prominent 
newspapers of those days and the early twenty-first century. 8 1  
I n  1982, the National Security Council made an announcement of the referendum 
for the establishment of the Turkey's new constitution, adding that that a white color vote 
would symbolize "accept," and blue color vote symbolize "reject" the constitution. 
Following that announcement, the Council passed Provision No. 7 and propaganda for 
"yes" or ''no" to the new constitution was prohibited. Newspapers were prohibited even 
from talking about the color blue. 82 
81 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 2 10-13. 
82 Ibid., 215. 
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Within that atmosphere, the new constitution of Turkey, in effect in 2002, was 
proclaimed on November 7, 1 982. The 1982 Constitution was similar to the 196 1  
Constitution with some minor changes. In the 1982 Constitution, as in the 1961  
Constitution, Chapter 2 included the basic guarantees for freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press. Article 25 stated: "Everyone has the right to freedom of 
communication." Article 29 prohibited prior restraint: "Publications of periodicals or 
non-periodicals shall not be subject to prior authorization or to the deposit of a financial 
guarantee." 
In a section called "Freedom of the Press," Article 28 secured the press freedom 
and again prohibits prior restraint by stating: 
The press is free, and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing 
House shall not be subject to prior permission and to the deposit of financial 
guarantee ... The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure the freedom 
of the Press and freedom of information. 
But then the same article continued, keeping the same restrictive statement taken 
from the 196 1  Constitution: "Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which 
threaten the integral or external security of the State . .. shall be held 
responsible . . .  Distribution may be suspended ... by a decision of a judge ... 
Article 28 set went on by setting additional restrictions: 
Periodical and non-periodical publications may be seized by decision of 
a judge in cases of ongoing investigation or prosecution of offenses 
prescribed by law . .. .  
Periodicals published in Turkey may be temporarily suspended by court 
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sentence if found guilty of publishing material which contravenes the 
invisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the fundamental 
principles of the Republic , national security and public morals . . .  
Article 30 of the 1982 Constitution provided further guarantees for freedom of the 
press but also noted some exceptions: 
A printing press or its annexes duly established as a printing house 
under law shall not be seized, confiscated, or barred from operation . . . . 
except in cases where it is convicted of offences against the indivisible 
integrity of the State with its territory and nation, against the fundamental 
principles of the Republic or against national security. 
Although the freedom of the press seemed to be protected with a series of 
principles set forth in the constitution, the exceptions to those guarantees were broad 
enough to cause some press restrictions in the following years. According to one account, 
between 1 2  September 1980 and 12  March 1984 there were 1 8 1  journalists and writers 
who were arrested and charged with violation of the stated principles of the constitution. 
Another news item noted that 404 charges were brought against the editors and writers of 
four newspapers and twenty magazines. Charges against 32 persons were upheld by the 
courts, and they were sentenced to 2500 years in jail .83 
83 Translated and paraphrased by the author from "Basin 1980-84 [Press between 1980 and 1984]," Cagdas 
Gazeteciler Dernegi Yayini [The Publication of the Organization of Modern Journalists], Ankara (1984): 
197-230, quoted in Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press 
in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 22 1 .  
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The military returned the government to civilian control in 1983 . In the same 
year, the Motherland Party won the elections as the majority party, and this party' s leader 
Turgut Ozal became the Prime Minister of Turkey. 
A State of Emergency Act which issued on 25 October 1983 brought further 
limitations over the press. Article 1 1  of the Act provided that when a state of emergency 
exists, the printing, publication and distribution of newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and 
books can be stopped, seized, or required to get a permission in order to secure the 
general order and to prevent violent actions.84 
In addition to the Constitution and the Act of a State of Emergency, press freedom 
was l imited by the Press Law of 15 July 1950 No.5680, which was amended on 
November 10, 1983, and still in effect in 2002. With the new amendments, punishments 
for press crimes were increased. The new version of the 1950 Press Law (Press Law No. 
2950) also stated that a public prosecutor, without securing a court order, can stop the 
distribution of any publication containing material that constitutes an offense against the 
state and that reveals government secrets. After distribution has been stopped, a public 
prosecutor should apply to a state security court in 24 hours for an order approving his 
action. The public prosecutor can also seize publications already distributed. In the case 
of a state of emergency, the government can also ban the published material.85 
84 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 25 Ekim 1983 tarihli 18204 sayili 
Olaganustu Hal Kanunu [A State of Emergency Act No.18204 of October 25, 1983], quoted in Mehmet 
Semih Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru: Turkiye'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning 
Press Freedom in Turkey] (Istanbul : Hurriyet Ofset Matbaacilik, 1990) , 179. 
85 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 2950 Sayili Kanun [Press Law 
No.2950], ek madde 1 (added Article No . l ], quoted in Kabacali , 224. 
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The government in Turkey, based on the power given it under the re-instituted 
Constitution of November 7, 1982, and a series of laws enacted by the Parliament, 
continued to put pressure on press. Two incidents can explain what it meant for press to 
live under such pressure. In the first incident, the daily newspaper Milliyet was 
confiscated for publishing the first of a series of interviews with the head of the Kurdish 
Workers Party (the PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. The PKK has been carrying on guerrilla 
warfare in southeastern Turkey since 1984. Before the June 16, 1988 issue of the 
newspaper reached newsstands, police raided the printing plant and seized that issue. 
Milliyet was also forbidden to print further versions of the interview. Mehmet Ali Birand, 
a well-known journalist who conducted that interview, and the responsible editor of the 
newspaper, Bren Guvener, were both charged with making propaganda detrimental to 
feelings of patriotism.86 They faced 15 years of prison sentence, but at the end of the trial 
before a state security court, they were acquitted. 
In the second incident again in June 1988, police raided the Ankara bureau of the 
daily newspaper Cumhuriyet for publishing a story about the interrogation of Kartal 
Demirag, the man who had attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Turgut Ozal . Erbil 
Tusalp, the journalist who wrote the story, was first detained for four days. Then he was 
charged with violations of the Press Law and 14 years of prison time was asked for him 
by authorities. 87 At the end of the trial, he was found innocent and released. 
The year 1989 was difficult for the press. That year broke a record for press trials, 
with 394 trials involving 16  daily newspapers. Of 394 trials, 183 of them were criminal 
86 Paying the Price-Freedom of Expression in Turkey, The Report of U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 
1989, p. 4. 
s1 Ibid. 
101 
trials, while the others were brought for monetary damages.88 During 1989, daily 
newspapers Sabah [Morning] , Hurriyet [Freedom], Bugun [Today] and Yeni Nesil [New 
Generation] whose circulations were about 1 .5 million, were also confiscated by 
authorities for IO times. 89 
On 10 May 1990, the "Decree Regarding the Additional Cautions in a State of 
Emergency" was issued by the government. Article I of the Decree provided that 
printing, publication, and distribution of any material, which could destroy the order of 
the region where a state of emergency exists, and which could cause excitement among 
the public of that region, can be prohibited temporarily or permanently by the 
government. If it is felt necessary, the printing houses of those publications can be closed 
as well.90 
The government in Turkey started to ease its restrictions over the media after 
1990, when the efforts to become a full member of the European Union became a 
priority. Following that, the press was gradually allowed to openly criticize the 
government and its policies. By 2002, then there is no prior restraint of books and 
newspapers, and no day-to-day censorship, resulting in the expansion of the areas in 
which free expression is permitted. However, some restrictions still remain. Although 
there is no prior restraint, every writer and publisher is responsible for the consequences 
of his or her efforts to publish. And those consequences can be severe, including the court 
88 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Yahya Kocoglu, Iletisim Arastirma [Communication 
Research] (ILAD Bulletin) ,  1990, 3. 
89 Translated and paraphrased by the author from KabacaJi , 236. 
90 Translated and paraphrased by the author from 9 Mayis 1990 Tarihli 424 Sayili "Siddet Olaylarinin 
Yayginlasmasi ve Kamu Duzeninin Ciddi Sekilde Bozulmasi Sebebine Dayali Olaganustu Halin Devami 
Suresince Alinacak Have Tedbirlere Iliskin Kanun Hukmunde Kararname"[The Decree Regarding the 
Additional Cautions in a State of Emergency No.424 of May 9, 1990], quoted in Kabacali, 238-245. 
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cases for civil defamation. 91 In addition to that, threats to national security and violations 
to the indivisible integrity of the State with its nation and territory are still the major 
reasons for limiting press freedom. 
The 1982 Constitution of Turkey was amended on October 17, 2001, and 28 
articles of the Constitution underwent some changes. The articles concerning freedom of 
the press were kept in there entirety, but a statement has added to Article 28 which said, 
"No ban shall be placed on the reporting of events, except by the decision of a judge 
issued to ensure proper functioning of the judiciary, within the limits specified by law." 
Similar to Turkey, the judges in the United States could issue restrictive orders called 
"gag rules" in order to provide proper functioning of judiciary. Between 1966 and 1976, 
"hundreds of restrictive orders were issued by courts against the news media."92 But in 
1976, the Supreme Court' s decision in Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuarr3 stopped such 
prior restraints on the news media. But despite this discouraging ruling of the Supreme 
Court, restrictive orders of judges against the news media still occur, if less frequently, 
and "will remain in force when they are issued unless challenged by joumalists."94 
Conclusion: 
Prior restraint, as a form of media control, existed in the histories of both the 
United States and Turkey. Prior restraint was applied as licensing by the government in 
early England and in the Ottoman Empire. In both early England and in the Ottomans, 
91 Paying the Price, 11. 
92 Dwight L. Teeter, Jr . and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and 
Broadcast Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 540. 
93 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 279 1 (1976). 
94 Teeter and Loving, 544. 
103 
royal families were in authority, and after the increase in the printing facilities, those 
royal families were established some government organizations, like the Stationers 
Company and the Star Chamber in early England, and like the Directory of Printing and 
the Press Commission in the Ottoman Empire, to regulate the licensing procedures on the 
press. At the same time, the Printing Acts issued by the government in early England, and 
the Regulation of Printing Houses and Press Laws in the Ottoman Empire became the 
primary legal devices of governments to put prior restraints over the media. 
The licensing system expired in 1694 in early England. After the declaration of 
independence, Americans wanted to set forth some principles securing the freedom of 
expression and press in writing. They did so with the United States Constitution and its 
First Amendment in 1791. The First Amendment, by saying "Congress shall make no 
law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .  " provided a guarantee against 
the abuses by the government. No exceptions to this freedom were noted in the First 
Amendment of the United States. 
On the other hand, the first Constitution of Turkey was proclaimed in 1924, after 
the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The first Constitution of Turkey set 
out this principle to secure the press freedom: "Press is free, and shall not be censored." 
But then noted a list of exceptions to this freedom such as expressions "which threaten 
the internal and external security of the State or the indivisible integrity of the State with 
its territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, riot or insurrection, or which refer to 
classified State secrets." The same guarantee for press freedom and same exceptions to it 
was kept from the first Constitution of 1924 to the last Constitution of 1982 in Turkey. 
As noted, a very broad and vague standard was established for the protection of freedom 
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of press in Turkish constitutions. Nowhere in those Constitutions was there any statement 
that forbids abridging of freedom of press by a specific authority, like that in the First 
Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . .  " Because of the exceptions to press freedom stated in the Turkish Constitution, 
government in Turkey successfully was and still is able to put restrictions over the press. 
When the First Amendment set out a basic principle for protection of freedom of 
the press, boundaries of this freedom were not drawn, and it was left to future generations 
for interpretation. In the United States, where the common-law tradition exists, the 
judiciary plays a central role in the interpretation of the First Amendment. The U.S.  
Supreme Court, the highest court of the United States, interpreted the First Amendment 
when it faced with questions of prior restraint over the media. The U.S .  Supreme Court, 
however, allowed prior restraint of publications in cases where dealing with matters of 
"wartime security such as troopship movements, with obscenity, or with incitements to 
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government." This was the famous 
Near decision of the Supreme Court where the basic exceptions to the "no prior restraint" 
rule were set forth.95 Later, in its decision of the Pentagon Papers case, the Court ruled 
prior restraint unconstitutional, but again recognized some exceptions such as "when the 
nation was at war or when troop movements might be endangered. "96 
In Turkey, where a civil-law tradition exists, the judiciary is not central in 
developing the law. Instead, a series of laws enacted by the Parliament, including the 
press laws, draw the boundaries for the commitment to freedom of the press. Turkey 
95 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716, 5 1  S.Ct. at 63 1 ( 193 1). 
96 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 727, 91 S.Ct. at 2149 ( 197 1). 
105 
experienced the system of martial law several times in its history. During those times, the 
Laws for Maintenance of Order were adopted, and they provided the pre-publication 
censorship of publications by government. In addition to that, a series of publication acts 
and press laws made the application of prior restraint possible in Turkey. The current 
version of the Press Law still gives a privilege to public prosecutor, without providing a 
court order, in stopping distribution of a newspaper which contains a material that 
constitutes "offense against the state" - a vague standard that includes political 
expression. One of the other regulations over the press, the laws issued during a state of 
emergency, also gave authorized agencies of the government the power to put previous 
censorship upon publications mostly because of national security reasons. 
In 2002, applications of prior restraint are rare in both the United States and 
Turkey, although American battlefield correspondents in Afghanistan in 2002 might 
disagree. However, the rareness of prior restraint does not mean that the exceptions 
where prior restraint can be allowed have been removed. Especially after the September 
1 1th, 2001 ,  terrorist attacks on the United States, it is possible that the U.S. Supreme 
Court, if it is faced with situation involving prior restraint of a publication which 
threatens to reveal government secrets by putting national security in danger, can 
recognize some exceptions, as it did in the past. 
The Turkish government, if it feels any danger against the national security, can 
put previous censorship over the press into effect even more easily than the United States 
by taking a power from the exceptions to press freedom recognized in the Turkish 
Constitution and in a series of laws, including the Press Law. 
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Thus prior restraint can come back to life at any moment in both countries. 
Threats to national security, as it was addressed in all Turkish constitutions, and in the 
laws concerning the press in Turkey, and as it was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in its rulings, is the primary reason for both governments to apply previous restraints over 
the press. Only the devices to apply this media control are different; in the United States 
through the judiciary, and in Turkey, through the Constitution and a series of laws as 
enforced by the Parliament. 
The picture appearing at the end of our analysis of prior restraint in the United 
States and Turkey nicely fits to Professor Siebert's Proposition TI explaining 
governmental control of the press. Professor Siebert suggested that "the area of freedom 
contracts and the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the 
government and of the structure of society increase."97 Consistent with this proposition, 
both Turkey and the United States, when they perceive an external or internal threat 
against the security and stability of their nations, were and are swift to increase the 
restraints on the press. 
97 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 10. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SEDITIOUS LIBEL IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the struggle to silence their critics, governments long have used the crime of 
seditious libel as one of their most effective weapons. Seditious libel has been defined as 
criminalizing "expression attacking government's form, laws, institutions, or officers." 1 
In the ages before us, many printers, journalists, and scholars have experienced what it 
meant to commit the crime of sedition sometimes by being mutilated, executed, and at 
other times by being forced to pay heavy fines or getting life imprisonment. A review of 
the battles over seditious libel from its beginning in early England and the Ottoman 
Empire to its current standing in the United States and Turkey is important to an 
understanding of sedition's  changing meanings. 
Like the other ancient enemies of freedom, seditious libel had its origins in early 
England before the founding of the United States. The prosecutions for seditious libel 
were handled by the Court of Star Chamber in the late sixteenth century and early 
seventeenth centuries. Although the offenders could not be punished with death under the 
powers given the Star Chamber, they could suffer "fine, imprisonment and corporal 
punishment (pillory, whipping, branding, mutilation)"2 in that period. The day of 
inflicting of the sentences of seditious libel generally was declared a public holiday by 
the Star Chamber so that the public could see how punishments were meted out. The Star 
1 Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1960), chapter 1 ( 1 - 17) ;  Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive 
History of the Law of Libel (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 3; and Dwight L. 
Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and Broadcast 
Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 28. 
2 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 12 1 ;  and Levy, 1 1 . 
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Chamber used public punishment to discourage future crimes and in that way, people also 
could see the seriousness of the crime of seditious libel. 3 But the prosecutions of 
Leighton (1630), Bastwick, Burton, and Prynne (1637) showed that the Star Chamber 
was mistaken. Instead of discouraging the public, the prosecutions created a public 
sympathy for those men and helped lead to the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641, 
along with the reason of growing unpopularity of controls on free discussion and the 
increase in political and religious dissatisfactions.4 
But the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber did not mean the abolition of the 
law of seditious libel. The rules under which offenders were prosecuted were adopted in 
almost every aspect by the common-law courts and sometimes they were even extended. 
As Professor Siebert pointed out, "no single method of restricting the press was as 
effective as the law of seditious libel as it was developed and applied by the common-law 
courts" late in the seventeenth century.5 
During that period, the term "sedition" had taken its widest meaning by being 
applied to any criticism of government in written or printed form. Governments after 
1660 were not so stable to take the chance of tolerating the criticisms about them. Public 
opinion was growing in power every passing day, and the other remedies, such as the law 
of treason, remained limited to silence the growing power of public opinion. Under those 
circumstances, and with the expiration of the Regulation of Printing Act in 1694, 
3 Rosenberg, 4; and Siebert, 125. 
4 Siebert, 3. 
5 Ibid., 269. Also see Rosenberg, 5. 
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seditious libel was considered as the most effective weapon to curb the criticisms against 
the government until the passage of the first Stamp Act in 1712.6 
There were some changes in the reasoning of finding someone guilty of seditious 
libel from the period of the Star Chamber to the period of common-law courts. During the 
Star Chamber period where the juries were not existent, the judges were only to decide 
whether the publisher intended to publish the seditious words regardless of proving false 
or malicious intent. On the other hand, during the period of common-law courts, juries 
were present. So common-law courts adopted a new principle for determining a seditious 
libel . According to this new principle, it was jury' s duty to decide whether the offender 
published the alleged seditious matter while judge's duty to determine both whether the 
matter was offensive and whether the seditious intent was present. This legal reasoning 
was employed throughout the eighteenth century until its change with the act by the 
Parliament in 1796.7 
In the eighteenth century, Parliament also had authority to punish libels 
committed against itself and against the government as breaches of parliamentary 
privilege.8 During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, legal principles developed in 
the previous century, were applied for finding someone guilty of seditious libel. 
Beginning in the 1730s, juries began to rebel in the seditious libel cases and prosecutions 
began to fail. At about the same period, in England's New York colony, one seditious 
libel case became an emotional if not legal precedent for future generations. 
6 Siebert, 27 1 ;  and Levy, 13. 
7 Rosenberg, 5-6; and Siebert, 273-74. 
8 Siebert, 4; and Levy, 15- 16, 20. 
1 10 
The case arose with the publication of attacks by James Alexander against the 
New York Governor William Cosby in John Peter Zenger' s New York Weekly Journal. 
James Alexander was a lawyer, a member of a colonial party opposed to the Royal 
Governor' s policies, and one of the active supporters and contributors to the New York 
Weekly Joumal.9 On 17 November 1734, Zenger was charged with "printing and 
publishing seditious libel having in them many things tending to raise factions and 
tumults, among the people of this province, inflaming their minds with contempt of his 
Majesty's Government, and greatly disturbing the peace thereof." 10 Zenger was held in 
jail for eight months until his trial for seditious libel. 
When Zenger was in prison, James Alexander and Anna Zenger, the printer' s 
wife, kept his paper printing, and Alexander got ready to defend Zenger in the trial . But 
he was disbarred by Chief Justice De Lancey from participating in the trial . After this 
development, Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia became Zenger' s  lawyer and defended 
him in his trial. 1 1  The law of seditious libel, under the English rule, had been that "the 
greater the truth, the greater the libel." Contrary to the law, Hamilton argued that the 
statements must be "false and malicious and tend to sedition" in order to be deemed as 
libelous. He stated that "if Zenger could prove the truth of the assertions in the alleged 
seditious libel, he should be acquitted." 12 After Hamilton's arguments, Chief Justice De 
Lancey instructed the jury with only finding whether Zenger printed and published those 
9 Robert W. Jones, The Law of Journalism (Washington DC : Washington Law Book Co., 1940) , 20; and 
Levy, 129. 
10 Quoted in Jones, 21 . 
1 1  Teeter and Loving, 30. 
1 2 Stanley Nide r Katz, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger (Cambridge : Harvard, 
1963), 2-9; and Levy, 130. 
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papers. De Lancey emphasized that it was up to him to decide whether published 
statements were libel. A defiant "runaway" jury returned a verdict of "not guilty of 
publishing." Although the Zenger case became famous, it established no legal precedent. 
If it was a precedent, it was an emotional symbol for people striving for increased 
freedom. 
Truth as a defense was not recognized by statutory enactment in England until the 
Parliament passed the Fox Libel Act in 1792, giving a jury a right to decide a criminal 
nature of the publication. Fox's Libel Act was adopted too late to be included in the laws 
of now independent American colonies, to the extent that the newly independent former 
colonies had been looking to England for precedents. The new nation was aware that the 
words the British saw as sedition played an important role in bringing the colonies to 
revolt against England and led to the independence. 1 3  
Only seven years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights and its First Amendment, 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798- 1800 were passed as devices to restrain and punish 
expression. At the time of the passage of the Acts, the United States was concerned with 
the problem of siding either with France or England in the possible war in Europe. 
Republicans supported France, while Federalists sided with England. 14 
In an attempt to curb the criticisms of its policies, the Federalist Party, then 
controlling Congress, passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. The first section of the Sedition 
Act "punished conspiracies and combinations to impede the operation of federal laws and 
13 Teeter and Loving, 33. 
14 James Morton Smith, Freedom 's Fetters - The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), 1 1 . 
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set the penalty at no more than $5,000." 15  The second section made it a crime to publish, 
utter, and print any false, scandalous and malicious statements against the government, 
either house of the Congress, or the President, with intent to defame them or to bring 
them into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred of the good people 
of the United States. The maximum penalty for these actions was two years' 
imprisonment and $2,000 fine. 16 
This situation supported the Siebert' s second proposition that the more insecure 
the government, the more the restraints on free expression and the press. It was the early 
years of the new nation, the government was not yet stable, and when the Federalists 
perceived an internal attack to their policies, they wanted to punish their opponents. 
Under the Sedition Act, about twenty-five persons were arrested, fourteen indictments 
were brought all against Republican newspapermen and publicists, and all fourteen of 
them resulted in convictions.1 7  The Sedition Act had made truth a defense, but in 
operation this "Zengerian" principle did not protect defendants. Prosecutors were 
Federalists, judges were Federalists, and juries were packed with Federalists. 1 8  
Unpopularity of the Alien and Sedition Acts created a storm of opposition against the 
Federalist Party, and helped lead to the defeat of that Party in the next election. New 
president Thomas Jefferson allowed the Acts to expire in 1 80 1 .1 9  After 1 8 16, the 
Supreme Court blocked the government from using another alternative, the common law 
15 Ibid., 94. 
16 Ibid., 95 . 
17 Ibid., 1 85 .  
18 Ibid., 424. 
19 Ibid., 1 87. 
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of crimes, including that of sedition, to silence its critics. It was 140 years before the next 
peacetime sedition act was passed. 20 
Early in the nineteenth century, the concept of seditious libel was weakened, as a 
result of the increase in civil libel suits. There also were some positive developments in 
favor of the freedom of speech and press in libel prosecutions. In 1805, the State of New 
York passed a statute that recognized truth as a defense in libel cases. According to the 
statute, "truth might be a help, of course, on the occasions when the offending words 
could be proved as 'facts,' though of little help where the words were opinions."2 1  This 
New York statute then "became the model for most nineteenth-century libel 
provisions."22 Until the 1830s, the press was subject mostly to threats from state court 
actions, civil l ibel suits, and occasional criminal libel actions.23 The years between 1800 
and 1830 represented a transitional period in the law of libel when civil libel suits 
brought by politicians and other public figures increasingly replaced criminal 
prosecutions. While the political leaders of the Revolutionary era were primarily 
interested in "what they called 'fame' --their stature in the annals of the history--rather 
than current estimation of their characters in the minds of other citizens,"24 "concern 
about one's immediate political name became a more pressing concern than thoughts 
about one's ultimate fame"25 in the first part of nineteenth century. As a result of this, in 
20 Harold Nelson, ed., Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court (Indianapolis, New York: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967), xix. 
21 Ibid., xxi. 
22 Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men - An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 1 15. 
23 Nelson, xxii. 
24 Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men - An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel, 1 20. 
25 Ibid., 1 2 1 .  
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addition to all the frenzy surrounding criminal libel prosecutions, civil libel suits 
appeared an attractive alternative during that period.26 
In the years following 1830, Abolitionists wanted "absolute freedom to protest 
against slavery, a 'national evil, ' and considered any infringement upon their rights to 
petition or their right to use the mail as a complete contravention of those rights." 27 
Southern states disagreed by believing that "abolitionism represented a threat to their 
lives and property (both guaranteed protection by the Constitution),"28 and they targeted 
Abolitionists with threats, violence, and their specific laws. According to the laws of 
Southern states, it was a crime to advocate the abolition of slavery and consequently, they 
denied abolitionist literature access to the mails.29 Those laws also gave the postmaster or 
other local authorities the authority to inspect mails and to forbid delivery of "incendiary" 
publications.30 These were the devices aimed to silence anti-slavery arguments of 
Abolitionists, and effective suppression came as a result in most of the South by 1 850.3 1  
During the Civil War, as in the other times of national stress, freedoms were to 
get threatened again. The federal government, without the legislation, successfully 
brought common law charges against and arrested about a thousand people since they 
were suspected to be dangerous, and put them in military prisons without trial. The 
number of executive arrests reached up to 38,000, and public opinion generally agreed 
26 Ibid. 
27 Russel B. Nye, Fettered Freedom - Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy 1830-1860 (Michigan : 
Michigan State University Press, 1963) , 42. 
2s Ibid. 
29 For more detailed information about the laws, see Nelson, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the 
Warren Court, p. 173-78, where Virginia laws 1832, 1836, and 1848 were discussed. 
30 Nye, 84. 
31 Teeter and Loving, 35. 
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with those actions.32 This situation resembled what the United States government wanted 
to do in 2001-2002. The establishment of military tribunals with the executive order by 
the George W. Bush administration to try foreigners who are under suspicion of being 
linked with September 1 1th , 2001, terrorist attacks reflects how individual freedoms can 
be jeopardized in the time of national distress. 
The number of criminal libel prosecutions began to increase during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. There were only 20 prosecutions between 1871 and 
1880, then this number jumped to "almost 75 between 1881 and 1890, and to more than a 
hundred during the last decade of the century."33 
During the twentieth century, in the years before World War I, the government 
took widespread precautions, this time, to silence the new group of people who posed as 
a new line of threat against the government. Those people accused were behind the ideas 
of socialism, radicalism, and anarchism. The assassination of President William 
McKinley by alleged anarchist Leon Czolgosz in 1901 provided a stronger impulse for 
government to silence its critics. The Immigration Act of 1903 was passed by the 
Congress "to bar from the country or to deport those who believed in or advocated the 
overthrow by force and violence of the United States govemment."34 Besides this federal 
act, states like New York, New Jersey and Wisconsin passed their own anti-anarchist 
acts. There was an awakening of sedition legislation during that period. 35 
32 Jones, 28. 
33 Nelson, xxix. Also see John D. Stevens, Robert L. Bailey, Judith F. Krueger, and John M. Mollwitz, 
"Research in Brief - Criminal Libel as Seditious Libel, 1916-65," Journalism Quarterly 43 ( 1966): I 10-
1 1 3. 
34 Nelson, xxxiii. 
35 Ibid. 
1 16 
With the entrance into World War I, new and important developments began to 
take place. To assure patriotism and wartime victory, and to support President Woodrow 
Wilson' s crusade to "make the world safe for democracy," new government policies were 
adopted to suppress individualism and diversity of opinion. The aim, in fact, was to 
prevent and suppress alliances of immigrants, pacifists, socialists, and a wide range of 
other Americans whose loyalty was in any way suspect.36 These new policies meant not 
only persuasive Americanism campaigns but also vigorous action through federal 
espionage, sedition, sabotage, and revised immigration laws against those who seemed to 
offer any resistance to these campaigns. 37 State statutes were adopted to make it a crime 
to advocate of violent overthrow of government. But it was the federal government's 
Espionage Act of 1917 and its amendment in 19 1 8  to include sedition that put most 
critics of the government into prosecution for criminal words. This federal act made it 
crime to cause insubordination or disloyalty in the armed forces or to obstruct enlistment 
or recruiting by talking or printing. Some 1 ,900 persons were prosecuted for their speech, 
and about 100 newspapers and an unknown number of periodicals, pamphlets, as well as 
books were barred from mails. 38 
The government also passed the Trading with the Enemy Act in October 1917, 
which authorized the censorship of overseas communication.39 In addition to that, the 
36 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York, London: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 26, 27 . 
37 Ibid. , 27. 
38 Teeter and Loving, 36. 
39 Steven Livingston, "Mass Media and the Military," in Margaret A. Blanchard, ed., History of the Mass 
Media in the United States (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1998), 377 .  
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Censorship Board was established during the same period with a task of monitoring 
newspapers and magazines.40 
Consistent with Siebert' s second proposition, as the growing fear of presumed 
alliances among socialists and immigrants increased during the World War I period, the 
restraints on freedom of expression and of the press increased as well. The feeling of 
insecurity was great in the war period, so the governments restricted the freedoms 
severely. 
In the post-war period, the U.S. Supreme Court found a chance to address the 
validity of the 1917 Espionage Act. The case was Schenck v. United States.41 Although 
the Court unanimously upheld the convictions in Schenck case, it established a First 
Amendment exception for such dissident expressions. This was the famous "clear and 
present danger" test. 
The case arose when the defendants, Charles T. Schenck and Elizabeth Baer, sent 
to "drafted men pamphlets that urged insubordination in the armed services and 
obstruction of the draft."42 This was a crime according to the 1917 Espionage Act and its 
amendment in 1918. They were convicted under the provisions of the Act, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the convictions. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes stated: 
40 Ibid. 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in 
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their consti­
tutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances 
41 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 ( 1919). 
42 John D. Zelesny, Communications Law, 2nd ed. (California; Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), 74. 
1 1 8 
in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic . .. The 
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances 
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. I t  is a 
question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that 
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to the effort that their 
utterance will not be endured . . .  43 
Although the threats on individual freedoms slowed down with the War's end, it 
did not stop. States passed a series of sedition acts to target "domestic espousal of the 
Russian revolutionary theme."44 Convictions were brought under the states' new laws, 
and they were generally approved by the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1920s.45 One 
important case in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the state sedition act 
was Gitlow v. New York,46 a decision supporting a state anti-sedition, anti-criminal 
anarchy act but also providing a rationale for nationalizing the First Amendment. 
Benjamin Gitlow had been charged with violating the criminal anarchy law of the 
state of New York, since he published the Socialist party's newspaper, Revolutionary 
Age, "a tedious justification of a dictatorship of the proletariat and an appeal for a general 
strike."47 I n  its ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Gitlow under the New 
43 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249 ( 1919). 
44 Nelson, xxxv. 
45 Ibid. 
46 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 ( 1925). 
47 Quoted in James Lofton, The Press as Guardian of the First Amendment (Columbia, SC : University of 
South Carolina Press, 1980), 207. 
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York law but also recognized that protections of the First Amendment were applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares that "no state shall deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."48 Justice Edward T. 
Sanford wrote the majority opinion of the Court: 
. . .  we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press-
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress­
are among the fundamental rights and "liberties" protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states. 49 
Justices Oliver W. Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis dissented in the Gitlow case, by 
articulating their famous "clear and present danger" test.50 They stated, " . .  . it is manifest 
that there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on 
the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's  views . . .  "5 1  
Neither the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the clear and present 
danger test helped Gitlow to be freed; after Schenck, the Court moved on to a "bad 
tendency" test, much easier for prosecutors to prove. But the Gitlow case was important 
since it opened the door to put state governments "under the federal Constitution in 
regulating words."52 
After World War I, another revolutionary source appeared that threatened the 
stability of the government: Communism. And on the eve of World War II, fears of 
communism and fascism accompanied by the activity of domestic communists led to 
48 Teeter and Loving, 17 .  
4 9  268 U.S. 652, 672, 45 S.Ct. 625, 630 (1925). 
50 268 U.S. 652, 672, 45 S.Ct. 625, 632 (1925). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Nelson, xxxvi. 
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passage of the national peacetime sedition law since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798.53 This was the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (known as the Smith Act). Section 2 
of the Act stated: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .  to advocate, abet, advise, or teach 
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying 
any government in the United States by force or violence; . . . with the intent 
to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States, 
to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any 
written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, 
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the 
United States by force or violence . . .  54 
The Smith Act prohibited three kinds of conduct: "advocacy of the violent 
overthrow of the government; organization of a group which advocates the violent 
overthrow of the government; and membership in a group which advocates the violent 
overthrow of the govemment."55 
When World War II began, violations of civil liberties began as well. But 
prosecutions brought under the Smith Act were much rarer than the ones brought under 
the earlier sedition acts. The Smith Act, in fact, had aimed to punish members of the 
Communist party in the United States, not to punish the mass media of general 
circulation. Because the mass media of the time were the advocates of the status quo.56 
53 Ibid., xxxviii. 
54 Ibid., 321-322. 
55 Don R. Pember, ''The Smith Act as a Restraint on the Press," Journalism Monographs 10 (May 1969): 8. 
56 Teeter and Loving, 37. 
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Although the Smith Act was invoked only two times during World War II, in the post­
war period the Act was used as a primary device to prosecute the Communist party 
members in the United States.57 More than 140 Communists had been indicted,58and 
about 100 of them were imprisoned under the Smith Act by the late 1950s.59 After that 
date, convictions under this act began to be overturned. 60 
In the context of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union in 
the years following the World War II, the Supreme Court had a chance to review the 
convictions brought under the Smith Act. One of those cases was Dennis v. United 
States. 61  The Dennis case was important because it set the pattern for the interpretation of 
the Smith Act, as well as it set the pattern for the method of prosecution. "Throughout the 
nation, prosecutors came to court armed with stacks of books and newspapers."62 
In Dennis, major figures of the Communist Party went to trial and 1 1  of them 
were convicted after a nine-month trial in 1949. Defendants were charged with 
conspiracy to teach and advocate violent overthrow of the government which was a crime 
under the Smith Act of 1940. The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit upheld the 
conviction of defendants, and the Fase finally came to U.S. Supreme Court for review. 
Writing for the majority opinion, Chief Justice Fred Vinson upheld the constitutionality 
of the Smith Act by stating: 
The Smith Act . .  . is directed at advocacy, not discussion . . .  the basis 
of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, 
57 Lofton, 220. 
58 Zelesny, 76. 
59 Nelson, xliii. 
60 Teeter and Loving, 39. 
61 34 1 U.S. 494, 7 1  S.Ct. 857 (1951). 
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propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in 
the wisest government policies. It is for this reason that this Court 
has recognized the inherent value of free discourse . . .  An analysis of 
the leading cases in this Court which have involved direct limitations 
on speech, however, will demonstrate that . . .  this is not an unlimited, 
unqualified right, but that the societal value of speech must, on occasion, 
be subordinated to other values and considerations . . .  63 
Chief Justice V inson wrote that the Court, in this case, were "presented with the 
application of the 'clear and present danger' test"64 which was originated by Justice 
Holmes in the Schenck case in 1919. V inson observed that 
. . .  Overthrow of the government by force and violence is certainly 
a substantial interest for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, 
this is the ultimate value of any society, for if a society cannot protect 
its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no 
subordinate value can be protected . . . Certainly an attempt to overthrow 
the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because 
of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil 
for Congress to prevent. 65 
Chief Justice V inson, with those words, legitimized what Siebert suggested in his 
second proposition. An internal attack was perceived in the cold war period with the 
activity of communists. As Siebert suggested, since protection of societal structure from 
62 Pember, 26. 
63 34 1 U.S. 494, 7 1  S.Ct. 857 ( 195 1). 
64 Ibid. at 508. 
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such an attack was seen as the governmental duty, the government was given every right 
to 1imit any speech that threatened the nation's security and societal structure. 
It can be said that in troubled periods, especially in war times, civil rights and 
human freedoms were and are in a real jeopardy. In periods of national distress, people 
who advocated a policy of repression and the abolition of freedom successfully argued 
that the nation's right to protect itself overrides the citizens' right to express themselves. 
Those favoring suppression of freedoms tried to rationalize their conduct by arguing that 
those who opposed to the government and its policies were trying to injure the nation, 
and therefore they did not deserve the privilege of free speech. Civil rights violators also 
added that their victims were enemies of the state, while they were patriots.66 
After Earl Warren was selected as the chief justice of the United States Supreme 
Court in 1953, the Court became reluctant to uphold the convictions under the Smith Act. 
The Warren Court made its opposing approach to civil rights violations clear with its 
decision in Yates v. United States 67 in 1957. In this case, the Court extended the First 
Amendment protection to those who advocate a political doctrine.68 Fourteen second­
level leaders of the Communist party in California were convicted under the Smith Act 
for conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of government. The Supreme Court 
reversed the convictions, and found the trial court faulty "for not having made clear to the 
jury the distinction between advocacy of action to overthrow the government by force 
65 Ibid. at 508, 509, 71 S.Ct. at 867. 
66 H. C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite, Opponents of War, 1917 -1918 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1957), 300. 
67 354 U.S. 298, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1 356 ( 1957). 
68 Robert Trager and Donna L. Dickerson, Freedom of Expression in the 21st Century (Thousand Oaks, 
London: Pine Forge Press, Inc., 1999), 65. 
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and violence and advocacy of abstract doctrine in this subject,"69 which was protected 
speech according to the Court. The decision of the Supreme Court in Yates halted the 
government' s  attempts to prosecute the members of the Communist party. In 1977, the 
Smith Act "disappeared from bills reforming the federal Criminal Code."70 
In the recent decades, the spirit of seditious libel has revealed itself under various 
forms because, as Norman L. Rosenberg concluded in his book titled Protecting the Best 
Men, the key concept was political libel, not criminal libel or civil libel . In other words, 
if the people holding the authority attempt to use a suppressive device against speech and 
press, it does not matter whether that device dressed as a criminal law, as an injunction or 
a civil suit for defamation. Pre-publication censorship, post-publication punishment or 
post-publication assessment of civil damages : all have a potential to put freedom of 
speech and press under severe danger.71 
During the 1960s, civil libel suits, one of the repressive devices of free speech and 
press, began to have a damaging effect on newspapers. The most famous and important 
defamation case of the twentieth century--New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)72--carne in 
the form of civil libel but carried the spirit of seditious libel . The real issue in Sullivan 
was racial politics. The officers of the organization titled "the Committee to Defend 
Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South" wanted to reserve a full 
page-advertisement in the New York Times "to protest the treatment of black 
69 Lofton, 243. 
70 Teeter and Loving, 40. 
71 Dwight L. Teeter Jr. ''The First Amendment at It s Bicentennial: Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 
Journalism Quarterly 69 (Spring 1992): 23. 
72 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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demonstrators by police in Montgomery, Alabama."73 The advertisement took place in 
the New York Times on March 29, 1960, with the headline "Heed Their Rising Voices"74 
and L.B . Sullivan, the commissioner of police operations in Montgomery, brought the 
history's famous libel suit against the New York Times and four black ministers who had 
taken out the alleged advertisement, even though Sullivan was not specifically named in 
the advertisement. 75 
Libel suits were not "a serious problem for the New York Times''16 until that time. 
But the paper's lawyer realized that the Sullivan case was a serious threat.77 The great 
legal and political conflict that began with the libel suit "threatened the existence of New 
York Times, as well as the right of the press to report on tense social issues, and the right 
of the public to be informed about them."78 
The Alabama trial court decided that under Alabama law, the chal1enged 
statements in the ad were "libelous per se," which tend to injure a person's reputation or 
bring him or her into public contempt.79 As a result, the New York Times lost the case 
both in the Alabama trial and Alabama's Supreme Court, and the jury awarded Sullivan 
$500,000, the full amount he demanded. The New York Times appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case. The United States 
Supreme Court announced its decision on March 9, 1964. Justice Brennan, writing for a 
unanimous Court, decided in favor of the New York Times and overturned a $500,000 
73 Robert D. Richards, Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open: Mr. Justice Brennan's Legacy to the First 
Amendment (Boone, NC: Parkway Publishers, 1994), 19. 
74 Anthony Lewis, Make No Law (New York: Random House, 1991), 6. 
75 Richards, 19. 
76 Anthony Lewis, 23 . 
n Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 7. 
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Alabama libel judgment against the newspaper. The first sentence of Brennan for the 
opinion of the Court made clear that "he was doing what the modem court rarely does: 
taking a fresh look at an enti re area of the law. "80 He began by stating, 
We are required this case to determine for the first time the extent 
to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a 
State's power to award damages in libel action brought by a public 
official against critics of his official conduct. 8 1 
After identifying plaintiff and defendants of the case, Brennan described the 
advertisement, "Heed Their Rising V oices" in detail, and stated the Alabama trial and 
Alabama Supreme Court's previous rulings about the case. Then Brennan announced the 
opinion of the Court: 
We reverse the judgment. We hold that the rule of law applied by the 
Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide 
safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought a 
public official against critics of his official conduct."82 
Justice Brennan continued, "We further hold that under the proper safeguards the 
evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for 
the respondent."83 After declared the Alabama law "unconstitutional," the Court 
responded the argument concerning whether the advertisement deserved the First 
79 Richards, 20. 
80 Anthony Lewis, 140. 
81 376 U.S. 256 (1964). 
82 Ibid., at 264. 
83 Ibid. 
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Amendment protection. Brennan said, "the present advertisement, as an expression of 
grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly 
to qualify for the constitutional protection."84 For the argument that some erroneous 
statements in the ad prevents that protection, Brennan said, "that erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the 'breathing space' that they need . . .  to survive."85 Justice Brennan then stated the 
requirement for public officials to collect the damages in libel suits: 
A public official cannot recover libel damages for criticisms of his 
official performance unless he proves that the statements was made with 
'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."86 
By looking at the facts of the case, the Court then concluded, 
. . .  We consider that the proof presented to show actual malice 
lacks the convincing evidence clarity which the constitutional 
standard demands, and hence it would not constitutionally 
sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law . . .  87 
Brennan's most frequently quoted passage of the opinion from New York Times v. 
Sullivan was his characterization of American freedom88 with these words: 
. . .  We consider this case against the background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
84 Ibid., at 27 1 .  
85 Ibid., at 272. 
86 Ibid., at 279. 
87 Ibid., at 286. 
88 Anthony Lewis, 143. 
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should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials. 89 
These words in the historic decision of the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan 
led to the beginning of the new era in which the press can criticize the public officials 
without the fear of libel suits. The "actual malice" standard was later extended beyond 
public officials to public figures in cases such as Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts 90 and 
Walker v. A.P.91 
Criminal libel was also common form of media restraint before the years of 
World War IT, but its application became rare after that. There is a distinction between 
the crime of criminal libel and civi l libel . While criminal libel charges can be brought by 
government official or agencies, civil libel charges can be brought for publications which 
are false and damage a person's reputation. People who are convicted for criminal libel 
charges are subject to get a jail time, fines, or both. On the other hand, people who are 
convicted for civil libel charges are not subject to criminal penalties, they are only subject 
to monetary fines.
92 Over the years, courts increasingly approved that civil libel suits to 
recover damages were much to be preferred form to criminal libel prosecutions because 
the defamed person had a chance to gain more from a civi l judgment for money damages 
than from a criminal conviction. In the same year with its Sullivan decision, the Court 
decided for Garrison v. Louisiana.93 In Garrison, the Court reversed the criminal libel 
s9 376 U.S. at 270 ( 1964). 
90 Curtis v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 ( 1967). 
91 Walker v. A.P., 388 U.S. 130 ( 1967). 
92 Teeter and Loving, 80. 
93 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209 ( 1964). 
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conviction of a Louisiana district attorney who had accused several of his county judges 
with laziness and inefficiency. The Court declared Louisiana criminal libel statute 
unconstitutional. With Garrison case, the United States Supreme Court "limited state 
power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of official conduct just as it had, in 
Sullivan, restricted the right of an individual to collect civil damages."94 
In recent years, it seemed as if criminal libel prosecutions had almost disappeared, 
but there are occasional times that showed itself again. For example, a 1991 Colorado 
Supreme Court decision declared the state's criminal libel statute invalid "only insofar as 
it reaches constitutionally protected statements about public officials or public figures on 
matters of public concern." But "where one private individual has disparaged the 
reputation of another private individual," the Colorado criminal statute is valid.95 
As seen, especially during the war years, in other words, in the period of national 
distress, attempts to curb the critics of government policies reached its peak. As a very 
recent example, in a wartime footing if not actually a declared war following the terrorist 
attacks of September 1 1th, 2001, the United States government has set up military 
tribunals to try non-U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism. Looking from this perspective, 
then it can be concluded that fears of internal or external attack to the stability of 
government and safety of the nation have become once again legitimate reasons for the 
government in the United States to take actions in curbing free expression that would be 
inconceivable in time of peace. 
94 Lofton, 250. 
95People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 ( 1991). 19 Med.L. Rptr. 1074, 1078, quoted in Teeter and Loving: Law of 
Mass Communications, 10th ed., 83. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SEDITIOUS LIBEL IN TURKEY 
Seditious libel has been seen as one of the most serious crimes against the 
government in Turkey for many ages. Its origins started in the period of the Ottoman 
Empire, then the laws concerning the seditious libel were expanded after the foundation 
of the Republic in 1923. Until recent times, there were many laws in Turkey that made 
seditious libel a crime and that punished the offenders who committed that crime. 
Therefore, if the offenders could escape from one of those laws, it was not very hard to 
be caught in the net of another one of those laws, and the result of being guilty for the 
crime of seditious libel was inevitable for its offenders. 
Controls available to government were not used in isolated fashion. The brave 
men discussed in Chapter V ,  Prior Restraint in Turkey, at times also collided with the 
Turkish version of the law of seditious libel. So, some of the names encountered while 
having prior restraint applied to their publications also will be found being prosecuted for 
seditious libel, imprisoned or banished into exile. Because these chapters focus on forms 
of control over the press and follow those controls as they were applied, the appearance 
of names made familiar from the reader's acquaintance with Chapter V may seem 
redundant in Chapter V il, but they are not. Instead, the instances mentioned here are but a 
second side of the operation of press control, whether it is Chapter V 's prior restraint or 
Chapter V IT' s post-publication censorship for seditious libel, the word crime of daring to 
criticize government men, organizations, and measures. 
Attempts to make seditious libel a crime in the Ottoman Empire were legalized in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The first Penal Code of the Ottomans passed in 
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1858. Article 138 of the Penal Code included the crime of sedition : "Anybody who 
publishes books, newspapers, or other written materials against the Sultan, the members 
of the government, or against the nation can be punished by seizure of those offensive 
materials, their printing houses can be closed, and they can be forced to pay in the 
amount of 10 to 50 units of gold money." 1 
Article 139 of the Penal Code also made it crime to publish anything which 
endangers the internal security of the Empire or which libels the officials or agencies of 
the government. 2 
As mentioned in the chapter of "Prior Restraint in Turkey," there were some 
brave men of that period in the Ottoman Empire who tried to institutionalize social and 
political reforms. The leaders of that movement were Ibrahim Sinasi, Namik Kemal, Ziya 
Pasa and Ali Suavi. Those Ottoman liberals worked "to create and instruct a Turkish 
public opinion which, they hoped, would play the same role in Turkey as its 
counterparts"3 in England and France. Their primary device was the press, as it was in the 
countries that they took as an example to follow. With this aim, Namik Kemal and his 
friends were spread over the important periodicals of the country, as either becoming 
editors or writers of these publications. 
Ibrahim Sinasi and Ziya Pasa were writing in Tercuman-i Ahval [Interpreter of 
Conditions], which began its publication life in 1860 as one of the most important 
newspapers of the time. The authoritarian mood of the government was increasing during 
1 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Alpay Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de 
Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] (Istanbul: Gazeteciler 
Cemiyeti Yayinlari 29, 1990), 19. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 146. 
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the same period, with officials arguing that those people, among them Ibrahim Sinasi and 
his friends, claimed more freedom than was their right. As a result of this, Tercuman-i 
Ahval was closed for two weeks by the government because of an article that criticized 
the education methods of the nation. The author of the article was Ziya Pasa. This 
incident entered the history books as the first precedent for government suppression in 
Turkey.4 
In this environment, the government passed the first Press Law on January 1 ,  
1 865 . This law was translated from the French Press Law, which was adopted in France 
when Napoleon m became an emperor. The first Press Law of the Ottomans, in addition 
to the provisions concerning the licenses prior to publication, laid down strict regulations 
for publications hostile to the general interests of the country. Newspapers with those 
dangerous characteristics that were published in foreign countries could be prevented 
from entering to the Ottoman country. Punishments for the offenders ranged from 
imprisonment, heavy fines, to temporary or permanent closings of their publications.5 
With the passage of the first Penal Code and Press Law, the government increased 
its pressures on the press. Government officials, now faced with the increasing number of 
the publications in the Ottoman lands, increasingly became aware of the power of the 
press, and this awareness impelled them to take stricter measures. The Turkish press, on 
the other hand, had learned how to pass "from report to comment, from comment to 
criticism, from criticism to opposition, and from opposition to defiance"6 in a notably 
short time. 
4 Ibid. , 148. 
5 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 26-27. 
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One of the most notable events symbolizing the organized opposition against the 
government' s absolutism was the 1859 Kuleli * Incident. The case arose when a small 
group of protesters organized a plot to depose and assassinate Sultan Abdulmecid, the 
sultan of the Ottomans in that period. The attempt was unsuccessful because the 
conspiracy was discovered, and their organizers were exiled to Asia and imprisoned 
there. The Kuleli Incident was seen by some as the first effort to bring constitutional and 
parliamentary government, but recent research concluded that the aim of the leaders of 
that conspiracy was only to depose the Sultan and his ministers, rather than to change the 
structure of the governmental system. 7 Whatever its aim and result, the Kuleli Incident 
was important because it revealed that the Turkish protesters were organizing, and 
gaining power against the authoritarian Ottoman government. 
During the 1860s, the Ottoman Empire witnessed, for the first time, an 
unmistakable liberal criticism of government actions with the writings of Ziya Pasa, 
Sinasi , Namik Kemal and their friends. In 1 865, Namik Kemal, with the support of his 
friends, established a organization called "Yeni Osmanlilar [Young Ottomans] ," and 
started their freedom struggle in Europe with the publication of two main newspapers, 
Muhbir [Informer] and Hurriyet [Freedom]. 
Ali Suavi was the editor and main writer of the Muhbir. He frequently wrote 
articles that criticized the foreign policy of the government, while also calling for more 
freedom. As a result of Suavi' s articles, Muhbir was closed by the government order 
dated March 8, 1867. The government order said: "Muhbir was closed temporarily for 
* Kuleli is a region in Istanbul. 
6 Lewis, 150. 
7 Ibid., 15 l. 
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publishing false information concerning the governmental actions, and for causing a 
confusion among the public, with the accordance of the 1865 Press Law . . .  "8 
Only a few days after the government order regarding the closing of Muhbir, the 
government issued a decree called "Kararname-i Ali" that brought new regulations in the 
control of the press on 12 March 1867. The decree said: 
It was detennined by the government that some newspapers in Istanbul 
published news and articles that endangered general interests and security 
of the nation. Although the government agreed that the press is useful for 
the completion of the government, this thought was valid when the press 
published with good intentions. Since the government's primary duty is to 
protect the stability and the security of the nation, it became inevitable to 
take some precautions against those dangerous publications. Therefore, it was 
decided that such publications are subject to direct punishment by the 
government aside from the provisions of the press law .9 
Kararname-i Ali did not mention anything about deportation of journalists, but by 
benefiting from the vague language of the decree, the government first arrested Ali Suavi 
in his house, and then exiled him by ship to Kastamonu, a Turkish city on the Black Sea, 
because of his articles in Muhbir. 10 
Namik Kemal returned to Istanbul in 1871, and started writing for the newspaper 
lbret in 1872. In his articles in Ibret, Kemal was expressing his ideas about freedom, and 
8 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 28-29. 
9 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Kararname-i Ali [The Decree of 'AW], 
12 March 1875, quoted in Alpay Kabacali : Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship 
of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 30-3 1. 
10 Translated and paraphrased by the autho r from Kabacali, 32. 
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sometimes criticizing the government's actions. But his journalistic activities in Ibret 
only lasted less than a year, until April 1873 . At that time, an event occurred leading to 
his second exile to Cyprus. Kemal's theatrical play Vatan yahut Silistre [Fatherland or 
Silistria] was performed before a fervent audience. The theme of the play was patriotism, 
and the four acts of the play dealt with the defense of the Turkish fortress of Silistria 
against the Russians in 1854. The next and following days after the play, support and 
praise letters as well as the report on the scenes of Vatan yahut Silistre were published in 
lbret. For the government, the play was an overt act of disloyalty because the theme of 
the play was about "the alien and subversive idea that the people owed loyalty not to the 
Sultan and his ministers, not to the Islamic community and its authorized exponents, but 
to an abstract and unfamiliar entity called the Fatherland." 1 1  On April 5, 1873, the 
government ordered the closing of Ibret "on the grounds of irresponsibility, sedition, and 
impudence." 12  Then Namik Kemal and his associates Ebuzziya Tevfik, Ahmet Mithad 
Efendi, Bereketzade Ismail Hakki and Nuri Beyler were arrested and deported to 
Cyprus. 13  
Namik Kemal' s writings caused some other publications' closings as well. One of 
those publications was Diyojen [Diogen], the first humor magazine of the Ottomans, 
which began its publication on 24 January 1870. In 1872, a series of articles published in 
the magazine that made fun with the ministers of the Sultan, and criticized the hostile 
attitude of the government against the press. The author of the articles was Namik Kemal. 
1 1  Lewis, 158. 
12 lbid., 159. 
13 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 42. 
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As a result of Kemal 's articles, Diyojen was closed on 13 January 1873 . The government 
order said: 
Diyojen, by taking advantage from its humorous character, continuously used 
a language that against the general ethics and that defamed the characters of some 
members of the government. Although they were warned to stop such 
publications, Diyojen insisted to publish them. As a result, the cancellation of its 
license to publish became inevitable. Therefore, Diyojen was closed permanently 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1867 decree of the govemment. 14 
On 11 August 1875, a new item was added to the 1865 Press Law, instructing that 
newspaper inserts could publish only official information, and they were not allowed to 
publish articles that confuse people' s minds and that give false information. Publications 
that did not comply with this new rule would be closed from one to three months. 15  
During the period between 1831 and 1876, the suppression of the press gradually 
increased but the importance and the number of newspapers increased as well in the 
Ottoman Empire. There were 47 newspapers in Istanbul in 1876. Thirteen of those 
newspapers were Turkish, one was Arabic, nine were Greek, nine were Armenian, three 
were Bulgarian, two were Jewish, seven were French, two were English, and one was in 
German. 16  
In 1876, Abdulhamid II was the new sultan of the Ottomans. Abdulhamid had 
promised to declare the first constitution of the Ottomans before he took his title as a 
sultan. I n  the first months of his administration, he kept his promise and on 23 December 
14 Ibid., 37-38. 
lS Ibid., 43. 
16 Ibid., 47. 
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1 876, the first constitution of the Ottomans (Kanun-i Esasi) was promulgated. He also 
organized the meeting of the first Ottoman parliament on 19 March 1 877. 
Article 1 13 of the first constitution dealt with the declaration of martial law, 
stating that "If there are signs anywhere of the Ottoman country concerning the possible 
revolt, the government has a right to issue a martial law in that region temporarily." 
The same article also authorized expulsion of "security risks" from Turkey: 
To exile and expel people from the territory of the Empire who, as a result of 
trustworthy information gathered by the police administration, are recognized as 
dangerous to the national security of the state, was under the authority of only the 
Sultan. 17 
Further, article 36 of the constitution allowed the Sultan to have lawmaking 
authority by himself: 
During the periods when the parliament was not on duty, if any situation appears 
that endangers the security and stability of the State, the Sultan has an authority to 
issue decrees, and these decrees are as powerful as laws in function. 1 8  
In a short time after declaring the constitution, Sultan Abdulhamid began to show 
his real personality. First he ordered Grand Vezir Mithad Pasa to exile on the grounds of 
an article 1 13 of the constitution, allowing expulsion of people deemed "dangerous" to 
the state. Then by relying on article 36 of his own constitution, he passed the decree of 
martial law, and he took greater authority with article 7 1  of that decree, giving himself 
the power to close immediately publications that cause confusion among members of the 
17 Lewis, 167. 
18 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 50. 
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public. 19 The 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War made the Sultan's quest for power easier. 
He used the war as an excuse to dissolve the Parliament, to declare martial law in the 
country, and then to dissolve the first constitution of the Ottomans. In this way, the 
dictatorial regime of the Sultan Abdulhamid had started in every aspect because the 
Sultan had no tolerance for any idea that suggested opposition. 
The period of the Sultan Abdulhamid II was devastating for the press. Many 
journalists endured imprisonment in that period, and their publications were closed 
temporarily or permanently. Most of those journalists served jail time because of 
violation of the articles of the constitution which forbade the criticism of the Sultan and 
its ministers. One of those journalists was Teodor Kasap. Kasap was publishing a 
newspaper lstikbal [Future] , and humor magazines Hayal [Dream] and Memos [Memos]. 
In 1 876, Hayal published a caricature that criticized some provisions of the Constitution 
and decrees, which had brought severe restrictions over the press. Charges brought 
against Kasap for degrading the Constitution, and its creator, the Sultan. He was found 
guilty by the court of martial law, and given three years imprisonment. All his 
publications were closed. 20 
Following the closing of Hayal, other humor magazines experienced the same 
fortune. Most of them were closed either with the reason of increased pressures of the 
19 Ibid., 5 1 .  
20 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Mehmet Ata, "Memalik-i Osmaniye'de 
Sansurun Tarihi [The History of Censorship in the Ottomans],"/kdam, 29 Rebiulahir 1 337 ( 191 8), quoted in 
Alpay Kabacali : Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey 
from its Origins to Present], 52. 
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martial law, or for lack of interest by the public. Daily sales decreased to five thousand 
each from fifteen or twenty thousand.21 
On 19 May 1878, when the Ottomans were still at war with the Russians, Ali 
Suavi, one of the leaders of the Young Ottomans, published an advertisement in the 
newspaper Basiret [Prudence]. He announced that he would explain the remedy that 
overcomes the country's difficulties in the next day's issue. 22 The advertisement said: 
"The foreign policy of our sublime State faced with some difficulties on these days, but 
the remedy for these problems are not impossible. I must recommend all the public to 
read my article in Monday's  issue of the newspaper."23 
This advertisement by Ali Suavi was a code for calling his supporters to gather 
and overthrow the government on that Monday. Some 500 men gathered in front of the 
Ciragan Palace in the lead of Ali Suavi, and 100 of them tried to break into the palace in 
order to depose the Sultan Abdulhamid. Police rapidly subdued the movement, and the 
protesters were silenced. Ali Suavi, with twenty others, was killed and about 30 people 
were wounded. A court martial declared one death penalty, but later transformed it to life 
imprisonment. The court also punished several of the protesters with deportation.24 
Basiret was closed for publishing Suavi' s advertisement, and its owner Ali Efendi was 
sent to exile to Jerusalem after a trial lasting five and a half months. 25 
The Act for the Regulations in Printing that was adopted in 1895 made it crime to 
publish not only against the Ottoman State, but also against the countries, their 
21 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 53. 
22 Lewis, 176. 
23 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 53. 
24 Lewis, 176. 
25 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 53. 
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presidents, and their religions who visited the Ottoman Empire. Those publications which 
criticized the visitor countries could be seized, and those who published and delivered 
them could be punished with heavy fines. 26 
Although Sultan Abdulhamid applied all such means to silence those who 
opposed his regime, the attempts to depose him did not stop. Unable to publish freely in 
I stanbul, the leaders of the liberal movement increased their publications in exile. One of 
those was Murad Bey, who began to publish the newspaper Mizan [Order] in Egypt, 
openly criticizing the Sultan and his administration. The Sultan responded by arresting or 
exiling some of Murad's friends in I stanbul. In August 1896, the same group tried 
unsuccessfully to depose the Sultan. At the end of the attempt, all the conspirators were 
arrested. The court martial was set to try the conspirators with the charge of rebellion or 
treason. No sentence of death penalty was imposed by the court, instead, the conspirators 
were punished with deportation.27 
During the period of the Sultan Abdulhamid ( 1876-1909), censorship had reached 
such a level that dozens of words were censored before their publication in the Ottoman 
dictionary, which was published in the last years of the 1800s. Among the words 
forbidden were "anarchy, revolution, revolt, obstruction, opportunist, oligarchy, bomb, 
parliamentarism, parliament, republic, freedom, democrat, discipline, Darwinism, 
dictator, dynamite, radical, poison, censor, socialism, protest, memorandum, nihilist, 
veto, and liberty."28 
26 Ibid., 55. 
27 Lewis, 198-99. 
28 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Mete Tuncay, Olusum [The Occurrence] 
Ekim-Kasim 1977 [October- November 1977]: 42-43. 
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Sultan Abdulhamid took some precautions against foreign pub)ications as we11. 
With this aim, he had established the Secretariat of Foreign Publications. The primary 
duty of this government agency was to respond to any foreign publication that criticized 
the policies of the Ottoman government, to prevent the entrance of the publication to the 
State, and to notify the country where such publications were originated. Between the 
years 1 88 1  and 1 883, the entrance and the delivery of 32 foreign publications including 
newspapers, magazines, brochures, books, maps, calendars to and in the Ottoman State 
were forbidden. 29 
The severe censorship under the Sultan Abdulhamid continued until the 
promulgation of the second constitution on 23 July 1908. Despite all the measures that 
the Sultan had taken, the liberal movement of Young Ottomans could not be stopped, and 
it grew in power over time. The Committee of Union and Progress, the instrument of the 
Young Ottomans' nationalist wing, gradually became the dominant party in the 
Parliament and took control of the country until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I in 19 1 8. 
The second constitutional period began with new hopes for the defenders of 
freedom and their press. Following the promulgation of the second constitution, the 
number of publications increased dramatically with more than two hundred newspapers 
and magazines within the first one and half month. Newspapers were able to publish 
articles that criticized the previous administrations of the Ottomans openly without the 
fear of being censored. But a11 those freedoms did not continue long. 
29 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Turkler Acaroglu, "Sultan Abdulhamid II Doneminde Dis 
Yayin Yasaklamalari [The Restrictions on Foreign Publications during the period of Sultan Abdulhamid 
II]," Ulusal Kultur [National Culture] (Temmuz [July] 1979): 5, quoted in Kabacali, 74. 
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On 12 April 1909, some army forces which sided with Sultan Abdulhamid II 
revolted by demanding a canonical law. They were silenced quickly, but the event 
resulted in the declaration of martial law in the country. Sultan Abdulhamid II was 
deposed and Mehmet Resad became the new sultan of the country. 
The period in which the nation enjoyed its freedoms had lasted only eight and half 
months from the adoption of second constitution in July 1908 until the reactionary army 
uprising in April 1909. On 16 July 1909, a new Press Law was passed which was 
prepared, taking the 1 88 1  French Press Law as an example. This new law did not bring 
prior censorship, but if the publication had a character to put national security in danger 
or to cause a revolt among the public, it could be closed by government order until the 
trial about it is over. The responsibility for the alleged publication belonged to 
responsible editor of the publication and to the owner of the accused article. 30 
Following the deposing of Sultan Abdulhamid, the nation had embraced a new 
and inspiring hope of forgetting the severe repression of the Sultan Abdulhamid' s 
administration . But later, the Committee of Union and Progress, as the dominant party in 
the Parliament and manipulator of the new Sultan Mehmet Resad, showed itself to be an 
even more brutal oppressor of the freedoms. The Committee Jed to the passage of two 
laws by the Parliament: The "Law of Associations" on 23 August 1909, and the "Law for 
the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition" on September 27, 1909.31 Bernard Lewis 
summarized the functions of these two laws as following: 
The first of these prohibited the formation of political associations based on 
30 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 84-85. 
31 Hikmet Bayur, Turk Inkilabi Tarihi [The History of Turkish Revolution], 2nd ed. (Istanbul, Ankara, 
1953), 306, quoted in Bernard Lewis: The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 217. 
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or bearing the name of ethnic or national groups, and was followed immedi­
ately by the closure of the Greek, Bulgarian, and other minority clubs and 
societies in Rumelia. The second authorized the formation of special "pursuit 
battalions" from the army, and prescribed strong measures for the disarming 
and repression of armed bands and of the famous Balkan komitadjis. Severe 
penalties were imposed for failure to report komitadji activities to the authori­
ties and for the unauthorized possession of weapons. To complete the pattern, 
steps were taken, for the first time, to conscript non-Muslims into the armed 
forces.32 
The restrictions imposed on the press began to mount quickly. Journalists 
including Istirakci Hilmi, Ismail Faik, and Asaf Konsilitci were arrested and exiled for 
publishing and writing articles that criticized the Unionists and their oligarchic 
domination. 33 
In that environment, some changes were made in 1909 Press Law. According to 
that, the publication of the opinions of the military personnel regarding the national and 
foreign policy of the government was forbidden. Additionally, the publication of the 
criticisms against the military forces was not permitted. An editor responsible from the 
publication who did not reveal the names and identity of his military sources could be 
punished with imprisonment and heavy fines. 
32 Lewis, 217- 18. 
33 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Munir Suleyman Capanoglu, Turkiye 'de Sosyalist 
Hareketleri ve Sosyalist Hilmi [The Socialism Movements in Turkey and Socialist Hilmi] (Istanbul: 1964) , 
79-80; and M.S. Capanoglu, 80 Yillik Gazetecimiz Asa/ Konsilitci [Our Journalist of 80 years 'Asaf 
Konsilitci'] (Istanbul: 1961) ,  29-30, 46-48. 
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The government made some changes again in 1909 Press Law in November 19 1 3. 
An article that went through change was Article 23. The first version of the article said: 
"If the publication has a character to put national security in danger or to cause a revolt 
among the public, it could be closed by government order until the trial about it is over." 
With the changes Article 23 then said: "Publications which would destroy the internal 
and external security of the government can be closed by the order of the Ministers' 
Council with the security and peace purposes."34 With this change, the government now 
had gained a right to close the newspapers whenever it wished. 
Article 33 of the Press Law also was changed: 
At the times of peace and in the state of emergency, the publication of 
information about the defense methods and war strategies of the navy, air, 
and land forces is forbidden. The responsible editor of the publications 
who publish such information can be punished with a fine ranging from 
100 Ottoman gold to 500 Ottoman gold. The responsible editor who does 
not reveal the source of his information can be punished with the 
highest range of fine and with imprisonment from one month to 
three months. 35 
With the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on 29 October 19 14, 
military censorship started. The famous Censorship Regulation Act contained of 6 1  
articles and passed in 19 14. The articles about the press started with Article 50: 
All the press is obligated to comply with the orders of censorship. If they 
34 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, 93-94. 
35 Ibid., 94. 
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chose not to do so, they can be punished with closing temporarily or permanently. 
The responsible editor of such publication is tried in the court of martial law .36 
The articles of the Act made clear that the privilege to give information about the 
war belonged only to general headquarters. Anyone not from the headquarters who 
published the information about the war could be tried immediately under martial law 
and could be punished severely regardless of where they got that information. The 
execution of the death penalties as a result of the decision of the martial law court could 
be administered with the order of the generals. Thus, the privilege to order executions 
passed from the Sultan to generals. In addition to these rules, the government also 
forbade the publication of any news that would make an unfavorable impact internally or 
externally. For example, publications of train and ship accidents, or of fires were not 
allowed.37 
The censorship that was exercised over the press with the entrance into the World 
War I ended on 11  June 1 91 8. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, 
the Committee of Union and Progress withdrew their authority. On July 2, 191 8, Mehmet 
Vahdettin became the new sultan of the Ottomans after the death of the Sultan Mehmet 
Resad.38 
Around the same time of these developments, the nationalist movement with its 
leader Mustafa Kemal established "the Ankara government" and announced that Sultan's 
36 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Sansur Talimatnamesi [The Censorship 
Regulation Act], Matbaa-i Askeriye [Military Publication], Istanbul, 1330 (1914): 16, quoted in Alpay 
Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its 
Origins to Present], 96. 
37 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Alpay Kabacali, Bir Ihtilalcinin Seruvenleri-Dogmayan 
Hurriyet ve Yarida Kalan Ihtilal [The Adventures of a Revolutionist - An Unborn Freedom and Unfinished 
Revolution] (Istanbul: 1989), 217. 
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administration was invalid. After that, there were two governments in the Empire; one 
was called the "Istanbul government," in which the authority belonged to Sultan and hi s 
ministers, while the second one was the Ankara government in the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal . The press which supported Mustafa Kemal' s actions became the primary targets 
of the Sultan and his repressive regime. Sultan Vahdettin and his Grand Vezir, Damat 
Ferit Pasa, pushed through the passage of the decree for the regulation of the press on 5 
August 1920. According to the first article of that decree, those who published articles, 
news, and documents that put the nation' s  internal and external security in danger could 
be punished with imprisonment from one year to three years. The second article of the 
same decree also made clear that newspapers and magazines which published such 
articles, news or documents could be closed from 1 5  days to six months, and the 
responsible editors of those publications could be forced to pay fines from 100 lira to 
1000 lira, and can be imprisoned from one month to six months.39 (In early 2002, 1 dollar 
is around 1 ,400,000 Turkish liras) 
In response to those actions of the Sultan and his administration, the Ankara 
government established the Grand National Assembly and organized its first meeting in 
Ankara on 23 April 1920. The Grand National Assembly passed the Treason Act No.2 on 
April 29. The first Article of the Act made crime to challenge the legality of the Grand 
National Assembly and to endanger the security of the nation. According to the Act, any 
person challenging the Ankara government and its actions would be deemed as a traitor 
to the nation. The second article of the Act stated that the punishment for treason was 
38 Lewis, 240. 
39 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] , 103- 104. 
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execution. Article four declared criminal courts as the place of trying those crimes.40 The 
Treason Act of 1920 remained in effect until 25 October 1923. 41 
After the Sultan V ahdettin' s flee to Malta in 1922, the Ankara government 
declared him deposed. And on 23 October 1923, the Grand National Assembly 
proclaimed the Republic of Turkey and elected Mustafa Kemal as the first president of 
the new Republic.42 
At the session of the Grand National Assembly which was held on December 8, 
1923, the first independent tribunal of the Republic was established. The underlying 
reason for the establishment of the court was explained by Ihsan Topcu, the president of 
the court: "to punish, in accordance with the law, those who acted against the stability 
and the principles of the Republic . . .  "43 
The court began operation immediately. The main writer Huseyin Cahid Yalcin 
and responsible editor Baha of the newspaper Tanin [Dawn] , the main writer Ahmet 
Cevdet Oran and responsible editor Omer Izzettin of Jkdam [Effort] , and the main writer 
Velid Ebuzziya and the responsible editor Hayri Muhiddin Bey of Tevhid-i Efkar 
[Promise of Ideas] were arrested between December 9 and December 13 for acting 
against the interests of the nation.44 
40 Translated from the Turkish by the author from Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu, No.2 [The Treason Act 
No.2], 29 Nisan [April] 1920, quoted in Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru, Turkiye'de Basin 
Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press Freedom in Turkey] (Istanbul: Hurriyet Ofset 
Matbaacilik, 1990), 65 . 
41 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 108 .  
42 Lewis, 261-262. 
43 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Alpay Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye • de 
Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 1 1 1 .  
44 Ibid. 
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Trials began on 15 December 1923 and continued until the decision of the Court 
on January 2, 1924. The prosecutor claimed that those journalists committed a crime by 
publishing a confidential letter that was sent to the Prime Minister Ismet Pasa. On the 
other hand, defense attorneys stated that journalists had published that letter because it 
was news. At the end, the Court decided that the publication of the letter was a crime, but 
the journalists did not publish it with bad intent. As a result, all the journalists were 
acquitted. 45 
At the beginning of 1925, several newspapers were closed by the government for 
a variety of reasons. For example, Toksoz was closed for publishing material that could 
cause a dangerous reactionary movement, Orient News for publishing articles regarding 
the neglect of Istanbul by the government and thus, for intervening the internal politics of 
the government, and Sada-yi Hak for publishing articles that belittled the members of the 
Grand National Assembly.46 
With the promulgation of the new constitution in 1 924, the special Seriat courts 
were abolished "in which theologian-judges had administered the Holy Law."47 On 1 1  
September 1 924, a commission was designed to create a new Turkish civil code, which 
would be adapted from the Swiss civil code. The commission completed its task in the 
beginning of 1926, and the new civil code became effective starting by 4 October 1926. 48 
45 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Ergun Aybars, lstiklal Mahkemeleri 1923-1927 
[Independent Tribunals 1923- 1927] (Ankara: 1982), 36. 
46 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 1 13, 1 14. 
47 Lewis, 265. 
48 Ibid., 272. 
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The new penal code, which was adapted from the I talian Penal code, also was 
passed in the same year. Article 140 of the Turkish Penal Code made it a crime to publish 
"in a foreign country untrue, malicious, or exaggerated rumors or news about the internal 
situation of the State so as to injure its reputation or credit in foreign countries." Article 
141 of the Code punished establishment of societies "with the purpose of establishing 
domination of a social class over other social classes or overthrowing any of the 
established basic economic or social orders of the country," while article 142 made it a 
crime to make propaganda "in any manner for governing of the State by one person or by 
a group of persons, contrary to republicanism or to the principles of democracy, directed 
to abolish for racial reasons partially or entirely the civil rights secured by the 
constitution, or to exterminate or weaken nationalist feelings," and to speak "favorably of 
the acts forbidden in these sections." 
Article 143 of the Penal Code punished anyone who "establishes . . .  without the 
permission of the Government, societies of international character or societies the 
headquarters of which are in foreign countries." Article 155 of the Turkish Penal Code 
penalized "publishing articles that make people unwilling to serve in the military." While 
article 158 of the Penal Code punished those "who insult the President of the country," 
article 1 59 made it a crime to insult the Parliament, the government, and the military. 
Article 311 and 312 of the Penal Code penalized to publicly incite a crime, to incite 
people to enmity and hatred by pointing to class, racial, or religious difference, and to 
praise an action considered criminal. 
The adoption of the new laws and abolition of religious laws were the first steps 
taken towards modem Turkey in which, with Mustafa Kemal' s words, "the Islamic faith 
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would be rescued from the position of a political instrument."49 After the foundation of 
the Republic of Turkey, the country achieved a legal transformation which might have 
required decades in most other countries. "The concepts, the texts, and the contexts of the 
new laws were made harmonious with the progressive thrust of Ataturk' s Turkey."50 
With Ataturk' s words, "the nation has placed its faith in the precept that all laws should 
be inspired by the actual needs here on earth as a basic fact of national life."5 1  
On 13  February 1925, a Kurdish revolt, which was known with its leader "Seyh 
Said," broke out in the eastern part of Turkey. After the necessary precautions were taken 
through the silencing of the uprising, martial law was declared. Further, on 4 March 
1925, the law named ''Takrir-i Sukun - Law for the Maintenance of Order" was passed. 
A Law for the Maintenance of Order gave exceptional powers to the government. The 
law was composed of only one article, as Kabacali wrote: "The government has a right, 
with the approval of the President, to control and stop any attempt or movement that 
would destroy the general order, internal security or peace of the country. The Ministers 
Council was employed with the execution of this law."52 
The Law for the Maintenance of Order also provided the establishment of 
independence tribunals "in the east and Ankara, the former with summary powers of 
execution. "53 Seyh Said, the leader of this Kurdish rebellion, and forty-six of his 
49 Mustafa Kemal said that in his speech on March l ,  1924, in the opening session of the Grand Assembly, 
iuoted in Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, 264. 
"Mustafa Kemal Ataturk:' www.ataturk.com.tr. (December 1 8, 2001). 
Sl Ibid. 
52 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 1 14. 
53 Lewis, 266. 
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followers were sentenced to death by the Diyarbakir Independence Tribunal on 29 June 
1925. All forty-seven were executed in the next day.54 
The East Independent Tribunal also issued a verdict for the arrest of journalists 
Esref Edib, Velid Ebuzziya, Abdulkadir Kemali, Fevzi Lutfi Karaosmanoglu, and Sadri 
Ertem. When they were sent to prisons in Elazig, in the eastern part of Turkey, some 
other journalists including Ahmet Emin Yalman, Ahmet Sukru Esmer, Suphi Nuri I leri, 
I smail Mustak, and Gunduz Nadir Bey were arrested in Istanbul. The trials of these 
journalists took almost six months. Toward the end of their trials, the journalists sent a 
telegraph to the President Mustafa Kemal and asked for his forgiveness. After receiving 
this telegraph, Mustafa Kemal wrote a letter to the presidency of the tribunal, and said, "I t 
would be appropriate to consider the innocence of the journalists who revealed their 
devotion to the Republic and its principles by spelling out their regrets for their 
actions."55 At the end of the trials, it was decided that those journalists did not commit a 
crime of causing a revolt with the intention of destroying the authority of the government. 
The verdict was "not guilty" for them, but they were not allowed to resume publication of 
their closed newspapers.56 
The newspaper Tanin published an article titled "I nvasion," which was about the 
police search of the I stanbul Headquarters of the Progressive Republican Party. After the 
appearance of the article, Nori Bey, the author of the article, the newspaper's main writer 
54 Ibid. 
55 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi Arsivi 
[The Turkish Grand National Assembly Archives] T-12, Dosya 96 [File No.96]. 
56 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 1 16-1 17. 
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Huseyin Cahid Yalcin and its responsible editor Muammer Bey were arrested, and sent to 
Ankara on 19 April 1925 for their trial.57 
At the trial, the prosecutor claimed that the police searches were showed as 
invasion by the newspaper, and this indicated the intention of causing an excitement and 
provocation among the public. The prosecutor further stated that the intention behind the 
establishment of the newspaper was the same with the intention of the alleged article. 
Huseyin Cahid, in his defense, claimed that he had no responsibility in the usage 
of the word "invasion" in that article. He said, "In the modem and free world where the 
people are real representatives of the republics and democracies, nobody can be punished 
for what they think. There cannot be no crimes in the jobs of opinion." He continued, 
"the freedom of the press is at the heart of all freedoms, and therefore, I have a strong 
belief that this independent tribunal won't issue a verdict of "guilty" for me. Only 
revenge and bad intentions must be punished."58 
The court was not impressed by Cahid's brave defense, and found him guilty, 
imposing a life imprisonment. Cahid was sent to prison in Corum, the northern city of 
Turkey, while Nuri Bey, the author of the article and responsible editor Muammer Bey 
were punished with a two-year imprisonment.59 One and half years later, Huseyin Cahid 
was forgiven by the government, and he returned to Istanbul. 
On 15 June 1926, a conspiracy attempt, whose purpose was to assassinate 
Mustafa Kemal in Izmir, was discovered by the police. Ziya Hursid, the leader of the 
57 Ibid., 1 18. 
58 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Huseyin Cahid Yalcin, Siyasal Anilar [The Political 
Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1976), 278. 
59 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Ergun Aybars, lstiklal Mahkemeleri, 241-25 1 .  
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conspiracy and his followers were arrested and the independence tribunal was transferred 
from Ankara to Izmir to try the offenders. Their trials began on 20 June 1926 in the 
leadership of the presiding judge Ali Cetinkaya, known as 'Bald Ali.' On 13 July 1926, 
the court reached a verdict "guilty" and sentenced the conspirators to death.60 
With the passage of the Law for the Maintenance of Order, the government had 
gained a legal authority to deal with the opponents of its actions, and by 1927, "all 
opposition to the regime - military, religious, or political - had been silenced,"6 1  along 
with the opposition press. 
The Law for the Maintenance of Order was renewed in 1927 for a further period 
of two more years. On 4 March 1929, the law expired. Towards to the end of 1929, a new 
newspaper Yarin (Tomorrow) began its publication. The government, at first, tolerated 
this newspaper's policy of publishing criticisms about the government. But later, Arif 
Orne, the editor of the newspaper, was arrested with the charge of writing provocative 
articles and causing an excitement among the public. He was tried in Istanbul Criminal 
Court and sentenced to a month's imprisonment. 62 
On 22 May 1930, the Military Penal Code was passed. Article 54 of the code 
made it crime for military personnel to commit any action that is against the security of 
the nation. Article 56 stated that if those crimes were committed at the time of the peace, 
offenders would be punished with imprisonment not less than 15 years. If the crimes 
were committed in the state of the emergency or during the time of war, offenders would 
60 Lewis, 275. 
61  Ibid., 276. 
62 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Mete Tuncay, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti 'nde Tek Parti 
Yonetiminin Kurulmasi, 1923-1931 [The Establishment of One Party System in the Republic of Turkey, 
1923- 193 1 )  (Ankara, 198 1), 278-279. 
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be sentenced to death . Article 58 of the Code made it crime actions that would cause 
incitement against the draft and those actions that would upset the status of national 
security. The punishments for these crimes are the same with what was stated in the 
article 56 of the same law. Article 85 of the Code also made it a crime to insult the 
supervisors of the military personnel, the punishment for thi s crime would be an 
imprisonment up to one year. 63 
The government passed the Press Law on 25 July 193 1 with the intent of silencing 
the opposition press and its leaders. The most restrictive and most applied article of the 
law was Article 50: "newspapers and magazines which published articles against the 
general policy of the government can be temporarily closed with the order of Ministers 
Council. The owners of those publications cannot publish other publications with 
different names during the time of their suspension."64 
Article 30 of the Press Law stated that the authors of the newspaper or magazine 
articles, which libeled, defamed or insulted the members of the Grand National 
Assembly, the Ministers' Council ,  or the other official government agencies, can be 
punished with imprisonment from three months to six months and fined with no less than 
100 Turkish liras.65 
Article 40 stated that the publications of the newspapers or magazines, which 
provoked the communism and anarchy, and which favored the Sultan 's policies , could 
63 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Askeri Ceza Kanunu No. 1632 [The 
Military Penal Code No.1632], 22 Mayis [May] 1930, quoted in Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz and Osman 
Dogru, Turkiye'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press Freedom in Turkey} 
(Istanbul: Hurriyet Ofset Matbaacilik, 1990) , 95. 
64 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present ], 128. 
65 Ibid., 129. 
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not be allowed. Those who violated this principle could be imprisoned from six months 
to three years.66 
In 1934, a new law was adopted and it required everyone to take a last name. 
Under this law, Mustafa Kemal received the last name "Ataturk" which means "Father of 
the Turks." 
In 1936, more changes were made in the Penal Code. The section titled "Actions 
against the Integrity of the State" was changed completely and rewritten by taking the 
1930 Penal Code of Fascist Italy as an example.67 Article 141 of this latest version of the 
Turkish Penal Code said: 
66 Ibid. 
Those attempting to establish or establishing, or arranging or conducting 
and administering the activities of, societies in any way and under any 
name, or furnishing guidance in these respects, with the purpose of 
establishing domination of a social class over other social classes or 
exterminating a certain social class or overthrowing any of the established 
basic economic or social orders of the country, or political and legal orders 
of the State shall be punished.68 
Article 142 of the Penal Code stated: 
Whoever makes propaganda or establishes societies with the purpose of 
exterminating or weakening national feelings, or speaks favorably of the 
acts in the foregoing paragraphs shall be punished. 69 
67 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Cetin Ozek, 141-142 (Istanbul, 1968), 123. 
68 Ibid., 122. 
69 Ibid. 
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Article 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code were repealed in 199 1  by the 
government. Until that time, they had been the most criticized articles of the Penal Code 
because according to their opponents, those articles had restricted the freedom of speech 
and of the press severely.70 
On 17 August 1938, Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote an article in the newspaper Tan 
about Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's  illness. After the publication of the article, the Prime 
Minister Celal Bayar gave an order for the closing of Tan for three months.71  
On 10 November 1938, Turkey lost its founder. From the foundation of the 
Republic of Turkey until Ataturk' s death, the country sometimes witnessed the use of 
force and repression of basic liberties . But these measures were used mostly "to establish 
and maintain the Republic during the period of revolutionary changes."72 The intensity of 
repressive measures dramatically decreased after the executions of 1926, but the political 
opposition to the government's actions was sti11 forbidden and opposition press was 
under strict control . Moreover, government repression was rare and took place only 
against to violent opposition .73 
One day after the death of Ataturk, lsmet Inonu was appointed by the Grand 
National Assembly as the new president of Turkey. In the 1940s, opinions and beliefs 
were spelled out not openly, but under different guises, and only to a certain extent, 
according to Nadir Nadi , one of the prominent journalists of the period.74 Zekeriya Sertel , 
70 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 1 32. 
71 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakin Tarihte Gorduklerim ve 
Gecirdiklerim C.III [My Memoirs of the Recent Times] (Istanbul, 1970), 240. 
72 Lewis, 290. 
73 Ibid. 
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another important journalistic figure, noted that the police organization was strengthened 
by the government during that period, and the press was under the occasional control of 
the police forces. There was no direct censorship, but not one day passed without the 
orders of the Ministers ' Council to newspapers about what to write. The newspapers, 
which did not comply with those orders, were getting closed by the govemment.75 
On 24 April 1940, Article 30 of the Press Law was revised and it said, "those who 
publish the articles that would hurt or weaken the national feelings, and therefore, cause 
to the misunderstanding of the national history, shall be fined from 50 Turkish liras to 
500 Turkish liras." 
Article 35/G of the same law was also changed. While the previous version of the 
article said, ''The discussions of the court decisions were not permitted," the new version 
stated, ''The publication of the articles that talked about the investigations and cautions 
regarding the security of the State was not permitted."76 
On 22 November 1940, martial law was declared in some provinces of the 
country. Martial law was renewed every three months, and remained in effect for seven 
years, until November 1947. Turkey remained neutral during World War II, but this 
neutrality did not get rid of the reasons that put the press under control . Many journalists 
were prevented from writing during the years of the World War II, and their newspapers 
were closed by government orders. 
74 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Nadir Nadi, Perde Araligindan [From In-Between the 
Curtain] (Istanbul, 1964), 40, 41 .  
75 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Zekeriya Sertel, Hatirladiklarim [My Memoirs], 3.baski 
[3nt ed.] (Istanbul, 1977), 235. 
76 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 138. 
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Sabiha Sertel was one of those journalists whose writings were found offensive by 
the government. She was prevented from writing for three times during the World War II 
period due to a series of articles that were against the imperialism. 77 
On 30 July 1940, Nadir Nadi wrote an article for the newspaper Cumhuriyet 
regarding Turkey' s possible position in World War II. His article created enormous 
interest among the public, and made the government very angry. Yunus Nadi, the owner 
of the newspaper, tried to explain the situation to his old friend, Prime Minister Ismet 
Inonu. On 7 August, they met at the Ankara train station . Inonu told Nadi that he would 
not allow the publication of political articles for the monetary purposes, and he left 
without shaking his old friend' s hand. The same day, Nadir Nadi received a telephone 
call that said, "If he writes anything about the incident at the Ankara train station, 
Cumhuriyet will be closed." The next day, Nadir Nadi wrote an article, in language that 
was directed to Ismet Inonu, that stated, "He would not write articles for monetary 
purposes." This article made Inonu even angrier, and he declared, "Those people are 
trying to mess with me. Close that newspaper !" With Inonu's order, Cumhuriyet was 
closed on 10 August 1940, and remained closed for three months until November 9, 
1940.78 
In the following years, many newspapers and magazines were closed by the 
government for a variety of reasons. For example, the magazine Yuruyus [Walk] was 
closed by the court of martial law on July 1943 for its covers that reflected the poverty 
caused by the war, and for some of its poems and articles about the same subject. Rifat 
77 Translated and paraphrased by the author" from Sabiha Sertel, Roman Gibi [Like A Novel] (Istanbul, 
1969), 270-27 1. 
78  Translated and paraphrased by the author from Nadir Nadi, Perde Araligindan, 89- 107. 
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Ilgaz, the famous author and the poet, was sentenced to six months in prison for violation 
of article 142 of the Penal Code. His crime was to write a poem book titled "Class." 
Besides his punishment, his book of poems was also confiscated by the order of the 
Ministers' Council. 79 
War years brought great stress, suffering, and poverty to Turkey, even though the 
country was not an active participant in the war. There was a universal threat of foreign 
espionage and infiltration with the burden of mobilization, and these threats, in the eyes 
of the government, justified the restrictive measures taken. The government must be 
stronger than ever according the members of the government, and with this in their 
minds, they passed a martial law, put the press and publications under strict control, and 
extended police powers and actions. 80 
After the war, the government began to test the transition from one-party rule to 
the multi-party parliamentary system. On 4 June 1945, the four members of the People' s 
Party, Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Koprulu and Refik Koraltan, known as "four 
rebels," proposed a number of legal reforms which would guarantee the removal of 
pressures on rights and Ii berties and the establishment of the second party to check the 
government. Their proposal was rejected on June 12, in a party group meeting. When 
their arguments failed inside of their party, four rebels turned to the public for the 
support.81 Ahmet Emin Yalman, editor of the newspaper Vatan [Fatherland] , opened the 
columns of the newspaper to the arguments of the rebels, and in September 1945 , signed 
79 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali ,  Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present), 147-148. 
80 Lewis, 304. 
81 Ibid., 304-305 . 
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articles were published that criticized the 'totalitarian' line of the government and party. 82 
After the publication of articles, the four rebels either resigned or were expelled from the 
Republican People's Party. 
Those developments increased the opposition of the press to the government's 
actions. The newspaper Tan [Dawning] was one of the newspapers, which carried out a 
strong opposition to the government. The newspaper, under the editorship of Sabiha and 
Zekeriya Sertel , was expressing mildly pro-Communist opinions.83 The main criticism 
that Tan was directed at the government was the one-party regime in Turkey. The 
government responded to those criticisms by launching a campaign against the writers of 
Tan. 
Huseyin Cahid Yalcin, one of the leaders of the campaign against Tan, published 
an article titled "Wake Up My Country" in the newspaper Tanin on 3 December 1945. 
The article called the public and the press to respond to the cruel propaganda against the 
government. The next day, Sabiha Sertel, wrote an article titled "Don't fear the 
newspaper, fear public opinion," in response to the Yalcin 's article.84 On 4 December 
1945, on the same day that this article was published, mobs of students attacked and 
destroyed the offices of Tan and other pro-Soviet journalists Yurt and Yeni Dunya by 
screaming "Damn communism, damn Sertels, and God bless the Turkish Republic."85 
There was little sympathy in Turkey for communism and its followers during that period, 
82 Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey In My Time (Istanbul, 1956), 223. 
83 Lewis, 309. 
84 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] , 1 50-154. 
85 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Tekin Erer, Basinda Kavgalar [The Fights in the Press] 
(Istanbul, 1 965), 172. 
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and therefore, severe restriction of Communist activities and Communism favored 
publications generally took a strong support by the public. 86 
In 1946, one-party rule ended in Turkey, and the Republican People's Party won 
the first multi-party election. On 24 July 1946, the government, through an order of the 
Court of Martial Law, issued a warning that prohibited any action or publication, which 
would put the public in suspicion about the results of the election, and with this way, that 
would destroy the peace of the nation. The Court of Martial Law had been established 
when martial law was declared in 1940, and this warning of the government reminded 
that martial law, which was forgotten for a long time, was still effective. 87 
In 1947, martial law expired, but certain restrictions still remained in effect. For 
example, criticism of Turkish foreign policy would not be allowed. 88 Furthermore, the 
opposition press was still under strict control . One of the opposition journalists, Recep 
Bilginer, who published the daily Soz Milletin [Words of Nation] , was arrested in 1947. 
He was found innocent at the end of his trial . 89 The humor magazine, Marko Pasa 
[Marco Pasha] was closed several times for writing about anti-democratic laws of 
Turkey, inflation, and for publishing strong criticisms about the authority of the 
Republican People's Party. Authors of the magazine, Aziz Nesin, Sabahattin Ali, Rifat 
Ilgaz, and Mustafa Uykusuz also were arrested and imprisoned.90 
86 Lewis, 309-3 10. 
87 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Hilmi Uran, Hatiralarim [My Memoirs] (Ankara, 1959), 
459-464., quoted in Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the 
Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 158 .  
88 Lewis, 309. 
89 See Recep Bilginer, Hapisligim [My Imprisonment] (Istanbul, 198 1). 
90 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 161 .  
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Aziz Nesin, a famous poet and author, was born in Istanbul in 19 15 .  He was 
graduated from Ankara Military School in 1937. He served for the military during the 
Second World War years. In 1945, he transferred from the military to the journalism. He 
began writing for a daily Karagoz [Black Eye] and a magazine Yedigun [Seven Days]. 
The same year he had his own column in a daily Tan. In 1946, he published a humor 
magazine titled Marko Pasa with Sabahattin Ali. He was arrested and exiled to Bursa 
because of his writings. In 1949, Elizabeth the Princess of England, Iran ' s  Shah Reza 
Pehlevi , and Egypt' s  King Farook, by officially applying to the Foreign Ministry of 
Turkey, sued Aziz Nesin for his writing that allegedly be]ittled them. He was found guilty 
and imprisoned for six months. In 1955, he began writing for a· daily Yeni Gazete [New 
Gazette] . In 1956, he won the international "Gold Palm" award in Italy for his novel 
"Kazan Toreni." In 196 1 ,  he began writing again for a daily Tan and published a humor 
magazine, the Zubuk [Zubuk] . In his later years, he won numerous national and 
international awards for his writings. He founded an organization devoted to education of 
orphans. In 1985, he was selected as the "best author of the year" by the Turkish public. 
He died in Cesme in 1995.91 
Rifat Ilgaz, another famous author and poet, was born in 19 1 1 in Cide. He began 
writing in his secondary school years. He served as a elementary teacher in late 1930s. In 
1942, he published a magazine Yuruyus [Walk] with Omer Faruk Toprak. He published 
his first book titled Yarenli [Friendly Conversation] in 1943. He began working as a 
journalist in the 1950s. Between 1952 and 1960, he worked for a daily Tan as a reporter. 
91 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author, "Aziz Nesin," 
http://www.geocities.com/sanaJdevrim/aziz.htm (2001). 
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He wrote for a magazine Dolmus [Taxi] by using a nickname "Stepne." He began to use 
his own name in his writings after the 1960s. He had retired in 1974. He was detained 
during the 1980s. After his imprisonment was over, he began to live with his son in 
Istanbul. He wrote his memoirs and his prison years in a book titled Kirk Yil Once, Kirk 
Yil Sonra [Before Forty Years, After Forty Years] .  He died in Istanbul in 1993 .92 
In 1948, the government promised to change the anti-democratic provisions of the 
Press Law. A new commission was established inside of the government to prepare a 
proposal for the new version of the Press Law. But before the proposal was sent to the 
Grand National Assembly, the elections were held on 14 May 1950, and the Democrat 
Party came to the authority. The Democrat Party, since it put providing the freedom of 
the press in its agenda before the elections, has taken strong support by the press during 
the election time. The new government passed a new Press Law on 15 July 1950 in the 
Grand National Assembly, and the law was carried on six days later, on 21 July 1950. 
1950 Press Law was still in effect in Turkey with some changes.93 
The 1950 Press Law required the establishment of "Press Courts" to deal with the 
offenses that were committed by the members of the press. In those courts, the press 
prosecutor is responsible for bringing charges. According to the law, the owners of the 
newspapers were not under the burden of carrying responsibility for the articles or news 
published, only the responsible editors and authors of the alleged articles were under the 
threat of fines and/or imprisonment.94 
92 Translated and paraphrased by the author, "Rifat Ilgaz," 
http://www.haberbilgi.com/kitaplar/Rifatllgaz/rifatil gaz. html (2001) . 
93 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] , 1 64. 
94 Ibid. 
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Article 3 1  of the Press Law authorized the Ministers' Council to prevent 
importation and delivery of the publications which originated outside the borders of 
Turkey and which contained material opposing the integrity of the State and nation, the 
principles of the Republic, national security, the general order and peace of the nation, 
and the general moral. 95 
About one year after the passage of the 1950 Press Law, the "Law Regarding the 
Crimes Committed Against Ataturk" was passed in the National Grand Assembly on 25 
July 195 1 .  The law was composed of only 5 articles. Article 1 of the law stated: 
Those who insult the memory of Ataturk shall be punished from one 
to three years imprisonment. Those who break, destroy, or ruin the statu-
tes or similar materials which represent Ataturk shall be punished with 
imprisonment from one to five years. Those who incite to commit these 
crimes are punished as same as the people who actually committed the crimes. 
Article 2 of the law noted that if the crimes stated above were committed in public 
places or through the means of the press, the punishment should be increased by half of 
the original amount. The law authorized the State prosecutors to bring the charges for 
these crimes. 96 
Good relationships between the government and press continued only for two 
years. When the newspapers and magazines began to publish criticisms about the actions 
95 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1950 Basin Kanunu No.5680 [The 1950 
Press Law No.5680], madde 31 [Article No.3 1}, 15 Temmuz [July} 1950, quoted in Mehmet Semih 
Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru: Turkiye'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press 
Freedom in Turkey} (Istanbul: Hurriyet Ofset Matbaacilik, 1990), 106. 
96 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Ataturk Aleyhine Islenen Suclar 
Hakkinda Kanun No.58 16  [The Law Regarding the Crimes Committed Against Ataturk], 25 Temmuz 
[July] 195 1 ,  quoted in Gemalmaz and Dogru: Turkiye 'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati, 1 13. 
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of the Democrat Party, the tension between authority and the press began to mount as 
well .  The opposition journalists started to be arrested again along with the closings of 
their newspapers. After 1954, the number of the trials involving press crimes increased 
dramatically. The publications of the Republican People' s Party were the ones which 
caused the most charges to be made. A number of journalists including Metin Toker, 
Ulku Arman, Sinasi Nahit Berker, Fethi Giray, and Kurtul Altug were arrested and 
sentenced. Ali Ihsan Gogus, the responsible editor of the newspaper Dunya [The World] , 
was also sentenced to 12 months in prison. Huseyin Cahid Yalcin was sentenced to 26 
months 20 days imprisonment for writing an article which allegedly insulted the Prime 
Minister. He celebrated his 80th birthday in prison. Finally, when he became ill, he was 
released from prison.97 
Huseyin Cahid Yalcin was a journalist, translator, and commentator. He was born 
in Balikesir in 1 874. He got the management of a magazine the Servet-i Funun after the 
departure of Tevfik Fikret in 1900. He joined to the Committee of Progress and Union in 
1910. He was elected as a senator to become the president of the Parliament around the 
same period. After the invasion of Istanbul during the World War I, he was arrested by 
English and exiled to the Malta Island in 1919. After the Independence War, he could 
return to Turkey, but since he opposed to some reforms and laws of the new republic, he 
was tried in newly established "Independent Tribunal." He was exiled to Corum in 1925. 
Yalcin was allowed to return to Turkey in the 1930s. He published a magazine Fikir 
Hareketleri [Opinion Movements] in 1933. He entered to politics again in 1938 and at the 
97 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 1 67- 168. 
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same time, he began writing. He was elected as a senator from Istanbul in 1939, and from 
Kars in 1950. He became the main writer of a daily Ulus [The Nation] in 1948. He was 
imprisoned during the Democrat Party period in 1954 for his writings criticizing that 
political party. He died in Istanbul in 1957.98 
Martial law was declared by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and other ministers 
in Turkey one more time on 7 September 1955 due to violent events directed to the 
minority citizens in Istanbul and Izmir. Martial law brought strict restrictions for the 
press. Nurettin Aknoz, the general marshal of the martial law, explained prohibitions over 
the press, in a press meeting held on September 10, 1955: 99 
- Publication of the news that would cause an excitement among the public was 
forbidden. If the discussions in the Grand National Assembly have the same 
characteristics, their publication was not allowed as well. 
Criticism of the government was forbidden. 
Publication of the proceedings of the martial law was forbidden. 
- News about the member countries of NATO was forbidden. 
News and the pictures about the violent events of September 6, 1955 were 
forbidden. 
- News about the poverty and sufferings of citizens in Turkey was forbidden. 
- Murder news that creates anxiety among the public was forbidden. 
Publication of the proceedings of martial law courts was forbidden. 
98 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author, "Huseyin Cahid Yalcin," 
http://www.kimkimdir.gen.tr/huseyincahidyalcin/index.html (2001 ). 
99 Translated and paraphrased by the author Hifzi Topuz, 100 Soruda Turk Basin Tarihi [The History of 
Turkish Press in 100 Questions] (Istanbul, 1973) , 195- 197. 
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On 20 September 1955 ,  Aknoz suspended the publication of the newspaper Ulus 
[The Nation] for indefinite time, and dailies Hurriyet [Freedom}, Tercuman [Interpreter}, 
and Hergun [Everyday) for 15 days for the violation of orders of martial law. 1 00 On 7 
June 1956, martial law expired. 
As a result of struggles between the Republican and Democrat Parties, the 
military intervened and martial law was declared again on 27 May 1960. The Democrat 
Party was removed from power, and on behalf of the military forces, Milli Birlik 
Komitesi [the National Unity Committee], consisting of mostly military officers, took 
over the administration. The National Unity Committee announced that the military coup 
was made in order to save democracy, and the government would be transferred to the 
civilians with the elections hold in the shortest period of time. After this announcement, 
the overthrown President, Prime Minister, ministers, deputies of the ruling party, were 
taken into custody. General Cemal Gursel, the leader of the military action, became the 
president of the National Unity Committee, and he claimed the functions of the President, 
Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff. The Turkish Grand National Assembly 
was dissolved and the National Unity Committee took over its legislative actions. 10 1 
During the period of the National Unity Committee, direct censorship of the publications 
was not allowed, but the advocacy of overthrowing the government was still a crime. 
In July 1961, the new constitution of Turkey was adopted with a public 
referendum and the National Unity Committee transferred power to the civilians 
following the elections held on 15 October 1961. "In accordance with the new 
100 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 17 1. 
101 "From 1923 to the Present," http://www.turkey.org/countryprofile/from1923.htm#top ( 1999). 
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Constitution, the twenty-two members of the National Unity Committee entered into 
Parliament as 'Natural Senators ' and Cemal Gursel was elected President ." 102 
With the new constitution, the legislature was transformed to a bicameral 
parliament. The constitution reserved the legislative power to the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, while the executive power was left to the President and the Council of 
Ministers. Civil and military courts were and are still responsible with the administration 
of judicial power. 
The second chapter of the 1961 constitution was composed of the provisions 
about the press. Article 22 of the Constitution stated: "The press is free, and shall not be 
censored. The government provides the necessary measures that would guarantee the 
freedom of the press and communication ." The same article then continued by noting a 
series of restrictions over the press: "Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles 
which threaten the internal or external security of the state or the indivisible integrity of 
the State, . . .  or which refer to classified state secrets . . .  shall be held responsible under the 
law relevant to these offences . . .  
The National Unity Committee passed an anti-democratic law about the press on 
5 March 1962. It was titled as the "Law Regarding the Actions that Threaten the 
Constitutional Order, National Security and Peace." Article l of the statute stated: 
102 Ibid. 
Those who criticize the 27 May 1960 military intervention, the decisions 
made by the official agencies of the government, publish false news about 
the proceedings of the government, and make propaganda in favor of the 
overthrown Democrat Party, shall be punished with imprisonment from one 
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to five years . 
Article 2 of the statute said: 
Those who criticize the multi-party parliamentary system of Turkey, and who 
make propaganda that this regime of the government is failed, shall be punished 
from one to five years in prison. 
Article 7 empowered the State prosecutors to investigate alleged crimes and bring 
charges. But under the circumstances that military judiciary is in charge, the military 
judge is privileged to execute the duties of the State prosecutors. 103 
After passage of the "Law Regarding the Actions that Threaten the Constitutional 
Order, National Security and Peace" went into effect, charges were brought against the 
many journalists with the violation of the provisions of the law .  For example, Ferruh 
Dogan was tried because of his caricature titled "Open Regime." He was found innocent 
at the end of his trial . Ahmet Emin Yalman, and Selami Akpinar, the responsible editor of 
Hur Vatan [Free Fatherland], underwent a lengthy trial for publishing an interview with 
the old members of the Democrat Party, who were at that time in prison. The law was 
repealed later, and all the charges and trials under it were dropped. 104 
With the elections held on 1965, the Justice Party (AP) received 53 percent of the 
votes and by obtaining the majority in the Parliament, came to power. The chairman of 
the party, Su]eyman Demirel, became the Prime Minister. The period between 1965-7 1 ,  
when AP, was in power, was one of the freest times of the press. "This was the period 
when the laws which limited free thought and which were considered to be anti-
103 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] , 92-194. 
104 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Topuz, JOO Soruda Turk Basin Tarihi, 221 .  
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democratic were applied at a minimal level, . . .  varying points of views were openly 
written and discussed." 105 
The end of 1960s was a period of intense student demonstrations, which started in 
France but then spread al l over the world. A major reason behind these demonstrations 
was to criticize the educational methods and examinations systems in universities. Turkey 
also felt the winds of these student reactions. 
On 12 March 197 1 ,  the period of freedom which was enjoyed between 1965 and 
197 1 ,  ended with a communique. The joint memorandum of the Chief of General Staff 
and four Force Commanders was read on the radio and it called "for the formation of a 
nonpartisan government of national consensus in which all the political parties would 
participate so that the necessary reforms with a Kemalist perception could be 
implemented and so that terrorism and anarchy could be prevented and the future of the 
regime could be secured." 106 Otherwise, the army warned, "it would undertake the 
administration directly."107 As a result of this development, Prime Minister Demirel 
resigned the same day, and Nihat Erim became a new Prime Minister. The first move of 
Erim's government, which was supposed to make reforms, was to declare martial law in 
eleven cities, and to adopt the Law for the Maintenance of Order No. 1402 on 13 May 
197 1 .  
Law No. 1402 gave the generals martial law privileges to search i n  the properties 
of the people, to stop the actions of political parties and organizations, to limit 
communications, to control the press, and to close the printing houses without giving any 




reason. 108 On 22 September 197 1 ,  the government also passed the Act No. 1488 on 22 
September 197 1 .  The Act No. 1488 changed the articles 22 and 27 of the 196 1  
Constitution, which, to some extent, had provided for freedom for the press. The previous 
version of the Article 22 had authorized a judge to suspend, as a preventive measure, the 
distribution of publications which carried out the offenses that were stated in the article. 
But the new version of the Article 22 authorized prosecutors with the same duty. 109 
In the later years, press trials followed one after other. Journali sts Turhan Dilligil 
in Ankara, Dogan Kologlu, Alpay Kabacali and Sabri Yilmaz in Istanbul were arrested 
for the charges of insulting the President, which was a violation of the Penal Code article 
1 58, and were sent to a jail in July 1972. Osman S. Arolat, the responsible editor of the 
magazine Ant, were arrested with the violation of articles 142, 1 59 and 3 1 1  of the 
Constitution, and 24 years imprisonment was sought by the prosecutor. Other journalists 
accused of insult were Abdulkadir Billurcu, Nihal Atsizm and Necdet Sevinc. The total 
imprisonment time asked for them was almost 100 years. 1 10  
Government repression also reached to education, and Mumtaz Soysal, a 
professor in constitutional law, arrested for making propaganda of communism in his 
book titled "Fundamentals of the Constitution." He was tried in the court of martial law, 
took 6 years 8 months imprisonment, then the verdict about him was withdrawn. 1 1 1  
108 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1402 Sayili Sikiyonet im Kanunu [The 
Law for the Maintenance of Order] ( 1971 ) ,  quoted in Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru: 
Turkiye 'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press Freedom in Turkey], 16 1 .  
109  Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1488 Sayili Yasa [The Act No. 1488] 
( 197 1), quoted in Alpay Kabacali: Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the 
Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 197. 
1 10 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present] ,  199. 
1 1 1  Ibid., 204. 
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The Commandership of the Istanbul Martial Law declared a list that included 139 
books whose publication was prohibited. According to the report of the International 
Lawyers Council, even Einstein' s Natural Law was among the ones prohibited. 1 12 
Martial law ended in October 1973, after the general elections were held in the 
country. Those who were arrested during the period of the martial law were released in 
1974 after the declaration of general pardon. 
In 1974, many prosecutions were brought against the publications of leftists and 
rightists whose number increased dramatically. According to the list that was sent by the 
government to the Department of Justice during the period between 7 July and 1 1  July 
1975, there were the names of 1 8  publications in which the government found criminal 
matter, and therefore, wanted to bring prosecutions against a variety of publications. 
Charges included: 1 13 
- For the three articles in Kitle [Mass], the magazine of the Turkish Socialist 
Party, with the violation of Articles 159, 142, 141,  and 3 12  of the Turkish 
Penal Code, 
- For the two articles in Yuruyus [Walk], the magazine of the Turkish Workers 
Party, with the violation of Articles 159 and 141 of the Code, 
m Translated and paraphrased by the author from Uluslararasi Hukukcular Birligi Turkiye Raporu 1971-
1973 (The Turkey Report of lntemational Lawyers Organization 1971- 1973), Ceviren [Translatated and 
edited by] Ince Pehlivan (Istanbul, 1973) , 56, quoted in Alpay Kabacali : Baslangictan Gunumuze 
Turkiye 'de Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 199. 
113 See Ugur Mumcu, "Sayin Muhbir Basbakan" [Dear Spy Prime Minister], Cumhuriyet [The Republic], 
21 Subat [February} 1976. 
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- For six articles in the magazine, Halkin Sesi [Voice of the Nation], with the 
violation of Article 3 12, and for two articles in the same magazine with the 
violation of Article 142 of the Code, 
For the article titled "Sakarya Election," which was written by Ahmet 
Kahraman, in the newspaper Yeni Ortam [New Environment], with the 
violation of Article 159 of the Penal Code, 
And for the article that published in the newspaper Milli Gazete [National 
Gazette], the publication of the National Peace Party, for the violation of 
Article 163, which made it a crime to establish, organize, regulate, or 
administer societies with the purpose of adapting the basic social, economic, 
political or judicial orders of the State to religious principles and beliefs. 
Article 16 of the Press Law, which required the imprisonment of the responsible 
editor and the author of the accused article, was changed with the law on 8 May 1979. 
According to the new version of the article, the imprisonment of the responsible editors 
was transformed to the fines. 1 14 
Over years, the intensity and tension of the struggle between the leftists and 
rightists increased, resulting in military intervention one more time on 12 September 
1980. Five military generals took all the authority in the country by naming themselves 
the "National Security Council." During that period, those generals had the power to 
control the press directly by allowing the newspapers and magazines to print only stories 
approved by this government. Those who did not comply with the orders began to get 
1 1 4  Translated and paraphrased by the author from Alpay Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de 
Basin Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 209. 
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arrested as early as the night of the 12 September 1980. Demirtas Ceyhun, Rifat Ilgaz, 
Osman Sahin, and Lutfu Oflaz were among the ones who were arrested for their writings 
before September 12. 1 1 5 
Preparation for the new constitution of Turkey gained speed after declaration of 
martial law in 1980, and finally on 7 November 1982, the new constitution of Turkey, 
still in effect in 2002 with amendments made in later years, was promulgated. Chapter 2 
of the 1982 Constitution, as in the 196 1  Constitution, included the basic guarantees for 
freedom of expression and of the press (see Appendix A for the amendments made in the 
1982 Constitution of Turkey) . 
Civilians took the control from the military in 1983, and the multi-party system 
was restored again. In the same year, the Motherland Party won the general elections, and 
came to the authority with its leader, Turgut Ozal , becoming the Prime Minister of 
Turkey. 
On 4 February 1983, the Law of the Supreme Court of Appeal was declared. The 
law regulated the elections and duties of the members of the Supreme Court of Appeal . 1 1 6 
On 16  June 1983, the State Security Courts were established, and the law regarding the 
establishment and trying procedures of the Court was passed. The law authorized State 
Security Courts to deal with offenses against the integrity of the state. Article 23N of this 
law stated that those who damage the order and integrity of the court with words, 
publications, and/or actions, or insult the court, the president of the court, the members of 
the court, or the public prosecutor and its assistant, can be held in contempt, and their 
1 15 Ibid., 2 19. 
1 16 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Gemalmaz and Dogru, Turkiye • de Basin Ozgurlugu 
Mevzuati, 168. 
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publications can be suspended. If they continue to publish by violating the order of 
suspension, they can be imprisoned from three months to six months, and can also be 
fined from five thousand liras to fifteen thousand liras. 1 1 7 
On 22 September 1983, The Turkish Flag Act was passed. Article 7 of the Act 
made it crime to use a flag in dirty, damaged, tom, wrinkled condition, which damages its 
symbolic value. The Article continued: "The contempt of and insult to the Turkish Flag 
with words, publications, and actions cannot be allowed. The flag cannot be tom apart, 
burned, or thrown out." 
Article 8 of the Act noted that those who did not comply with the provisions of 
the Flag Act are punished according to what was stated in the article 526 of the Turkish 
Penal Code. 1 1 8 
There were Flag Protection laws in the United States, similar to the one in Turkey, 
prior to 1989. Both the Federal Government and 48 states had such laws prohibiting 
desecration of the flag before 1989. But since the Supreme Court's ruling in Texas v. 
Johnson1 1 9  that stated "burning an American flag as part of a political demonstration was 
expressive conduct protected by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment," 
neither the Federal Government, nor the States, have been able to pass laws prohibiting 
the desecration of the American flag. As recently as in July 2001, the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed flag protection amendment that would grant Congress the power 
to enact laws to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag. Despite the amendment's 
success in the House, it can be expected to fail again in the Senate, if we consider the 
1 17 Ibid ., 172. 
1 1 8  Ibid., 175-176. 
1 19 49 1 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct . 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 ( 1989). 
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similar amendments' fortune in the last 12 years which was resulted with rejection by the 
Senate. 1 20 
A State of Emergency Act passed on 25 October 1983 and brought additional 
restrictions over the press. Article 1 1  of the Act stated that when a state of emergency 
exists; the printing, publication and distribution of newspapers, magazines, pamphlets 
and books can be stopped, seized, or required to get a permission in order to protect the 
general order and peace of the nation and to prevent violent actions. 1 2 1  
Press Law No. 5680, which was passed on 15 July 1950, and was still in effect in 
2002, noted further limitations on press freedom. With the new amendments made on 
November 10, 1983, the punishments for press crimes were increased. The new version 
of the 1950 Press Law also authorized a public prosecutor, without securing a court order, 
to stop distribution of any publication containing material that constitutes an offense 
against the state and that reveals government secrets. 1 22 
On 10 November 1983, the "Law Regarding the Establishment and Trying 
Procedures of the Constitutional Court of Turkey" was passed. The law authorized the 
Constitutional Court for judicial review of legislation. Article 42/1 of the law stated that 
pre-trial hearings of the Constitutional Court were secret. Article 43 of the law provided 
that agencies and officials of the government may refrain from giving the top-secret 
120 "Flag Protection Amendment Passes House," http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa07 l80 l  b.htm 
(July 17, 2001). 
121 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 25 Ekim 1983 tarihli 1 8204 sayili 
Olaganustu Hal Kanunu [A State of Emergency Act No. 1 8204, October 25, 1983], quoted in Mehmet 
Semih Gemalmaz and Osman Dogru: Turkiye'de Basin Ozgurlugu Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning 
Press Freedom in Turkey] (Istanbul: Hurriyet Ofset Matbaacilik, 1990), 179. 
122 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 2950 Sayili Kanun, ek madde 1 [The 
Act No. 2950, added Article No. I], quoted in Kabacali, 224. 
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information and/or sending the top-secret documents if they think that the national 
security of the nation and the nation can be damaged as a result of releasing that 
information and the documents. The constitutional court makes decisions about such 
incidents. If the two-third of the Court votes in favor of delivery of that top-secret 
information by the government, the government was obligated to release of that 
information and documents related to that. 123 
According to the report of the Organization of the Modem Journalists of Turkey, 
1 8 1  journalists, publishers, and writers were charged against and arrested for various 
offenses, and 82 were imprisoned between the period of 12 September 1980 and 12 
March 1984. Among those who were convicted were Bektas Erdogan, Fuat Akyurek, 
Mustafa Colak, Semih Ozal, Muslim Colak, Ahmet Tastan, Taner Kayas, Erol Gozmen, 
Ugur Tekin, Ilhan Akalin, Attilla Aksu, Isik Yurtcu, Dogan Yurdakul, Yunus Er, and 
many others. 124 Most of the "guilty" judgments were issued for violation of the Article 
142 of the Penal Code, which made it a crime to make propaganda "in any manner for 
governing of the State by one person or by a group of persons, contrary to republicanism 
or to the principles of democracy, directed to abolish for racial reasons partially or 
entirely the civil rights secured by the constitution, or to exterminate or weaken 
nationalist feelings," and to speak "favorably of the acts forbidden in these sections." 
123 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Gemalmaz and Dogru, Turkiye 'de Basin Ozgurlugu 
Mevzuati [The Regulations Concerning Press Freedom in Turkey], 1 8 1 .  
124 Translated and paraphrased by the author from "Basin 80-84 [The Press Between 1980 and 1984]," 
Cagdas Gazeteciler Dernegi Yayini [The Publication of the Organization of Modern Journalists] (Ankara, 
1984) : 197-230. 
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Some of those journalists were also found guilty for the violation of the articles 159, 3 1 1 ,  
and 3 12 of the Penal Code. 1 25 
On 1 5  May 1984, a signed petition was sent to the Presidency and the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey. Those who signed the petition demanded some regulatory 
changes in order to increase the effectiveness of a democracy. A free press was seen as 
one of the most important fundamental parts of the democracy, according to the signers 
of the petition. The petitioners stated that in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
democracy, the press should be without restrictions, should be independent, and multi­
voiced. The same day that the signed petition was received by the government, its 
publication was prohibited. Those who signed the petition were questioned, and most of 
them were tried in the courts. In the trials, cameras and tape-recorders were not allowed 
in the courtroom. The government also disallowed the defense of Aziz Nesin, one of the 
signers of the petition in July 1985. The lawsuit known as the "Petition of the 
Intellectuals" was resulted with the "not guilty" verdict of the court for the defenders. 1 26 
On 4 May 1988, Article 24 of the civil law was changed. The new provision of 
that article provided that those, whose reputations were attacked or in the danger of being 
attacked, can demand the necessary precautions to stop these invasions. 1 27 This change 
was made in fact to stop some news and publications. It was mostly carried out in this 
way by the members of the authority party in the following years. Some leading members 
of the party in authority brought lawsuits against many journalists with the charge of 
125 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present], 223. 
126 Ibid., 221 .  
127 See Dr. Ahmet Kilicoglu, "Medeni Kanun Degisirken" [While Civil Law Was Changing], Cumhuriyet 
[The Republic] ,  7 Mart [March] 1988. 
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personal insult. In 1988, with the changes in the Articles 480 and 482 of the Penal Code, 
which regulate the punishment for the crimes of personal insult, fines were increased. 1 28 
While the members of the press evaluated those latest actions of the government 
as attempts to suppress the freedom of criticism of the press, the government continued 
its similar actions. In 1988, publisher Muzaffer Erdost and attorney Halit Celenk were 
interrogated by the police for 18  hours, and then they were arrested for the charge of 
making the communist propaganda. They were tried in the court for provoking the labor 
segments of the population, but at the end, they were found innocent. 129 
On 10 May 1990, the government passed a "Decree Regarding the Additional 
Cautions in a State of Emergency." Article 1 of the Decree stated that printing, 
publication, and distribution of any material, which could damage order in the region 
where a state of emergency exists, and which could cause excitement among the public of 
that region, can be prohibited temporarily or permanently by the government order. If it is 
seen necessary, the printing houses of those publications can be closed as well. 1 30 
On April 12, 199 1 ,  both positive and negative developments occurred in the area 
of freedom of expression. Articles of the Penal Code, which were seen as anti-democratic 
by many, were repealed. These included Article No. 140 [forbidding publishing in a 
foreign country untrue, malicious, or exaggerated rumors or news about the internal 
situation of the States, or conducting activities harmful to national interests] , Article 
128 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Kabacali, Baslangictan Gunumuze Turkiye 'de Basin 
Sansuru [Censorship of the Press in Turkey from its Origins to Present}, 232. 
129 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from Cumhuriyet [ The Republic], 26 Aralik 
[December] 1988. 
130 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 9 Mayis 1990 tarihli 424 sayili "Siddet 
Olaylarinin Yayginlasmasi ve Kamu Duzeninin Ciddi Sekilde Bozulmasi Sebebine Dayali Olaganustu 
Halin Devami Suresince Alinacak Ilave Tedbirlere Iliskin Kanun Hukmunde Kararname" [A Decree 
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No. 141 [forbidding establishing societies or conducting activities with purposes of 
establishing domination of a social class over other classes, or overthrowing any of the 
established basic economic or social orders of the country, or exterminating the political 
and legal orders of the State, or governing the State by one person or by group of persons, 
contrary to the principles of republicanism or democracy, or abolishing partially or 
entirely societies because of race, the civil rights provided by the constitution, or 
exterminating or weakening national feelings], Article No. 142 [forbidding creating 
propaganda contrary to republicanism or the principles of democracy, directed to abolish 
for racial reasons partially or entirely the civil rights secured by the constitution, or 
exterminating or weakening national feelings], Article 143 [forbidding establishing, 
organizing, regulating or conducting, without the permission of the Government, 
societies of international character or societies the headquarters of which are in foreign 
countries] , and Article 163 [forbidding, contrary to laicization* establishing, organizing, 
regulating or administering societies with the purpose of adapting, even partially, the 
basic social, economic, political or judicial orders of the State to religious principles and 
beliefs] , were all repealed. 13 1 That same day, the Turkish Parliament passed the Anti­
Terror Law, making the same offenses covered in the repealed articles of the Penal Code 
criminal once more. 
Article 1 of the Anti-Terror Law described terror as "the actions of a person or 
group of persons which belonged to an organization whose purpose is to change the 
Regarding the Additional Cautions in a State of Emergency No.424, May 9, 1990], quoted in Kabacali, 
238-245 
* Freedom of Government affairs from religious interference. 
131  For detailed explanation of the Articles see page 150 of this chapter. 
1 8 1  
political, legal, social, economic order and principles of the Republic, to destroy the 
indivisible integrity of the State, to endanger the presence of the State and the republic, to 
attempt of weakening or destroying the stability of the Government, to destroy the basic 
rights and freedoms, to threaten the internal and external security of the State and general 
order of the nation ." 
Article 2 of the Law made it a crime to commit the actions stated above. Also 
Article 8 prohibited the separatist propaganda which aims to destroy the indivisible 
integrity of the State. Those who commit the stated crimes can be punished with 
imprisonment from one to three years, and be fined from 100 million to 300 million 
Turkish Liras. 
After the 1990s, the press in Turkey gradually began to gain its independence 
from government. The government allowed the members of the press to criticize the 
authority and its actions, and to express any political viewpoint. Lively debates on 
political issues increased in number. The abolition of the state monopoly over television 
and radio broadcasting in 1993 as a result of rapid increase in the number of private 
television and radio stations was also a positive development toward expanding the areas 
in which free expression and speech are not restricted. Today there are 16 national private 
television channels and seven state radio and television channels in Turkey, which 
outweigh any European nation in number. 
Although the press in Turkey enjoyed more freedom in the years following 1990, 
certain restrictions of the government over the press still exist in some areas. For 
example, threats to the national security and order, publishing propaganda detrimental to 
national feelings, insulting the authorities, and violations to the indivisible integrity of the 
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State with its nation and territory are sti ll the major reasons for suppressing of freedom of 
the press. 1 32 Laws and constitution of the country authorize the government to restrict 
freedom of expression and press for the purposes or preventing crime, punishing 
offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the 
reputation rights and the personal and family privacy of individuals, protecting 
professional secrets as prescribed by law, and ensuring the proper functioning of the 
judiciary. 
As recently as in October 2001 ,  Burak Bekdil , a journalist for the newspaper 
Turkish Daily News, was accused of ridiculing the judiciary of Turkey by violating 
Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code, which makes it a crime to insult the authorities 
including the Parliament, the government, and the military. The article that brought him 
trouble stated that "An ordinary Turk would probably have one in a million chance for a 
fair trial if he is foolish enough to trust Turkish courts and judges. And worse, if in search 
of justice he dares to complain about a verdict -or a judge- that would only add to his 
nightmares. Many people think Turkey's  most untouchable class is its generals. Oh, no, 
never underestimate its judges." 1 33 
The trial about Bekdil was stil l continuing early in 2002, and he is facing a 
maximum prison term of six years. 1 34 
The 1982 Constitution of Turkey went to amendment on October 17, 2001 ,  and 
28 articles of the Constitution were changed. With the amendments, broadcasting in the 
Kurdish language and other languages was allowed. The new amendments also provided 
132 Paying the Price, 77. 
133 ''Turkish journalists pokes fun at judiciary, may go to jail,"www.freedomforum.org. (October 3, 2001). 
134 Ibid. 
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that the death penalty, which had not been administered in Turkey since 1984, is now 
limited to acts of terrorism and treason. 
The election of Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the former chief justice of the constitutional 
court and outspoken advocate of democratic reforms, as President of Turkey in May 2000 
accelerated Turkey's efforts toward expansion of freedoms. President Sezer urged 
"relaxation of anti-terror laws and other legislation that restricted free speech, political 
parties, and the rights of Kurds." 1 35 I n  August, he twice vetoed "a government decree that 
would facilitate the removal of public servants suspected of fundamentalist or separatist 
sympathies." 1 36 I n  October 2000, the law authorizing the Turkish government to issue 
decrees with the force of law was annulled by the constitutional court of Turkey. 1 37 
Conclusion: 
Seditious libel, another ancient enemy of freedoms, has been a very effective 
weapon of governments to silence their critics over years. I n  the United States, although 
it is not much of a threat in 2002, seditious libel has been declared a crime several times 
with laws in the nation's history, especially at the times of stress. I n  Turkey, although 
there is no wording equivalent to seditious libel, its function can be found in the nation's 
history as well as in the United States. Over the years, governments in Turkey designed 
many laws and decrees to silence their critics. Since the Turkish governments have been 
more open to external threats like the campaign of Kurdish Workers' Party (PICK) with 
terrorist actions, they have felt insecure and this insecurity have compelled them to 
135 ''The 2000-2001 Freedom in the World Report on Turkey," Freedom House Committee," 




design laws to punish their critics whose loyalty was in suspect. The events of September 
1 1 th, 2001 ,  have opened a new window for governments and have given them "terrorism" 
as a factor to justify their actions to limit freedoms. 
Looking at the picture in early 2002, we can conclude that Siebert' s second 
proposition is instructive for it stated that the more insecure the government, the more 
restraints are brought on the press. In the past, when governments in the United States 
and Turkey perceived an internal or external attack to their stability and structure of the 
society, seditious libel charges and prosecutions for people whose loyalties were in 
suspect increased as legitimate cautions to protect the nation's security, and in the future, 





Licensing is another form of prior restraint. Although it does not exist in 2002 as a 
form of governmental control on the print media in the United States and Turkey, 
licensing is administered on the broadcasting media in both countries through 
governmental agencies. 
Today broadcasting is more than 75 years old as one of the industries that 
experienced a most rapid development in line with technological and political changes. In 
every country in the world, governments have made attempts to regulate broadcasting 
either because they realize broadcasting's power to influence citizens or, as in the United 
States, for reasons of technology, to cope with a scarcity of frequencies. The fact that the 
electromagnetic spectrum is finite limits the number of broadcast stations that may 
transmit simultaneously. Licensing radio and television stations to operate on 
electromagnetic spectrum became a necessity because an unlimited number of 
unlicensed, or unassigned stations create "chaos" on the airwaves. Since the only answer 
to "chaos" is licensing, it fell to the governments of nations to license stations. 1 
Regulation of broadcasting usually has been administered in the form of 
legislation, and even "in former totalitarian states, the law was used as a legitimizing 
vehicle."2 However, in the recent times, regulation was replaced with deregulation in 
1 Herbert H. Howard, interview by author, Knoxville, Tennessee, 2 April 2002. 
2 Wolfgang Hoffinann-Riem, Regulating Media - The Licensing and Supervision of Broadcasting in Six 
Countries (New York, London: The Guilford Press, 1 996), 2-3. 
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most Western and Eastern countries, following a trend of regulation by market forces that 
said, there always remains a fundamental level of government permission to broadcast. 3 
In the most Western European countries, including Turkey, broadcasting has been 
a monopoly of the state, in the form of so-called public broadcasting, until the 1990s. 
Therefore, opening up the broadcasting market to competition was a significant change in 
those countries. However, in the United States, broadcasting was the responsibility of the 
private commercial sector from its very beginning, and public broadcasting was created 
later. A duopoly of public and private broadcasting emerged in the United States in the 
1930s, but it did not reach Turkey until the 1990s. 
Especially in those European countries which began private broadcasting recently, 
some issues have been raised such as the threat to vulnerable traditional and cultural 
values since most of the programming in the form of "entertainment," "news," or 
"education" is imported from the United States. In fact, since its first decade of 
emergence in the 1950s, American television was involved in the lives of other nations -
"an involvement of imperial scope. "4 Other concerns were loss of program quality and 
deterioration of the public service concept. These concerns are part of the context for 
statutory regulation and supervision of broadcasting in those countries. The legal range of 
regulatory instruments in the United States and its supervisory body of broadcasting, the 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC), were used as models in the regulation of 
private broadcasting in those European countries, including Turkey.5 As Hoffman-Riem 
3 Ibid., 3. 
4 Eric Bamouw, The Image Empire - A  History of Broadcasting in the United States, Volume ill - from 
1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 970), 3. 
5 Hoffmann-Riem, 4. 
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stated, "the creation of broadcasting regulation in this way was an important precondition 
for the introduction of private sector broadcasting. The supervisory body set up by the 
state served as a guarantee that broadcasting would develop in a responsible manner - or 
at least not proliferate uncontrollably."6 
At this writing in 2002, a comparison of broadcasting regulation in the United 
States and Turkey gives us some insight regarding the similarities and differences in this 
area of media control. These countries came from different backgrounds - the United 
States has a long tradition of private sector broadcasting under the FCC supervision; 
while in Turkey there was a 57-year government monopoly on broadcasting, and private 
broadcasting is only a decade old. Outlining the main distinctions in broadcasting 
between those two countries allows seeing the diversity of possible regulation options 
where these two nations are concerned. 7 
2. Licensing in Early England 
Because the legal system of the United States evolved from English law, these 
early roots of licensing communication deserve mention here. I n  Early England, prior 
restraint was applied by the government in the form of licensing. A licensing system 
began in and around London in 1 530. The Stationers Company was established under 
Queen Mary in 1 557 and was responsible with informing authorities about illegal 
unlicensed printers. 8 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Wolfhang Hoffinann-Riem, Regulating Media - The Licensing and Supervision of Broadcasting in 
Six Countries, 5, where he used the same logic in comparison of six countries. 
8 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1 776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 68. 
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The Court of the Star Chamber was created by royal edict in 1588 as another 
controHer of the printing media. The members of the Star Chamber included high-ranking 
government officials. Those members issued decrees and ordered punishments by sitting 
"behind closed doors in the ' starred chamber' at Westminster."9 The 23 June 1586 decree 
of the Star Chamber, as the most extensive regulation of the press in that period, stayed in 
effect until 1637. The Decree confirmed the Stationers Company' s power for search and 
seizure. It also authorized the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London to 
license an books (with the exception of law books and the ones printed by the queen 's 
printer). 1 0  
The Court of Star Chamber was abolished in 1641 ,  but the government continued 
its restrictions of printers "by means of a licensing agency (the Company of Stationers), a 
Board of Li censers, or by various parliamentary committees." 1 1  After 164 7, a series of 
Printing Acts were put into effect by the government. Printing Acts of 1649 and 1653 
limited printing to the city of London, prohibited an 'scandalous' and 'seditious' 
publications, and required that al l books and pamphlets to be licensed. 12 The Printing Act 
of 1653 imposed additional restrictions by giving authority to the Council of State to 
determine the number of printing houses, apprentices, and presses, and required that all 
the printers must get the permission of the Council of the State. 1 3  The Regulation of 
Printing Act, which was passed in 1662, intended to prevent "the frequent abuses in 
9 William E. Francois, Mass Media Law and Regulation, 6th ed. (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland 
Press, Inc., 1994), 2. 
10 Siebert, 6 1 ,  62. 
1 1  Francois, 2. 
1 2  Siebert, 222, 223. 
13 Ibid., 228, 229. 
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printing seditious, treasonable, and unlicensed books and pamphlets," and to regulate 
"printing and printing presses." 14 This Act was the major regulation of the press from 
1662 to 1694 except the years 1679-1685. 1 5 
The Regulation of Printing Act of 1662 also offered special privileges to the 
stationers and printers if they cooperated in enforcing the state regulations. The Act also 
put the licensing system under authority of the Parliament. I t  prohibited the printing of all 
unlicensed and unauthorized books and pamphlets. 16  The Regulation of Printing Act 
expired in 1694 due to inability of a two-party Parliamentary government to enforce an 
effective regulation system. 17 
As seen above, in early England, "a licensing system was instituted on the theory 
that printing was a state matter and therefore subject the control by the crown." 1 8  During 
that period, the English government used its licensing power on the press successfully, 
and made it crime to publish without license. A licensing system expired in England in 
1694. 
3. Licensing in the United States 
Licensing in the United States has not been a problem for print media, except in 
getting permission to cover battles during wartime conditions. Although licensing of the 
print media was not allowed, licensing of broadcast stations in the "public interest, 
convenience, or necessity" has been a widely accepted form of governmental control. 19  
1 4  Ibid., 238. 
15 Ibid. 
16  Ibid., 242. 
17 Ibid., 260. 
18 Francois, 2. 
19 Dwight L. Teeter Jr., "The First Amendment at Its Bicentennial: Necessary But Not Sufficient?" 
Journalism Quarterly 69 (Spring 1992): 2 1 .  
190 
From that aspect, broadcasters argue that the shield of First Amendment is weaker for 
them than the print media because the federal government, through the Federal 
Communication Commission, requires them to get a license to operate a radio or 
television station, and this is a form of prior restraint. In the United States, however, 
licensed broadcast stations · are free to criticize government, and it is understood that 
"broadcast re-licensing by the Federal Communications Commission has become largely 
a routine matter."20 
The primary reason for licensing in broadcasting and the need for a government 
agency, representing the public, is to provide for orderly use of the spectrum on which 
there is a limited number of channels for possible use. Secondary reasons for licensing 
stations include providing that qualified and responsible parties are entrusted with the 
facilities to which they are licensed and who will serve "the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity." In some countries, licensees are approved because the parties have 
incurred favor with the government and other would-be licensees are turned down 
because they are out-of-favor with the government. In any case, a licensee is expected to 
follow the rules and regulations of broadcasting set forth by the government and its 
broadcasting agency (e.g. , the FCC).21  
The rapid development of large-scale broadcasting in the United States in the 
1920s caught Congress unprepared to deal with the chaos (interference between stations) 
and to bring new requirements in this field. At that time, the only statute governing radio 
broadcasting was the Radio Act of 19 12, which primarily dealt with ship-to-ship and 
20 Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and 
Broadcast Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 7 1 .  
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maritime communications. 22 Over time, this statute proved to be inadequate to control 
rapidly growing radio broadcasting. "By November 1925 more than 578 stations were on 
the air and applications had been filed for 175 and more."23 After experiencing 
considerable interference with each other on the airwaves, radio stations, politicians, and 
the public came to the point of demanding governmental control in this field since "the 
increase in stations continued unchecked."24 
Succeeding the Radio Act of 1912, the new Radio Act was finally enacted in 1927 
to make order out of the chaos in radio industry. With the Radio Act of 1927 both 
broadcast regulation began and the era ended in which "use of the airwaves was an 
inherent right of every citizen, limited only by the availability of spectrum space."25 
Section 1 1  of the Act transformed this right to the status of privilege, to be granted by the 
Federal Radio Communication to broadcast stations which would serve the "public 
interest."26 
The Radio Act of 1927 created the Federal Radio Commission (PRC) and divided 
the responsibilities between The Secretary of Commerce and the new Commission. The 
act authorized the FRC "with broad administrative and quasi-judicial powers"27 over 
applications for station licenses, renewals, and revoke of those licenses, while the 
Secretary of Commerce was responsible with "fixing the qualifications of operators, 
21 Howard, interview by author. 
22 Erwin G. Krasnow and Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics of Broadcast Regulation, foreword by 
Newton Minow, second ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 8-9. 
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Teeter and Loving, 650. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Krasnow and Longley, 1 1 . 
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inspecting station equipment, and assigning call letters."28 But the FRC was an 
experimental body with a temporary status and its powers expired after one year. 
Additionally, the vagueness of the Radio Act of 1927 posed some difficulties in control 
of the radio industry. 
After the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president, the Communications Act 
of 1934 was enacted and a new Federal Communications Commission was created as the 
supervisory body of broadcasting industry "with power to issue licenses, allocate 
frequencies, and specify operating conditions."29 The Jicensees were to operate in the 
public interest, convenience, or necessity. 
The Federal Communications Commission was composed of seven members 
appointed by the president "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. "30 The new 
commission was authorized with "regulation of interstate and foreign communication by 
wire as well as by radio,"3 1  and its powers also included the regulation of te]ephone and 
telegraph. 
The Mass Media Bureau of the FCC was formed in 1982 with the merger of the 
Broadcast Bureau and the Cable Bureau. 32 This bureau is  primarily responsib]e for 
developing, recommending, and administering policies and programs for the regulation of 
28 Ibid. 
29 Francois, 497. 
30 William B. Ray, FCC-The Ups and Downs of Radio-TV Regulation, foreword by Cla rk Mollenhoff 
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990), xvii. 
31 Ibid. 
32 T .Barton Carter, Marc A.Franklin, and Jay B.Wright, The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate -
Regulation of Electronic Mass Media, 5th ed . (New York: Foundation Press, 1999), 37. 
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radio and television broadcasting. The Mass Media Bureau's duties and responsibilities 
are as follows:33 
(a) Process applications for authorizations m radio and television services, 
including conventional and auxiliary broadcast services ( other than 
international broadcast services) and multi-point and multi-channel 
distribution services. 
(b) Process applications for renewal of licenses and for assignment or transfer of 
ownership interests in such licenses. 
(c) Participate in hearings before the Administrative Law Judges and the 
Commission. 
(d) Plan and develop proposed rulemakings and conduct comprehensive studies 
and analyses (legal, engineering, social and economic) of various petitions for 
policy or rule changes submitted by industry or the public. 
( e) Conduct studies and compile data relating to radio and television network 
operations necessary for the Commission to develop and maintain and 
adequate regulatory program. 
(f) Investigate complaints and answer general inquiries from the public and 
handle political broadcasting and fairness doctrine complaints. 
(g) To exercise authority to issue non-hearing related subpoenas for the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, 
correspondence, memoranda, schedules of charges, contracts, agreements, 
33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Volume 4 7. Telecommunication, 1998, article 0.6 1 .  
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and any other records deemed relevant to the investigation of matters within 
the jurisdiction of the Mass Media Bureau. Before issuing a subpoena, the 
Mass Media Bureau shall obtain the approval of the Office of General 
Counsel. 
Any individual or organization desiring to operate a radio or television broadcast 
station is required to get a license from the Federal Communications Commission. 
Broadcasting without license is illegal in the United States. The FCC is also responsible 
for renewal or revocation of the licenses. Currently, license terms for television and radio 
are eight years. However, from about 1927 until the 1980s, the license period was only 
three years. I n  the 1980s, with deregulation of a lot of rules and regulations of 
broadcasting, the license period was extended - at first to 7 years for radio and 5 years for 
television - then in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, licenses were extended to 8 
years for both radio and television . 34 
Today in 2002, if broadcast stations do not commit a serious violation or 
persistently abuse of FCC rules, they may assume their license will be renewed. But until 
1996, a station's license renewal could be jeopardized if another party filed to seek the 
channel the station occupied. Few stations lost their license this way, but the threat was 
considerable. After 1996, the law protects the licensee so as to provide a "presumption of 
renewal" unless the licensee has performed so badly or abused the license by doing 
something seriously offensive to the public interest. These are recent changes that 
provide greater freedom to the licensee. 35 
34 Howard, interview by author. 
35 Ibid. 
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The FCC was primarily set up to end "chaos in the ether" by enacting a series of 
"traffic regulations."36 Hoffman-Riem explained the reasoning behind the regulations of 
the FCC this way: 
. . .  since frequencies (at least those of terrestrial broadcasting) were scarce, the 
regulatory duty grew into an area in which considerations of common good were 
used to find or justify criteria for allocation. In making allocation decisions as 
well as in its subsequent supervisory activities, the FCC was bound by the 
Communications Act of 1934 to observe the common good (i.e., "public interest, 
convenience, and necessity"). 37 
The scarcity argument, as the main reasoning of regulation of broadcasting, lost 
much of (if not all) its legitimacy over the years with the discovery of new means and 
technologies of transmissions, such as cable television and satellite-delivered television 
programming. As a result, the radio and television industry were substantial ly 
deregulated in the United States during the early 1980s because it seemed "inequitable to 
impose regulation upon certain forms of electronic media that cannot legally be imposed 
upon others."38 
The Federal Communications Commission makes its licensing decisions by 
seeking certain criteria in the applicants, including "U.S. citizenship (or is a corporation 
with only a limited number of foreign stockholders), good character, access to technical 
36 Hoffmann-Riem, 15 .  
37 Ibid. 
38 Teeter and Loving, 646. 
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knowledge and financial resources, an understanding of the community's programming 
needs, and conformance to certain limits on ownership of other stations or media."39 
The Supreme Court of the United States accepted the rationale of spectrum 
scarcity in its decisions made over the years regarding broadcasting. In National 
Broadcasting et. al. v. United States,40 the networks challenged the FCC rules which 
"limited the amount of network broadcast time that any affiliate station could carry, and 
authorized the agency to revoke the license of any broadcast station that exceeded this 
limit.',4 1 The network claimed that such practice of the FCC was a denial of free speech 
rights of the broadcasters. But the Supreme Court took a position favoring the federal 
government by stating that denial of station license on the grounds of "public interest, 
convenience, or necessity," if valid under the Communications Act of 1934, was not a 
denial of free speech. 42 Speaking for the unanimous Court, Justice Frankfurter explained 
the reasoning behind the Court 's  decision: 
. . . Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. 
That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of 
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it cannot be 
used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied . . . 43 
The Supreme Court, turned back to its scarcity argument as a rationale for 
broadcast control again in 1969, but this time "even more clearly and forcefully than it 
39 Robert Trager and Donna L .  Dickerson. Freedom of Expression in the 21'' Century (Thousand Oaks, 
London: Pine Forge Press. Inc., 1999). 156. 
40 3 19 U.S . 190, 63 S.Ct. 997 (1943). 
41 CFR 47 §§ 3. 101-3. 108, quoted in Teeter and Loving : Law of Mass Communications, 644. 
42 3 19 U.S. 190, 226-27, 63 S.Ct . 997, 10 14 ( 1943). 
43 Ibid . ,  at 213. 63 S.Ct. at 108. 
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had been described in the earlier Supreme Court decision."44 In Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC,45 which involved the issue of the right of reply of an author attacked by the 
radio station, Justice White wrote for the unanimous Court: 
. . .  When there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than 
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First 
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to 
speak, write or publish . . .  the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech 
by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with 
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.46 
The Communications Act of 1934 forbids censorship, but, for many years, the 
FCC tried to circumvent that item by attempting to influence programming by 
enunciating types and percentages of programming by stations that would be looked upon 
favorably when licenses were up for renewal. In earlier times, because of various 
concerns about programming balance, the FCC has chastised the radio industry for 
having too many sponsored programs, too much entertainment (at the expense of 
informative or educational programming), too much recorded programming (vs. live 
performance), and other broad criticisms. 47 In 1946 the FCC issued a document called 
"Public Service Responsibility for Broadcast Licensees," which came to be known as the 
44 Teeter and Loving, 645. 
45 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794 (1969). 
46 Ibid .• at 367, 386-390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1805-1806 (1969). 
47 Howard, interview by author. 
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Blue Book.48 This was intended to be a guideline for U.S. broadcast stations to follow in 
developing their program schedules - in a manner that would satisfy the FCC. With this 
document, the FCC encouraged broadcast stations to engage in certain type of 
programming. More local programming, more non-sponsor programs, and more news 
were some of the FCC' s demands. The Blue Book was branded as "censorship" and was 
never adopted. It was an attempt by the FCC to tell broadcasters what they ought to 
program on their stations.49 
Later, in 1960, the FCC issued another programming guideline in the "1960 
Programming Policy Statement."50 This document was milder in tone and more 
effectively enforced. As a result, it strongly influenced broadcast programming in the 
1960s. With it, the FCC devised a license renewal plan in which an applicant for renewal 
of license would promise various types of programs and specify the percentage of air 
time in a typical week. Then, when it became for the next license renewal , the station had 
to go back and analyze its program logs to determine if it had kept its promises to the 
FCC. It was called "promise vs. performance." The FCC called some stations "on the 
carpet" if they failed to do what they said they would do in broadcasting various types of 
programs [e.g. , news, public affairs, information (such as agricultural, educational, 
religious, etc.)] .5 1 
As seen, in the United States, censorship at the level of statements and news 
stories has not been restrictive; but the government has attempted, at times, to demand 
48 See Frank J. Kahn, ed., Documents of American Broadcasting, 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century 
Crofts, 1973), 151 -233. 
49 Howard, interview by author. 
50 See Kahn, 234-250. 
51 Howard, interview by author. 
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that stations program certain percentages of certain types of beneficial programs (such as 
5% news).52 
The validity of scarcity argument was called into question after the emergence of 
cable television. Although the cable technology began as early as 1948, its expansion 
took a long time, but "during the1970s the number of local U.S. cable systems grew to 
some four thousand, with more than fifteen million homes subscribing."53 So, the late 
1970s and early 1980s witnessed an explosion of the use of cable television in the United 
States, and starting in that period, cable TV began to pose a serious competitive threat to 
broadcasting. 54 
Unlike broadcasting, cable television does not use spectrum channels to deliver 
the programming. Its signals can be transmitted through a wire, "which prevents the radio 
frequencies from entering the spectrum."55 Then it can be assumed that since cable TV 
systems do not use the spectrum, the FCC has no legal basis to regulate cable TV in a 
way to regulate broadcasting. However, there are certain restrictions on the operation of 
cable TV systems, although the FCC had no legal authority to license cable TV operators. 
There have been two reasons behind the regulation of cable TV systems. First, local 
authorities may regulate cable television systems because their wires go down and across 
public streets and alleys. So to circulate transmission via their wires, a cable television 
company needs permission from the government agency that is responsible to control 
public property. In return of giving permission to use public property, the government 
52 Ibid. 
53 Eric Barnouw, Tube of Plenty - The Evolution of American Television, second revised edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 493. 
54 Teeter and Loving , 646. 
55 Trager and Dickerson, 157. 
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expects from cable television companies to comply with some rules, including paying a 
fee to the government (no more than 5% of the system's  gross annual revenues) and 
reserving some of its channels for educational, public, and governmental programming. 56 
Especially after the 1980s, the federal courts began to take an unsympathetic 
approach against the attempts of the FCC to impose content control on cable television 
systems. The underlying basis for that approach was that "these regulations exceeding the 
authority granted the agency by Congress." 57 But in fact, even the FCC was aware that 
any cable programming regulation could hardly withstand First Amendment challenge in 
the courts. So, as a result, the FCC began to move toward deregulation by repealing every 
television and radio rule of its own, which do not seem justifiable any longer.58 
During the same period, the FCC also began to encourage the development of 
other new electronic media, including direct broadcast satellite (DBS), low power TV 
(LPTV) and multi-point, multi-channel distribution systems (MMDS), under less 
restrictive standards than those in broadcasting. 59 
The rationale behind these recent actions of the FCC has been, as Dr. Teeter and 
his colleagues suggested, "to create such a vast electronic media marketplace of viewing 
and listening alternati ves for American audiences that there will be no need for any 
further intervention on the part of the federal government to protect public interests in 
electronic mass communication. "60 
56 Ibid . •  158. 





In the United States, as it can be seen, broadcasting has been the responsibility of 
the private commercial sector from its beginning. In contrast to Jong-term monopoly of 
public broadcasting in Turkey, broadcasting had never been a monopo]y of the State in 
the United States. Public broadcasting in the United States emerged original1y in the form 
of educational broadcasting.61 In order to encourage the development of public 
broadcasting services, "those college and university radio stations that had already 
received a broadcast license from the Commerce Department during the early 1920s were 
permitted to remain on the air,"62although no spectrum space was set up for them either 
with the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934. But over years the 
development of non-commercial broadcast stations was not very promising, because they 
lacked funding to meet the expensive production costs of programming. With the 
adoption of the Educational Television Facilities Act in 1962, the governmental funding 
for public broadcasting was established by setting up a grant program for noncommercial 
facilities.63 Five years later, in 1967, the Public Broadcasting Act was enacted by the 
Congress and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) was created. This 
Corporation was a non-profit, non-governmental organization and was authorized with 
funding all activities of noncommercial broadcasting. When the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting was created, it inserted "new regulatory language in the Communications 
Act of 1934 specially designed to govern its functions. "64 Section 398 of the 
Communications Act stated "the clear intent of Congress that there shal1 be no direct 
61 Hoffman-Riem, 3. 
62 Teeter and Loving, 708. 
63 Carter, Franklin, and Wright, 348. 
64 Teeter and Loving, 7 10. 
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jurisdiction of the FCC over the Corporation."65 I n  1970, CPB and a coalition of 
noncommercial broadcast stations formed the Public Broadcast Service (PBS) and 
National Public Radio (NPR) in order to "distribute public radio and television programs 
to member stations."66 I n  1974, the Station Program Cooperative (SPC) Plan was adopted 
by the CPB and the member licensees of PBS "to insure local control and origination of 
noncommercial broadcasting funded by the CPB."67 As noted, public broadcasting in the 
United States "has been sheltered from direct FCC control by a separate set of 
regulations. "68 
As a result of recent developments in the broadcasting area and in its regulation in 
the United States, questions have been raised in the twenty-first century whether 
broadcasting someday will enjoy the same First Amendment protection that was granted 
to the print media. Although certain restrictions imposed on broadcasting were repealed 
by the federal government, broadcasting stations still cannot operate in the United States 
without licenses. I n  other words, the practice of licensing was still alive in the United 
States early in 2002 where broadcasting was concerned. 
65 Carter, Frankling, and Wright, 349. 
66 Teeter and Loving, 709. 
67 Carter, Franklin, and Wright, 349. 
68 Teeter and Loving, 708. 
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CHAPTER IX 
BROADCAST LICENSING IN TURKEY 
The history of broadcasting in Turkey began around the first quarter of the 20th 
century. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) aired the first official radio 
broadcast in 1 922. The first regular television program was also carried out by the BBC 
in 1 936. The first official Turkish radio broadcasting began on 6 May 1 927 in Istanbul. 1 
Wireless stations began to be established in Ankara and Istanbul with the 
enactment of the "Wireless Installation Law" in 1925, and these stations were used for 
the first "test" radio broadcasts aired in Ankara. 2 
After the airing of these test broadcasts, the "Turkish Wireless Inc." (TTT AS) was 
established by Is Bank (Business Bank) as a responsible unit for radio broadcasts in 
Turkey. Turkish Wireless Inc. was privately owned. The first official Turkish 
broadcasting then began on 6 May 1 927, when the Anatolian News Agency, which was 
composed of two deputies of the Interior Ministry and a businessma� was given sole 
broadcasting management rights for 10 years. The contract between the Turkish Wireless 
Inc. and the Interior Ministry required radio broadcasts to include news programs, 
lectures on a variety of subjects, concerts, and weather reports, which would serve the 
"public interest. "3 
After Istanbul, Ankara Radio started its regular broadcasts in October 1 927, airing 
everyday between 7.00 p.m. and 10.00 p.m. At that time, there were 1 1 78 receivers 
1 "Historical Background of Radio and Television Broadcasting in Turkey." 




throughout Turkey. In 1937, Law No. 3222 was enacted and responsibility for radio 
broadcasting was passed from the Turkish Wireless Inc. to the Post Office, which was 
owned by the State. This was a significant development since it marked the end of private 
company management in radio broadcasting and the beginning of state-controlled 
broadcasting and state radios. Then, with the enactment of Law No. 3837 in 1940, the 
Directorate of Press and Information was authorized with the control of radio stations.4 
After the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, the number of State radio stations 
began to increase steadily. On 31 May 1961, with the resolution adopted by the Council 
of Ministers, provincial radio stations were set up in seven cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, 
Adana, Antalya, Kars, and Gaziantep. I n  1963, the responsibility of the supervision of 
radio broadcasting was given to the Tourism and Information Ministry.5 
I n  1963, the Turkish Radio and Television Broadcasting (TRT) was established, 
and all radio and television broadcasting was assigned to this autonomous publicly­
owned institution, according to the provision stipulated in article 121 of the Constitution 
which stated: "The management of radio stations and television networks are regulated 
under the law as autonomous public corporate bodies."6 The sovereignty of the 
broadcasting service, as stated in the Constitution, was translated into an Act of 
Parliament, "which decreed that all radio and television programs had to be made and 




7 Bulent Capli, ''The Media in Turkey," paper presented at the British Council, Ankara, Turkey, 3 March 
1998. 
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Television Law No.359 was passed by the Parliament on December 24, 1963 , and went 
into effect on May 1 ,  1964.8 
The transfer of broadcasting control from the State to an autonomous and 
authorized unit, the TRT, made positive impact on the development of broadcasting 
sector in Turkey. The TRT established Turkey' s first television station on 3 1  January 
1968, and began the first television transmissions at the same day from a studio in 
Ankara, capital of Turkey. The TRT Istanbul TV began to broadcast on 30 August 1 97 1 .9 
The autonomous structure of the TRT, which was stipulated in Article 12 1  of the 
196 1  Constitution, lasted only eight years. On 20 September 197 1 ,  Article 1 21 was 
amended and the TRT Law No.359 was changed with the enactment of the Law No. 
1569. With the constitutional amendment and enactment of the new law, the TRT was 
transformed to an impartial public corporate body. 1 0  
With a referendum on 6 November 1982, a constitutional amendment was made 
in regulation of radio and television broadcasts in Turkey. Consistent with Article 133 of 
the Constitution, radio and television stations "could only be established by the state and 
their management would be as public corporate bodies . Furthermore, the principle of 
impartiality would be preserved in the management and supervision of the institution, 
establishment of the administrative bodies and in all radio and television broadcasts." 1 1  
8 "Historical Background of Radio and Television Broadcasting in 
Turkey. "www. bye gm. gov .tr/references/radyo-tv200 l .htm (2001). 
9 Capli, 1 .  
10 "Historical Background of Radio and Television Broadcasting in Turkey." 
www .bye gm. gov.tr/references/radyo-tv2001 .htm (2001 ) .  
1 1  Ibid. 
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In line with the constitutional amendment, the new Law No. 2954 was put into 
effect in 1983. With the passage of this law, a "Supreme Board of Radio and Television 
Broadcasts" was established with powers over the TRT. Article 5 of the Law No. 2954 
stated that "broadcasting shall respect the privacy of life, reputations, and fundamental 
human rights within the boundaries of honesty;" "news broadcasting shall be made with 
the principles of objectivity and truthfulness, and within the framework of contemporary 
news reporting methods and techniques;" "news and its interpretations shall be separated 
during the broadcasting, and sources of interpretations shall be declared," and "one-sided, 
subjective broadcasting shall not be allowed." 12  No such rules are applied to broadcasters 
in the United States. 
In 1984, the TRT began programming in color. Until 1986, TRT' s television 
channel TRT- 1 was the only television channel. On 15 September 1986, TRT's second 
channel TRT-2 was launched, followed by the establishment of TRT-3, TRT-4, TRT­
INT, TRT-AVRASYA, and GAP-TV in the later years. 13 
September 1990 saw establishment of the first commercial channel, ST AR 1 ,  
taking advantage of a loophole i n  the monopoly law. ST AR 1 began its broadcasting in 
Turkish via satellite from Germany. This was an i llegal action because the monopoly of 
the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) on broadcasts had been stipulated in 
the Constitution. Following the example of ST AR 1, many radio and television channels 
began broadcasting both at home and abroad. "By the beginning of 1993, there were 
12 Translated by the author from The Law No.2954, Article 5 ( 1983). 
13 "Historical Background of Radio and Television Broadcasting in 
Turkey."www.byegm.gov.tr/references/radyo-tv200l .htm (2001). Avrasya, in English, means "Eurasia," 
while GAP represents "Southeastern Anatolia Project." 
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almost 500 local commercial radio stations and 100 local television stations operating 
without licenses." 14 The emergence of new private radio and television channels created a 
"chaos in the ether" because private channels were using powerful transmitters, which 
resulted in interference to other frequencies. At that time, there was neither a law nor a 
supervisory body to regulate private broadcast channels and to allocate frequencies 
among them in Turkey. The rapid increase in the number of private broadcast channels 
compelled Turkish government to end the monopoly of the TRT in broadcasting field and 
to legalize the de facto pirates. 15 
With the passage of the Law No. 39 13  on 8 July 1993, Article 133 of the 
Constitution was amended as follows: 16 
"Radio and television channels may be freely established and managed within 
the stipulations to be regulated by law. The independence and impartiality of the 
only radio and television institution established by the state as a public corporate 
body and news agencies aided as public corporate bodies are essential." 
With that constitutional amendment, the monopoly of the TRT on broadcasting 
was broken, and private radio and television stations established from 1990 onward were 
given legal status. 1 7  
With the entrance of private radio stations and television networks into the 
broadcasting field, a dual structure appeared in Turkey in the 1990s: "TRT, which was 
established in 1964, and the private television channels, which started to broadcast later. 
14 Capli, 1 .  
15 Ibid. 
16 Amendment in Article 1 33 of the 1982 Constitution, July 8, 1993 (available in Appendix B). 
17 "Historical Background of Radio and Television Broadcasting in 
Turkey."www.byegm.gov.tr/references/radyo-tv200l .htm (2001). 
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TRT remained in a separate position in this field, both from the aspect of its perception of 
broadcasting and from its legal structure." 1 8 The TRT Law No. 2954 was still in effect in 
early 2002, which clarified the TRT's position as mainly broadcasting in "public service" 
and acting with constitutional autonomy. The TRT is also required to comply with the 
principles stated in the Law No.3984. 19 
Following the constitutional amendment in 1993, the "Law on the Establishment 
and Broadcasting of Radio Stations and Television Channels" No. 3984 was enacted by 
the Parliament on 13  April 1994 and a supervisory body was created in order to regulate 
private and public broadcasting in Turkey. The new supervisory body, Radio and 
Television Supreme Council (RTUK), was authorized with "allocating frequencies, 
channels, and transmission licenses to all broadcasting organizations."20 After this 
development, a "Supreme Board of Radio and Television Broadcasts," which was 
established in 1983 with the enactment of the Law No.2954, was abolished, and its 
responsibility to supervise public broadcasting was given to the new supervisory body, 
the RTUK.21 
Article 1 of the Law No. 3984 states the objective of the law is "to prescribe 
principles and procedures relating to the regulation of radio and television broadcasts and 
18 "Radio and Television," Republic a/Turkey Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/cj/cje/07.htm 
(2001). 
19 Translated and paraphrased by the author from Gursel Ongoren, Televizyon ve Radyoda Kisilik 
Haklarina Saldirilara Karsi Hukuki Basvuru Yollari [The Legal Remedies against the Attacks of Individual 
Rights through Television and Radio] (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1996), 300. 
2
° Capli, 2. 
21 Ongoren, 300. 
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to the establishment, duties, competence and responsibilities of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council."22 
Article 4 states that radio and television broadcasts shall be conducted in a spirit 
of public service according to the following standards : 23 
Broadcasts shall not violate: 
(a) The existence and independence of the Turkish Republic; the territorial and 
national integrity of the State, 
(b) The national and moral values of society, 
(c) The principles, democratic rules and individual rights stipulated under the 
Title on General Principles of the Constitution, 
(d) General morals, social order and Turkish family structure, 
(e) The freedom of expression, and the principle of pluralism in communication 
and broadcasting, 
(t) The principle that people shall not be discriminated against because of their 
race, sex, social class or religious beliefs, 
(g) The principle that broadcasts shall not instigate the community to violence, 
terror or ethnic discrimination or give rise to feelings of hatred in the 
community. 
Article 4 continues by stating the standards that broadcasts shall comply with :  
(h) The general objectives and basic principles of national education and the 
development of national culture, 
22 The Law No.3984, Article 1 ,  http://www.rtuk.org.tr/engl l .htm (2001). 
23 The Law No. 3984, Article 4, http://www.rtuk.org.tr/engl2.htm (2001). 
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(i) The principle of fairness and impartiality, and respect for the law in 
broadcasts, 
(j) The bans on broadcasts that may humiliate, insult or slander persons or 
organizations beyond limits of criticism, 
(k) The principle that broadcast shall not serve private aims and interests or lead 
to unfair competition, 
(I) The principle that broadcasts shall present news and events truthfully and 
rapidly, 
(m)The principle that broadcasts shall not impair the physical, mental , emotional 
and moral development of chi ldren and adolescents, 
(n) The rule that no one may be declared guilty unless convicted by the judiciary, 
(o) The rule for the right of reply or rectification by individuals or organizations, 
(p) The objective of ensuring that broadcasters wil1 reserve at least half of their 
transmitting time to domestic productions, excluding the time set aside for 
news, sport programs and advertising, and that they will achieve this 
proportion gradually, taking into consideration the demands of the audience, 
the informational, educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities of 
the broadcaster and the types, duration, and quality of programs, 
(q) The principle that equality of opportunity will be achieved between 
democratic groups and political parties within the framework of democratic 
rules in such a way to respond to public expectations in the fields of politics, 
education, and culture, 
2 1 1  
(r) The principle that Turkish shall be used as the language of radio and 
television broadcasts, with the exception that foreign languages which have 
contributed to universal works of culture and silence may be used for teaching 
and news casting purposes; and that Turkish shall be used in its spoken form 
without going to extremes, and without destroying its characteristics and 
rules; that the Turkish language shall be developed and enriched in the form if 
a modem educational and scientific language, as a basic element of national 
unity and integrity, 
(s) The principle that the rights of musical composers and copyright holders shall 
be recognized and shall not be violated, in keeping with the principle of 
contributing to the development of the Turkish music sector. 
Article 5 of the Law No. 3984 provided the establishment of the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council (RTUK) with legal autonomy. Article 6 stated the election 
and term of office of the members of the Supreme Council. According to that article, 
RTUK is composed of nine members elected by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, . . . five of whom are elected from among candidates nominated by the 
governing political party of parties, and four from among candidates nominated 
by the opposition parties. 
This composition of the Supreme Council has been highly criticized in the later 
years, claiming that overtly political structure of the Council might affect its objectivity 
of judgment. 
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Article 8 of the Law No.3984 states the functions and powers of the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council. Some of the important functions and powers of the Council 
are : 24 
Planning: To determine the conditions and priorities necessary for national and 
regional frequency planning within the framework of the European Convention 
on Trans-frontier Television. 
Assignment of Channels, Frequencies and Bands : To issue broadcast permits and 
licenses to national and regional radio stations and networks for a maximum 
period of five years. 
Establishment and Control of Radio and TV Transmitting Stations and 
Application of Sanctions: To control the transmitting facilities of national, 
regional, and local radio stations and TV networks in line with frequency and 
band plans. 
Encouragement of Channels to Operate on a Time-Shift Basis :  Especially to 
encourage regional radio stations and TV channels to broadcast on a rotating 
basis. 
Regulations: To issue regulations on related matters including conditions 
channels, frequencies and band assignments, broadcast permits, license fees 
within the framework of the broadcasting standards stated in the law and 
compliance with the European Convention on Trans-frontier Television. 
24 The Law No.3984, Article 8, http://www.rtuk.org.tr/engl3.htm (2001). 
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Regulations on Coded and Cable Broadcasts: To draw up regulations on coded 
and cable broadcasts initiated by the PTT (Turkish Postal-Telephone-Telegraph 
Service) authorities within the framework of legal requirements. 
Surveys: To carry out public opinion polls in cooperation with related institutions 
in order to evaluate the reaction and requests of the public . 
Representation: To represent Turkey on international platforms apart from the 
international broadcasting organizations with which the Wireless Directorate­
General, Foreign Ministry and the TRT have direct contact, or are members of. 
The European Convention on Trans-frontier Television, as one of the important 
legal documents that the broadcasters in Turkey must comply with, states its purpose in 
article 1 as "to faci litate, among the Parties, the transfrontier transmission and 
retransmission of television program services." Article 4 requires parties to provide 
freedom of reception and retransmission: 
The Parties shall ensure freedom of expression and information in accordance 
with Article 10  of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and they shall guarantee freedom of reception and 
shall not restrict the retransmission on their territories of program services 
which comply with the terms of this Convention. 25 
Section 1 of Article 7 of the Convention says, "all items of program services, as 
concerns their presentation and content, shall respect the dignity of human being and the 
fundamental rights of others," while the section 3 of the same article states, "the 
zs European Convention on Trans-frontier Television, Article 4, 
http://conventions.coe. intff reaty/EN/f reaties/HtmV 1 32 .htm (2001 ).  
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broadcaster should ensure that news fairly presents facts and events and encourages the 
free formation of opinions."26 
The Radio and Television Supreme Council applies a range of sanctions for those 
broadcast stations and networks which do not comply with the standards stated in the 
Law No. 3954. The lightest of the sanctions was a warning. The Supreme Council warns 
broadcast institutions "which do not fulfill their obligations, exceed the condition of the 
permission and which make broadcasts in violation of the broadcasting principles and 
fundamentals."27 If a broadcast station or television network chooses to ignore the 
Council ' s  warning, "then RTUK has the authority to close the broadcasting temporari ly 
or cancel the permission, depending on the seriousness of the violation."28 RTUK's 
decisions can be appealed to the provincial administrative court and then to the Council 
of State (Danistay). 
During 1999, the Radio and Television Council (RTUK) imposed a total of 2,378 
days of suspension on the broadcasting media in Turkey. Aktif Radyo [Active Radio], 
based on the city of Izmir, was suspended for 15 days for broadcasting "in contradiction 
general morals, social order and Turkish family structure" (article 4d of the Law No. 
3984). BTV, a radio station which is known with its closeness to former prime minister 
Tansu Ciller, was suspended for a week for "humiliating, insulting or slandering persons 
or organizations beyond limits of criticism"(article 4j of the Law No. 3984) and for 
"accusing a person whose guilt had not been recognized by the courts" (article 4n of the 
26 Ibid., Article 7. 
27 "Radio and Television, Republic of Turkey Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ci/cje/07.htm 
(2001). 
28 Ibid. 
2 15  
same law). Moral FM [Morale FM], based in Istanbul, was suspended for three days for 
failing to respect "the principles, democratic rules and individual rights stipulated under 
the Title of General Principles of the Constitution" (article 4c of the Law No.3984).29 
In February 1999, national private televisions ATV and Kanai D [Channel D] was 
suspended for a day for violating "the principle of fairness and impartiality, and respect 
for the law in broadcasts" (Article 4i of the Law No.3984). The decision was taken since 
those national private televisions aired "Bay Tumike" and "Carkifelek" (game show 
programs similar to "Wheel of Fortune" in the United States) without taking permission 
of the responsible national unit of lottery (Milli Piyango Idaresi).30 
In March 1999, Ozgur Radyo [Freedom Radio] was suspended for a year for 
broadcasting information likely to incite "to violence, terror or ethnic discrimination or 
give rise to feelings of hatred in the community" (article 4g of the Law No.3984). The 
decision was taken in a response to the radio station's news bulletin on 19 February, 
which had mentioned "a directive instructing police to shoot real bullets at the legs of 
demonstrators who expressed their support for PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) leader 
Abdullah Ocalan too fiercely."3 1  On 1 April 1999, Radyo Umut [Hope Radio], 
broadcasting from Istanbul, was suspended for a year for broadcasting information likely 
to incite "to violence, terror or ethnic discrimination or give rise to feelings of hatred in 
29 Translated and paraphrased from the Turkish by the author from 1999 Yili RTUK Basin Bildirileri [The 
RTUK Press Releases of 1999] , http://www.rtuk.org.tr/bas99.htm ( 1999). 
30 Ibid. 
31 ''The 2000 Annual Report of Reporters Sans Frontiers (RFS) on Turkey," p. 10, 
httJ>://www.rsf.fr/uk/rap2000/europe/turkey.html (2000). 
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the community" (article 4g of the Law No.3984) after the publication on 21  February of a 
PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) communique.32 
In one of the high-profile incidents of the year 1999, the RTUK suspended 
broadcasting of the national channel Kanal 6 [Channel 6] for one week, under Article 4j 
of the Law No.3984 for "humiliating, insulting or slandering persons or organizations 
beyond limits of criticism" and under article 4g of the same law for encouraging "to 
violence, terror or ethnic discrimination or give rise to feelings of hatred in the 
community." The RTUK took this decision in response to strong criticism of by the 
Kanai 6 regarding the organization of assistance by government rescue units after the 17 
August devastating earthquake in the northwestern Turkey. Kanai 6 appealed the 
decision, and the Council of State overturned the decision of the RTUK in 2000.33 
According to the 1999 Report of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), on 
30 October 1999, Radyo Foreks [Radio Forex], based on Istanbul, was suspended from 
broadcasting for 30 days for "persisting, despite warnings, in broadcasting statements 
from a terrorist organization, thus facilitating its activities, in violation with an article 4a 
of the Law No.3984. The RTUK took this action in response to Radyo Foreks' May 26 
broadcast of the BBC's  "Turkish Service," a regular program, carrying an item about a 
recent meeting of the Kurdish National Congress in Europe.34 The same report of the 
CPJ also mentioned that RTUK has forced stations to suspend broadcasting for a total of 
5 ,642 days in the period from 1994 to 2000, "for such alleged offenses as violating 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 13 .  
3 4  "Middle East and North Africa: Country Report," The Committee to Protect Journalists, 
http://www.cpj.org/attacks99/mideast99/furkey.html ( 1999). 
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morals, depicting violence, invading privacy, 'separatist propaganda, '  or 'reactionism' 
(i.e. , pro-lslamist political discourse)."35 
The year of 2000 also witnessed a high number of suspensions of broadcast 
stations by the RTUK. According to the information given by the Turkish government, 
RTUK closed 62 television stations for 704 days, and 67 radio stations for 3,889 days in 
2000. 36 
In February 2000, the RTUK suspended the broadcasting of CNN TURK for a 
day, "in response to a January broadcast in which a commentator asked a program guest 
if PKK leader Ocalan could be compared with former South African president 
Mandela."37 According to RTUK, this broadcasting of CNN TURK was a violation of 
article 4a of the Law No.3984. CNN TURK appealed the RTUK's decision and won the 
case.38 
On 5 July 2000, the RTUK suspended the broadcasting of Ozgur Radyo [Freedom 
Radio] for a year, starting on 31 July, for having cited a verse by a Turkish poet, Ataol 
Behramoglu, during its May 1 broadcast: "The dying men are multiplying / I exhaust 
myself by killing them / We prepare ourselves for the bloody combat / Our flag of 
socialism ahead / Raise the flag / Even higher." According to the RTUK, broadcasting of 
this verse was the violation of article 4g of the Law No.3984, which forbids encouraging 
35 Ibid. 
36 The 2000 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Turkey, the U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.humanright-usa.net/reports/turkey.html (February 2001) .  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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"to violence, terror or ethnic discrimination or give rise to feelings of hatred in the 
community. "39 
On 12 July 2000, the RTUK suspended Kral TV [King TV] , Show TV, and 
InterStar [Interstar], which broadcast at national level, for a day for broadcasting and 
speaking at length about a saucy song. RTUK took this action by claiming that those 
three national television stations violated article 4d of the Law No.3984 which forbids 
broadcasting "in contradiction general morals, social order and Turkish family 
structure. "40 
During 2001 , the RTUK imposed more suspensions on private television and 
radio stations. In January 2001 ,  it suspended the broadcasting of a radio station, Cagdas 
Radyo [Modern Radyo], based in Ankara, for 1 80 days, for violation of Article 4g of the 
Law No.3984. The action was taken in response to television' s  broadcasting of a poem 
devoted to the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. During the same month, Kral TV's  
broadcasting was suspended for a week for a series of programs involving lesbian 
relations, oral sex, and showing male and female genital organs in close range. The 
decision was given for a violation of Article 4d of the Law No.3984 which forbids 
broadcasting "in contradiction general morals, social order and Turkish family 
structure."41  In October 200 1 ,  the RTUK suspended the broadcasting of a radio station, 
Best FM, based in Istanbul, for a day in response to a dialogue between the program's 
host and one listener in the program "The Girl with a Red Hat," which involved remarks 
39 "Violations of press freedom in Turkey July 2000," The International Freedom of Expression 
Community Report, http://www.hr-action.org/archive3/1008ifex.html (August 2000). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Translated and paraphrased by the author from 2001 Yili RTUK Basin Bildirileri [The RTUK Press 
Releases of 2001], http://www.rtuk.org.tr/bas2 l .htm (2001). 
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like "being in the military is like being in the circus." The action was taken against the 
radio station for a violation of Article 4j of the Law No.3984 which forbids "humiliating, 
insulting or slandering persons or organizations beyond limits of criticism." In November 
2001 ,  Mihr TV and Mihr Radio were suspended for a year for broadcasting a program 
involving remarks that the Ministry of Religion and university's theology departments in 
Turkey is misdirecting Muslim people toward the way of Allah (God). The RTUK took 
its action against that television and radio station for violating Article 4f of the Law 
No.3984, the principle that "people shall not be discriminated against because of their 
I . . . I b 1 · � "42 race, sex, re 1g1ous or socia e 1e1s. 
In Turkey in 2002 there were 16 private TV channels at the national level and 250 
at the regional level, in addition to seven channels operated by the Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation. As for radio stations, there were 36 of them at national, 108 at 
regional, and 1058 at local level in 2002. The total number of broadcast stations and 
networks in Turkey currently outweighs the number of stations and networks in any other 
European nation.43 According to the 1998 report of the Organization for Economic Co­
Operation and Development (OECD) on communications, "Turkey is the record-holder 
on development in radio and TV broadcasts." OECD announced the average rate of 
increase in radio and TV sector for the 1995-1997 period as 3.4 percent, while "in Turkey 
the development of this sector in this two-year period was 24.3 percent."
44 
42 Ibid. 
43 "Chapter 2: Democratic Institutions and Turkey's Place in European Institutions," Republic o/Turkey 
Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eg/eg27/04.htm (2000). 
44 lbid. 
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The entrance of private television and radio stations into the broadcasting arena 
can be considered a positive development in Turkey, since they offered richness and a 
diversity in a very short time to their audiences. Before the establishment of private 
broadcasting, Turkish broadcasting was a state monopoly and highly criticized for 
broadcasting one-sided and making the propaganda of the political party or parties in the 
authority. 45 
The broadcasting field is one of the fastest growing and profitable industries in 
Turkey. The government is aware of the power of the broadcasting, and knows that the 
attractiveness of private television and radio stations on Turkish audiences once 
compelled them to break the monopoly of the state broadcasting. In order to regulate this 
industry, a governmental body was created in 1994 and authorized with allocation of 
frequencies, assignment of broadcasting licenses, and supervision of stations to comply 
with broadcasting standards, which are stated in the two legal documents: "The Law No. 
3984" and ''The European Convention on Trans-frontier Television." 
The most important legal document organizing broadcasting field in Turkey is the 
Constitution. Article 33 of the Constitution sets forth the basic rules concerning the 
establishment of broadcast stations. Audio-visual broadcasting, organized by this article 
of the Constitution, is regulated by the "Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of 
Radio Stations and Television Channels" No. 3984. The Radio Television Supreme 
Council (RTUK) takes its authority from the Law No. 3984 as a supervisory body on 
broadcasting. ''The European Convention on Trans-frontier Television" is another 
45 See Paying the Price: The Freedom of Expression in Turkey, The U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee 
Report, 1989, 61-62. 
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important legal document in broadcasting field in Turkey, which the broadcasters must 
comply with the principles stated in it.46 
Similar to the United States, the licensing power of government on broadcast 
stations can be seen as a form of prior restraint in Turkey, even though the government 
claims that the reason behind the regulation of broadcasting is to protect "the public 
interest." At the time of renewal of broadcasting licenses, the Law No. 3984 requires 
each station to submit a "national security" document in which they have to mention all 
the punishments they have taken for violating national security principles. In line with 
this requirement, some stations can lose their licenses if they cannot meet this 
requirement. And the "national security" again becomes a legitimate reason for 
governments to restrain or deny media's activities. 
Conclusion: 
The development of broadcasting and regulation of this industry has been 
significantly different in the United States from Turkey. In the United States, 
broadcasting began as a private commercial broadcasting and has been regulated by the 
laws and supervised by the governmental body, which was bound to observe the common 
good (public interest, convenience, or necessity). The Federal government in the United 
States has never held a monopoly in the field of broadcasting. Public broadcasting 
emerged in the second quarter of the twentieth century, but it was governed with different 
set of rules and regulations from the ones governing commercial broadcast stations in 
order to encourage public broadcasting' s development. Commercial radio and television 
46 "Radio and Television," Republic of Turkey Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/cj/cje/07 .htm 
(2001). 
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stations in the United States need to obtain a license from the governmental body, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to operate. The FCC was also authorized 
in allocating frequencies and forcing private and public broadcast stations to comply with 
the provisions of the Broadcasting Acts. 
Broadcasting in Turkey began in the 1920s, around the same time as in the United 
States. I n  the first ten years, broadcasting was managed by a private organization, Turkish 
Wireless I nc. But in 1937, state took the control of broadcasting in Turkey by transferring 
its management to the state-owned Post Office, and later to the Directorate of Press and 
I nformation. This was the beginning of the period of the State's monopoly on 
broadcasting until 1963. That year, according to the provision stipulated in article 12 1 of 
the 1961 Constitution, all radio and television broadcasting was assigned to the 
autonomous publicly-owned institution, "the Turkish Radio and Television Broadcasting 
(TRT). 
The TRT established Turkey's first television station on 31 January 1968. But the 
autonomous structure of the TRT, which was stipulated in the 196 1 Constitution, lasted 
only eight years. lnl971, Constitution was amended and the TRT was transformed to an 
impartial public corporate body. And the monopoly of the State on broadcasting began 
again. The new constitution, which was adopted in 1982, preserved the monopoly of the 
State on broadcasting in its article 133 which stated, "radio and television stations could 
only be established by the state and their management would be as public corporate 
bodies." 
Starting in 1990, private television and radio stations began their broadcasting 
illegally in Turkey. The rapid increase in the number of these stations and the 
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interference that they caused in the air did not leave much of a choice but to break a 
government's monopoly on broadcasting. First, article 133 of the 1982 Constitution was 
amended in 1993, to allow the establishment of private radio and television stations. Then 
in 1994, with the adoption of the "Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting of Radio 
Stations and Television Channels" No. 3984, a new supervisory body, the Radio and 
Television Council was created in order to regulate private and public broadcasting in 
Turkey. The duties of the RTUK were very similar to the duties of the FCC in the United 
States, such as allocation of frequencies and assignment of licenses to broadcasting 
organizations. Although their duties are similar, the time of the establishments of the 
RTUK and the FCC was very far apart: the FCC in 1934, while the RTUK was in 1994. 
There is a 60-year difference between their establishment times. 
One other significant difference is that while the FCC was prevented from 
exercising direct control on public broadcasting in the United States, the RTUK in 
Turkey was authorized to regulate public broadcasting as well. Currently, there are no 
signs in Turkey indicating deregulation of broadcasting. The RTUK is still very active in 
imposing sanctions on broadcasting stations, often using the power vested by Turkish law 
to impose punishments similar to court punishments for seditious libel. On the other 
hand, in the United States, the trend towards deregulation began in the 1980s and still 
continues with the encouragement of other new electronic media, including direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS), low power TV (LPTV ) and multi-point, multi-channel 
distribution systems (MMDS), under less restrictive standards than those in broadcasting. 
Broadcasting in the United States is governed primarily with the 1934 
Communications Act, as revised in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. There is no 
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provision in the Constitution of the United States regarding the regulation of broadcasting 
media since at the time of Constitution' s  adoption, there was no electronic media. But the 
free speech and press clause of the First Amendment can be considered to cover 
broadcasting as well. In Turkey, on the other hand, in addition to laws governing 
broadcasting, the Constitution also includes an article regarding the establishment of 
broadcasting stations. Additionally, broadcasters in Turkey are required to comply with 
the broadcasting standards stated in the European Convention on Transfrontier 
Television, dealing with technical matters of power and channel location and other 
matters including human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of reception, and 




Each of the three research questions of this study and their sub-sections seeks to 
explore the commonalities and differences between the United States and Turkey in the 
key media control areas. The research questions aimed to show the concerns about 
national security, in line with Siebert's propositions, as a justification factor by 
governments in application of those key media controls. Answers to research questions 
are reported through a historical examination of both countries' legal documents 
including constitutions, statutes, decrees, and court cases along with judicial opinions 
involving the key media control areas. 
Research guestion one asked about similarities and dissimilarities between Turkey 
and the United States under the media control area of prior restraint. Research question 
one (a) asked how prior restraint emerged in the two nations, while research question one 
(b) sought to discover whether prior restraint exists in both print and broadcasting media 
in these two countries. 
Prior restraint is defined as censorship prior to publication. For an answer to 
research question one (a}, it can be stated that prior restraint existed in the form of 
licensing both in the Ottomans and early England before the founding of Turkey and the 
United States. Following the emergence of printing in both Ottomans and early England 
around the end of fifteenth century, governments realized the power of printing and with 
a series of laws, required the press to get prior permission to publish. Those laws made it 
a crime to publish without license. Governments of both countries also authorized 
government agencies to control the licensing procedures of the press. While licensing 
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systems expired in England in 1694 and later was not used in the United States, it 
continued in the Ottoman State and later in the Republic of Turkey. A licensing system 
was in operation in the Ottomans through a series of press laws and printing houses acts 
until the Empire's destruction in the second decade of the twentieth century. Licensing 
also was an effective weapon of government on the press during the first years of the 
Republic of Turkey. As a result of Kurdish uprisings, a Law for the Maintenance of 
Order was issued in 1 925, and it made publications subject to prior censorship for 
security purposes. A Law for the Maintenance of Order was also used during the period 
of military intervention in 1960, 197 1 ,  and 1980 to suspend the publication of materials 
that threatened the internal and external security of the State. A State of Emergency Act 
which was designed as a result of terrorist actions of the Kurdish Workers Party (the 
PKK) in southeastern regions of Turkey also required press of that region to get a 
permission prior to their publication in order to report about those violent incidents. Press 
Law No. 2950, which was amended in 1983, also authorized the public prosecutor to stop 
distribution of material that constitutes offense against the state and that reveals 
government secrets. Although the last constitution of Turkey (the 1982 Constitution) 
prohibits prior restraint of the media in its Articles No.28 and 29, it notes a series of 
exceptions to this principle for example in matters dealing with threats to internal and 
external security of the state, fundamental principles of the Republic, and public morals. 
In the United States, on the other hand, licensing was not used on the print media 
as a form of media control . But prior restraint appeared under different forms in the 
United States as well. In troubled years of the nation, for example, during the Abolitionist 
period, Abolitionists' access to mails is denied in southern states. Through the first third 
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of twentieth century, prior restraint was used to control material discussing sex in 
peacetime, and to stop sedition in wartime. The United States has not had laws as those in 
Turkey that include provisions about the prior restraint. But in several periods of history 
of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court had a chance to interpret the First 
Amendment when it was faced with questions of prior restraint of the media. Two of the 
most important decisions of the Court, Near v. Minnesota1 and New York Times Co. v. 
United States2 (known as Pentagon Papers case), declared prior restraint 
"unconstitutional" but it recognized some exceptions, for example, when nation is at war 
or when troop movements might be endangered. Prior restraint also appeared in the form 
of news control by the government during World War I and II, and during U.S. actions in 
Grenada (1983), Panama ( 1989) and Persian Gulf War ( 1991), when news access was 
denied by the military. Recently, complaints have been made following the military 
action in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002 concerning military's controlling power 
over correspondents. 
Research question one asked the similarities and differences between the United 
States and Turkey about prior restraint of the media. A basic dissimilarity between the 
United States and Turkey in the area of prior restraint is the application of this media 
control. In Turkey, it was used in the form of licensing and applied by a series of laws 
enacted by the Parliament, and taking advantage of provisions allowing prior restraint in 
the constitution. In the United States, it was used in the form denial of access to mail in 
the early years of the nation, and later, denial of news access by the military, during the 
1 283 U.S .697 , 5 1  S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 ( 193 1). 
2 403 U.S. 7 1 3, 91 S.Ct. 2 140 ( 197 1). 
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time of military actions. The United States Constitution also does not address any 
exceptions to "no prior restraint" rule, unlike the Constitution of Turkey. But the 
judiciary of the United States, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, recognized some 
exceptions to allow prior restraint of the media under limited circumstances. 
Although the sources of those exceptions are different in the two nations, their 
logic is similar: concerns of national security and protection of their nations from internal 
or external threats. Fredrick S. Siebert proposed that "the area of freedom contracts and 
the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government 
and of the structure of society increase."3 Consistent with this proposition, governments 
in both Turkey and the United States, when perceiving an external or internal threat 
against the security and stability of their nations, used the exceptions to "no prior 
restraint" and put restraints on the media. 
As an answer to research question one (b t prior restraint of the print media does 
not exist in 2002 in both countries but certain exceptions are recognized. Prior restraint 
exists in broadcasting media in both countries in the form of licensing. The details of 
broadcast licensing are addressed in research question three. 
Research question two asked about similarities and differences between Turkey 
and the United States under the media control area of seditious libel. Research question 
two (a) asked the circumstances under which seditious libel crimes appeared, while 
research question two (b) asked the legal sanctions that the governments used to punish 
seditious libel. 
3 Fredrick S. Siebert. Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965) , 10. 
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Seditious libel has been defined as criminalizing "expression attacking 
government's form, laws, institutions, or officers."4 Laws of both early England and the 
Ottoman Empire made it a crime to publish criticism of royal policies. After the founding 
of the United States and Turkey, seditious libel was transferred to the lands of these 
countries. In the history of the United States, especially during the periods of national 
distress, such as during the period of involvement in the possible European war at the end 
of eighteenth and beginning of nineteenth century, during the Abolitionist period and 
Civil War, and during the period of World War I and II, federal and state seditious libel 
laws were adopted to make it a crime to advocate violent overthrow of government. 
During the World War I period, presumed alliances of immigrants, radicals, and socialists 
were seen as threats by government. The Espionage Act of 1917 and its amendment in 
19 18  were designed to silence those opposing voices against the government. On the eve 
of World War II, the Smith Act of 1940 was designed to silence pro-Communist views, 
because in that period, and later during the Cold War, communism was a threat against 
the government. 
But after the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Yates in 1957 that halted the 
government's attempts to prosecute the members of the Communist party, seditious libel 
prosecutions declined, and in 1977, the Smith Act "disappeared from bills reforming the 
federal Criminal Code."5 Although seditious libel was not seen as a serious offense in the 
years following the Yates decision of the Court, the issue is still alive and can appear in 
any moment following the reaction to September 1 1 th, 2001 ,  terrorist attacks. The reason 
4 
Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving. Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and 
Broadcast Media, 10th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2001 ), 28. 
5 Teeter and Loving, 40. 
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for the United States to pass seditious libel laws in the past was to silence opposition 
from immigrants, socialists, radicals, and communists, and to protect the nation. Now, 
after September 1 1 , the government can invoke the same rationale: to protect the nation 
against external and internal threats of terrorism. The first step already has been taken by 
the U.S. government by ordering the use of military tribunals to try non-U.S .  citizens 
suspected of involvement in terrorism actions.6 
There are many laws in Turkey that make seditious libel a crime. Although there 
is no wording equivalent to "seditious libel" in Turkey, its functioning is at work in a 
series of laws enacted by the Parliament. Most of those laws that made seditious libel a 
crime were enacted, as the ones in the United States, at the time of national distress. In 
the early years of the Republic of Turkey, Kurdish rebellions were serious threats to 
stability of the government. So, the Turkish Parliament enacted the Penal Code in 1926. 
A series of articles of the Penal Code made it a crime to advocate overthrow of the 
government, to publish against the indivisible integrity of the State, the fundamental 
principles of Republic, the national security and to insult the authorities including the 
President, the Parliament, the government, and the military (for the detailed discussion of 
these articles see Chapter VII, Seditious Libel in Turkey). 
The three periods of military intervention in the nation's  history also can be seen 
as times of distress . During those periods, laws were designed to make "criticism of 
military actions and advocacy of government' s  overthrow" crimes. As a result of 
terrorism incidents in the southeastern provinces of Turkey after the 1980s, new laws 
6 "Ashcroft: Critics of new terror measures undermine effort." 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/ 12/06/inv.ashcroft.hearing/ (December 7, 2001 ). 
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were designed to punish the offenders who violated the stated principles in these laws. 
The 1983 Flag Act made it a crime to insult the Turkish flag. The 1991  Anti-Terror Law 
made it a crime to make the separatist propaganda which aims to destroy integrity of the 
State. Turkey has lived under the pressure of terrorism for a long time and lost many 
lives, therefore, threats to national security, propaganda detrimental to national feelings, 
and insulting authorities have all been and still are legal reasons for governments in 
Turkey to silence the opposing voices. 
As an answer to research question two, the basic similarity between the United 
States and Turkey in the media control area of seditious libel is found in the 
circumstances that cause the appearance of seditious libel crimes : national distress. This 
also answers research question two {a). And here again, Siebert's proposition becomes 
valid: the more insecure the government, the more restraints imposed on media. For an 
answer to research question (b), legal sanctions used to punish seditious libel in the 
United States were Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798- 1 800, the Immigration Act of 1903 , a 
series of state sedition acts, the Espionage Act of 1917 and its amendment in 19 18, and 
the Smith Act of 1940. In Turkey, the Penal Code, a series of laws enacted during the 
time of military intervention, A Law Regarding the Crimes Committed Against Ataturk, 
A State of Emergency Laws, Flag Act, and Anti-Terrorism Law. 
Research question three involved the commonalities and differences between the 
United States and Turkey under the media control area of broadcast licensing. Research 
question three (a) asked how the two nations license the broadcasting media, while three 
(b) asked the reasoning of broadcasting regulation in these two countries . 
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As mentioned before, licensing of the print media i s  not allowed in either country 
in 2002 although some exceptions to this princip)e still remains standing. But the 
situation is different for broadcast media. For an answer to research question three, it can 
be said that broadcast stations of the two countries are required to get a Jicense from 
governmental agencies to operate . In the United States, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), with the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934, was created 
as a supervisory body of the broadcasting industry and authorized to license broadcast 
stations in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." 
The primary duties of the FCC are to issue licenses, a1Iocate frequencies, and 
specify operating conditions. In Turkey, a governmental agency responsible from the 
supervision of the broadcasting industry was established 60 years after the creation of the 
FCC in the United States. This supervisory body, the Radio and Television Council (the 
RTUK) was created in Turkey with the enactment of the "Law on the Establishment and 
Broadcasting of Radio Stations and Television Channels" No. 3984 in 1994. Like the 
FCC, the RTUK was authorized with allocating frequencies, channels, and transmission 
licenses to all broadcasting organizations .  
The RTUK also is responsible from the compliance of broadcast stations to 
Articles of Law No. 3984, including principles of not broadcasting against the existence 
and independence of the Turkish Republic, or against the territorial and national integrity 
of the State, the national and moral values of society, against the principles, democratic 
rules and individual rights stipulated under the Title on General Principles of the 
Constitution, general morals, social order and Turkish family structure, against the 
freedom of expression, and the principle of pluralism in communication and 
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broadcasting. Broadcast stations also cannot instigate the community to violence, terror 
or ethnic discrimination or give rise to feelings of hatred in the community, according to 
the Law No. 3984. Broadcast stations which violate those articles of Law No. 3984 first 
are warned by the RTUK. If violations continue, the RTUK can suspend their 
broadcasting temporarily or permanently. Unlike the United States, in Turkey, a 
broadcast station also is required to submit a "national security" document in which it has 
to mention punishments taken for violation of national security issues at the time of 
renewal of its license. In the United States, if broadcast stations did not commit a serious 
violation or persistently abuse of FCC rules, they may assume their license will be 
renewed. 
As an answer to research question three (at the broadcasting media are licensed 
in both countries through governmental agencies, in Turkey by the Radio and Television 
Council (the RTUK) and in the United States by the Federal Communication 
Commission (the FCC). For an answer to research question three {b), the primary 
reasoning behind the regulation of broadcasting in the United States was the technology, 
to cope with a scarcity of frequencies. Spectrum scarcity is a universal phenomenon - as 
true in Turkey as in the United States. In Turkey, although broadcasting regulation under 
the supervisory of the RTUK initially emerged to deal with the "chaos in the ether," its 
primary purpose then has been more to provide development of broadcasting in what 
government officials regarded as a responsible manner (this is also one of the 
responsibilities of the FCC) and to protect traditional values of the nation and the 
principles of the Republic, including laicization, patriotism, secularism, indivisibility of 
the existence of Turkey, and separation of powers .  
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study examined governmental interaction with freedom and control of mass 
media of communication in the United States and Turkey. Specifically, three major media 
control areas--prior restraint, seditious libel and broadcast licensing--were investigated. 
In doing research of those key media control systems, Fredrick S. Siebert' s propositions 1 
that characterized government control over the media were used as a framework for this 
dissertation. Siebert' s Proposition I stated, "the extent of government control of the press 
depends on the nature of the relationship of the government to those subject to the 
government." His Proposition II claimed, "the area of freedom contracts and the 
enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the stability of the government and 
of the structure of society increase." 
The historical examination of the evolution of press freedom and control in the 
two countries, in line with Siebert' s Proposition I, showed that as governments proceeded 
from monarchies to more democratic ones, freedom of expression and of the press 
expanded. But as seen, even in early twenty-first century, press freedom is not absolute in 
those two nations. In 2002, two of the major media control systems, prior restraint of the 
media and seditious libel are still living issues in both Turkey and the United States, 
although their severity dramatically decreased. As for broadcasting, the licensing issue 
also is still alive in 2002 in the two countries. 
1 Fredrick S. Siebert, Freedom of Press in England, 1476-1 776 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1965), 10. 
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Freedom of expression and of the press in 2002 are ideal concepts of modem 
democracies that many countries in the world want to achieve. But as seen in the 
examination of the two nations, they are also vulnerable values and easy to lose. A 
variety of circumstances can cause their limitations. In this study, incidents of terrorism 
appeared as the primary justification used in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries by both countries' governments in their attempts to impose restrictions on those 
freedoms. In Turkey, with its long history of autocratic rule and relatively short history of 
democratic strivings, perceived threats to government stability in the press often met with 
swift and severe legal reprisal. It must be emphasized, however, that terrorism claimed 
the lives of 40,000 Turks in only 1 8  years, from 1984 to 2002. Provocation on 
government to take repressive measures for security reasons was extreme. 
Terrorism, of course, is not something that countries can accept. It can come 
without any prior notice, and take many lives. Therefore, it is very important for 
governments to protect their nations, sometimes, as they have claimed, at the expense of 
sacrificing freedoms. Because, as they argued and as generally approved by the public, 
the right to live was paramount among all freedoms. In this study, a major focus was on 
governments' expressed justifications and consequently, the methods that they used to 
limit freedoms, particularly freedom of the press. 
So, why is this study important? What does it contribute? It is important because 
it shows how two culturally, traditionally, and politically different nations used the same 
motive to limit the freedom of the press. This motive was the protection of the safety of 
their nations. Understanding the evolution of press freedom and the logic of governments 
in both Turkey and the United States helps to understand how the motives of other 
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countries where violations to freedoms occurred may be viewed. This study also can 
serve as a useful source for scholars interested in comparative studies of media liberty 
and media constraint, the more so because of the author's translations of materials from 
Turkish to English. 
A comparison of countries is a risky task, and this is not only because of the 
language barriers. For the author of this study, although in the United States for three 
years, it is easier to understand her own national system, and this consequently runs the 
risk of seeing other countries, in this instance the United States, from this perspective. 
Therefore, those readers of this study who are more familiar with other systems may find 
that this study does not address their perspective adequately. 
Could any other method be used in this study? This study was designed to use 
legal and historical approaches to cover the issues presented. The condition of press 
freedom and restraints over it in countries is a life-long study. Thus, longitudinal studies 
are needed in the examination of similar topics. In case of this paper, the investigation of 
the legal documents including constitutions, statutes, and decrees historically provided 
useful evidence in the interpretation of the condition of the freedoms and the restraints 
over it in the two countri�s. But historical documents without context lack spirit. They do 
not inform us about other background factors that caused specific behaviors of 
governments, the media, and public. These background factors, for example, press 
reaction to some specific action of the government, can be revealed to a greater extent 
with the content analysis of major newspapers of the time. Additionally, the examination 
of public opinion polls can provide information about public reaction to some specific 
position of the government towards the media. 
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Quantitative research could be another approach to study the topics of this paper. 
Using quantitative research techniques, the frequency of terrorism incidents occurring in 
the specific time range could be correlated with the frequency of violations to press 
freedoms occurring in the same time range in Turkey. Then, the United States could be 
examined by using the same approach in the same time period. And at the end, the results 
of Turkey research could be compared with results from the United States, and a general 
statement could be made regarding whether governments in these two countries used the 
terrorism incidents as a justification factor to limit press freedom in the time period 
investigated. This is an area which could be addressed in future research. 
Translation and collection of the writings of the brave journalists who, in pursuit 
of their political ideals, also developed--with ideas from France stirred into the mix in 
terms of theories of freedom, including freedom of expression--is a worthy long-term 
project. Often, freedom may be guaranteed by legal authority, but usually the push for 
freedom comes from citizens, often journalists, willing to risk their lives for freedom. 
Future researchers can investigate these issues. 
Media systems are still evolving and new ones are coming to the stage. In this 
study, traditional media systems--print and broadcast media--were examined. But in 
2002, we have other media systems such as the Internet. Since the Internet was a 
relatively new and different than other traditional media systems in its nature, there are 
not many studies made about it. Future research can focus on governments ' attempts to 
control this new medium, the Internet. 
As media systems are evolving, the underlying reasons that cause restrictions over 
are changing as well. This study examined the issue of "terrorism" as the underlying 
238 
reason because "terrorism" was a lively topic in 2002, as a result of September 1 1 1\ 
2001 ,  terrorist attacks to the United States. The toll from terrorism in the United States 
from 1995 to 200 1 totaled perhaps 3,500 persons, and sent shock waves through 
America. Turkey has had a much longer history with terrorism, with 40,000 killed 
between 1984 and 2002, and Turkey' s recent history of media restraints is more sweeping 
and severe than in the United States. It is not argued here that similar threats will bring 
commensurate responses in both nations. The United States Constitution has remained in 
force with its Bill of Rights since 1791 ,  and the tradition of a right to criticize 
government is as strong as anywhere in the world. Turkey, given its geographic destiny 
as a crossroads between East and West, swept by both external and internal threats over 
the centuries, comes from different traditions of expression and control than the United 
States. 
Future research can examine the factors other than terrorism incidents as 
underlying reasons for limitation of freedoms. It is the hope that this study encourages 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
4 October 2001 
The constitutional amendments undertaken by the TGNA constitute one of the 
most comprehensive packages of amendments that the TGNA has accepted to this date, 
with the exception of extraordinary situations. 
These amendments testify to a broad-based political will for EU membership in 
Turkey. The package introduces new provisions, in line with the NP AA priorities, such as 
the freedom of thought and expression, the prevention of torture, strengthening of 
democracy and civilian authority, the freedom and security of the individual , the privacy 
of the individual life, the inviolability of the domicile, the freedom of communication, the 
freedom of residence and movement, the freedom of association and the equality between 
men and women. 
These amendments, along with their relevance to the Political Criteria section of the 
NP AA, are as follows: 
Article 1 
The phrase ''no thoughts or opinions" in the fifth paragraph of the preamble of the 
Constitution is replaced with ''no activity". This amendment further limits restrictions 
that may be imposed on the freedom of thought and expression. Restrictions can now be 
imposed only in the case of an "activity" that is in violation of the provisions of this 
paragraph. 
This amendment is undertaken in the light of: 
-Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) titled "Freedom of expression"; 
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-the principles of freedom and democracy referred to in the introductory paragraph to 
Political Criteria: Section 2.1. in the NP AA. 
This amendment is also a step forward in the fulfillment of Turkey's commitment to 
review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms, in particular 
those concerning the expression and the dissemination of ideas . . . " in the short term 
(Political Criteria 2.1.1. "Freedom of Thought and Expression"). 
Article 2 
This article amends Article 13 under the heading "Restriction of the Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms" of the Constitution. 
The amended version of Article 13 now reads "Fundamental rights and freedoms may 
be restricted only on the basis of specific reasons listed in the relevant articles of the 
Constitution without prejudice to the values defined therein and only by law. The se 
restrictions shall not conflict with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and 
the requirements of the democratic social order and the secular republic and the 
principle of proportionality." 
With the amendments to Artide 13, the following grounds for restrictions, ''the 
indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, 
the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest and 
public morals or the protection of public health", are deleted from the text of the 
article. In the amended version, fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted "only 
on the basis of specific reasons listed in the relevant articles of the Constitution 
without prejudice to the values defined therein and only by law". The restrictions on 
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freedom of thought and expression are eased and the scope of fundamental rights and 
freedoms are expanded. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 10 of ECHR titled ''Freedom of expression"; 
-the principles of freedom and democracy with additional safeguards referred to in the 
introductory paragraph to Political Criteria Section 2.1 . 
These amendments are also a step forward in the fulfillment of Turkey's commitment to 
review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms,
,
, in the short 
term (Political Criteria 2. 1 . 1. "Freedom of Thought and Expression"). 
Article 3 
This article amends Article 14 under the heading "Prohibition of the Abuse of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms". 
The following is the amended version of Article 14: "None of the rights and freedoms 
embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the 
indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, or for activities 
undertaken with the aim of destroying the democratic and secular Republic based 
on human rights." 
"No provision of the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that grants the 
State or individuals the right of destroying the fundamental rights and freedoms 
embodied in the Constitution, and of staging an activity with the aim of restricting 
rights and freedoms more extensively than is stated in the Constitution." 
"Sanctions for persons undertaking activities in conflict with these provisions shall 
be defined by law". 
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These amendments strengthen existing safeguards on the exercise of fundamental rights 
and freedoms and are in accordance with the change in the preamble. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 17 of the ECHR, titled "Prohibition of abuse of rights"; 
-the principles of freedom, democracy with additional safeguards and the rule of law 
referred to in the introductory paragraph of Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .  
These amendments are also a step forward in the fulfillment of Turkey' s commitment to 
review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms . . .  " in the short 
term (Political Criteria 2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of Thought and Expression"). 
Article 4 
This article amends Article 19 under the heading "Personal Liberty and Security". 
In the amended version of Article 19, the phrase "in the case of offences committed 
collectively, within fifteen days" in the fifth paragraph is replaced with the phrase ''in 
the case of offences committed collectively, within four days." 
The sixth paragraph which reads "Notification of the situation of the person arrested 
or detained shall be made to the next of kin without delay, except for cases of 
definite necessity pertaining to the risks of revealing the scope and subject of the 
investigation compelling otherwise" is replaced with "Notification of the situation of 
the person arrested or detained shall be made to the next of kin without delay." The 
special restriction on the provision on the notification of the next of kin of the person 
arrested or detained without delay is deleted from the text. 
The phrase "according to principles of the law on compensation" is added to the last 
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paragraph on the right to seek compensation from the State provided for persons 
subjected to treatment contrary to these provisions. 
All of these amendments are related to the improvement of human rights. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 5 of the ECHR titled "Right to liberty and security". 
These amendments also fulfill Turkey's commitment to "review Article 19/6 of the 
Constitution" in the medium term (Political Criteria 2. 1 .4. "Pre-trial detention" ). 
Article 5 
This article amends Article 20 under the heading "The Privacy of Individual Life." 
This article remains the same with the exception of the following amendments: 
The third sentence of the first paragraph, "Exceptions necessitated by judicial 
investigation and prosecution are reserved" is deleted, thereby strengthening the 
safeguards on the protection of the privacy of the individual and family life. 
Specific reasons for the restrictions on the right of privacy, ''national security, public 
order, the prevention of crime, public health, public morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others", are added to the second paragraph of this article, in 
light of Article 8 of the ECHR titled "Right to respect for private and family life". The 
requirement for a ''written" order from an authorized body before restrictions can be 
imposed on the exercise of this right is an additional safeguard for the right to privacy of 
the individual. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 8 of the ECHR titled "Right to respect for private and family life"; 
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-the principle of democracy with safeguards and the rule of law referred to in the 
introductory paragraph to Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .  
These amendments are also a step forward in the fulfillment of Turkey' s commitment to 
review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms", in the short 
term (Political Criteria 2. 1 . 1 . "Freedom of Thought and Expression" ). 
Article 6 
This article amends Article 21  under the heading "The Inviolability of the Domicile ." 
The article remains the same with the exception of the following changes: 
Specific grounds for the restrictions on the inviolability of the domicile, "national 
security, public order, the prevention of crime, the protection of public health, 
public morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" are added 
to this article, in light of Article 8 of the ECHR titled "Right to respect for private and 
family life,,_ 
The requirement for a ''written" order from an authorized body before restrictions can be 
imposed on the exercise of this right is an additional safeguard for the inviolability of the 
domicile. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 8 of the ECHR titled "Right to respect for private and family life"; 
-Article 1 titled "Protection of property" of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR; 
-the principle of democracy with safeguards and the rule of law referred to in the 
introductory paragraph to Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .  
These amendments are also a step forward in the fulfillment of Turkey' s commitment to 
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review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms .. . " in the short 
term (Political Criteria 2.1.1. "Freedom of Thought and Expression"). 
Article 7 
This article amends Article 22 under the heading "Freedom of Communication". 
The article remains the same with the exception of the following changes: 
Specific grounds for the restrictions on the freedom of communication, "national 
security, public order, the prevention of crime, public health, public morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others", are added to this article, in light 
of Article 8 of the ECHR titled "Right to respect for private and family life". The 
requirement for a ''written" order from an authorized body before restrictions can be 
imposed on the exercise of this right is an additional safeguard on the freedom of 
communication. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 8 of the ECHR titled "Right to respect for private and family life" and Article 10 
of the ECHR titled "Freedom of expression"; 
-the principle of safeguards and the rule of law referred to in the introductory paragraph 
to Political Criteria Section 2. 1. ; 
-Political Criteria Section 2. 1.1. "Freedom of Thought and Expression". 
Article 8 
This article amends the fifth paragraph of Article 23 under the heading "Freedom of 
Residence and Movement ". 
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A citizen' s  freedom to leave the country may no longer " • • •  be restricted on account of 
the national economic situation". This amendment is in the context of the expansion of 
the scope of the fundamental rights and freedoms. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 2 titled "Freedom of movement" of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR 
-the principle of freedom referred to in the introductory paragraph to Political Criteria 
Section 2. 1 .  
These amendments are also a step foiward in the fulfillment of Turkey' s commitment to 
review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms . . .  " in the short 
term (Political Criteria 2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of Thought and Expression"). 
Article 9 
This article amends Article 26 under the heading "Freedom of Expression and 
Dissemination of Thought". The second paragraph is amended, the third paragraph is 
deleted entirely and a new paragraph is added to be the last paragraph. 
The sentence which reads "No language prohibited by law shall be used in the 
expression and dissemination of thought" is deleted from the text and the third 
paragraph beginning with this sentence is entirely deleted from the text. 
Restrictions on the exercise of this right, ''national security, public order, public 
security, the fundamental characteristics of the Republic and the protection of the 
indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation", are added to the second 
paragraph of Article 26. 
The following sentence is added as the last paragraph of Article 26: "The formalities, 
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conditions and procedures to be applied in exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression and dissemination shall be prescribed by law." 
These amendments expand the scope of the right of the freedom of thought and 
expression and remove restrictions on the use of different languages, dialects and tongues 
by citizens in their daily lives. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 9 titled "Freedom of thought, conscience and religion," Article 10 titled 
"Freedom of Expression", Article 14 titled "Prohibition of discrimination", and Article 
18 titled "Limitation on use of restrictions on rights" of the ECHR, and Article 1 titled 
"General prohibition of discrimination" of Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR; 
-and is relevant to the introductory paragraph to Political Criteria Section 2.1., Political 
Criteria Section 2.1.1. "Freedom of Thought and Expression", Section 2.1.9. ''Cultural 
Life and Individual Freedoms", and Section 2.1.11. "Full Enjoyment by All Individuals 
All Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". 
Article 10 
This article amends Article 28 under the heading "Freedom of the Press." 
The second paragraph, which reads "Publications shall not be made in any language 
prohibited by law" is deleted from the text of the Constitution. This amendment extends 
the scope of the freedom of thought and expression, and removes restrictions on the use 
of different languages, dialects and tongues by citizens in their daily lives. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
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Article 9 titled "Freedom of thought, conscience and religion," Article 10  titled "Freedom 
of Expression", and Article 14  titled "Prohibition of discrimination" of the ECHR and 
Article 1 titled "General prohibition of discrimination" of Protocol No. 12  of the ECHR; 
-and is relevant to the introductory paragraph to Political Criteria Section 2. 1 . ,  Section 
2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of Thought and Expression", Section 2. 1 .9. "Cultural Life and Individual 
Freedoms", and Section 2 . 1 . 1 1 .  "Full Enjoyment by All Individuals All Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms." 
Article 1 1  
This article amends the second paragraph of Article 3 1 ,  under the heading "Right to use 
media owned by public corporations other than the press". 
Specific grounds for restrictions on the right of the public to use media owned by public 
corporations other than the press are added to the second paragraph. These grounds are 
listed as ''national security, public order, public morals or the protection of public 
health". 
This amendment is undertaken in the light of: 
-Article 10 of the ECHR titled "Freedom of Expression"; 
-The principle of freedom in the introductory paragraph to Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .  
This amendment i s  also a step forward in the fulfillment of Turkey's commitment to 
review "the provisions of the Constitution on human rights and freedoms, in particular 
those concerning the expression and the dissemination of ideas . . .  and the press" in the 
short term (Political Criteria 2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of Thought and Expression"). 
Article 12 
This article amends Article 33 under the heading "Freedom of Association'' .  
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The amended Article 33 now reads: 
"Everyone has the right to form associations, to become, or to cease to be a member of 
an association without prior permission . 
No one shall be compelled to become or remain a member of an association. 
The right to form associations shall only be restricted on grounds of national 
security, public order, the prevention of crime, public health and morals, and 
protection of the rights of others. 
The formalities, conditions, and procedures to be applied in the exercise of the right 
to form associations shall be prescribed by law. 
Associations may be dissolved or suspended from activity by the decision of a judge in 
cases prescribed by law. In cases where delay endangers national security or public order 
and in cases where it is necessary to prevent the perpetration or the continuation of a 
crime or to effect apprehension, an authority designated by law may be vested with 
power to suspend the association from activity. The decision of this authority shall be 
submitted for approval to the competent judge within twenty-four hours. Unless the judge 
declares a decision within forty-eight hours, this administrative decision shall be annulled 
automatically. 
Provisions of the first paragraph shall not prevent the imposition of restrictions on the 
rights of armed forces and security forces officials and civil servants to the extent that the 
duties of ci vii servants so require. 
The provisions of this article are also applicable to foundations." 
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In the amended version of Article 33, the second paragraph on obtaining permits to 
establi sh associations is deleted, thereby easing restrictions on the establishment of 
associations. 
Specific grounds for the restrictions to this right, "national security, public order, for 
the prevention of crime, public morals, public health, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others", are added to this article. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 1 1  of the ECHR titled " Freedom of assembly and association;" 
-The commitment made by Turkey to "review the legislation on the freedom of 
association" in the medium term (Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .2. "Freedom of 
Association and Peaceful Assembly, and the Civil Society"). 
Article 1 3  
This article amends Article 34 under the heading "Right to hold meetings and 
demonstration marches." 
The amended Article 34 now reads: 
"Everyone has the right to hold unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration 
marches without prior permission. 
The right to hold meetings and demonstration marches shall only be restricted on 
grounds of national security, public order, for the prevention of crime, public 
morals, public health, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and 
by law. 
The formalities, conditions, and procedures governing the exercise of the right to hold 
meetings and demonstration marches shall be prescribed by law." 
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Specific grounds for the restrictions to this right, "national security, public order, for 
the prevention of crime, public morals, public health, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others and by law", are added to this article. 
The second paragraph of Article 34 which reads "The competent administrative 
authority may determine a site and route for the demonstration march in order to 
prevent disruption of order in urban life" and the last paragraph which reads 
"Associations, foundations, labour unions and public professional organizations 
shall not hold meetings or demonstration marches exceeding their own scope and 
aims" are deleted from the text. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 11 of the ECHR titled "Freedom of assembly and association"; 
-The commitment made by Turkey to review "the legislation on the freedom of 
association and holding meetings and demonstration marches" (Political Criteria Section 
2.1.2. "Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly, and the Civil Society"). 
Article 14 
This article amends Article 36/1 under the heading "Freedom to Claim Rights." 
The phrase "the right to fair trial" is added to the first paragraph, thereby introducing a 
additional safeguard for the protection of human rights. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 6 of the ECHR titled "Right to a fair trial"; 
-Political Criteria Section 2.1.7. "Improving the Functioning and the Effectiveness of the 
Judiciary", particularly with respect to Turkey's commitment to "strengthen legal defense 
by introducing a constitutional provision that will establish this as one of the fundamental 
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elements of the judicial process". 
Article 15 
This article amends Article 38 under the heading "Principles Relating to Offences and 
Penalties." 
I n  the amended version of Article 38, the sentence ''the death penalty may only be 
imposed in time of war, imminent threat of war and for crimes of terrorism" is 
added to be the seventh paragraph of the article , thereby restricting the cases in which 
the death penalty may be imposed. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 2 of the ECHR titled "Right to life"; 
-Article 1 titled "Abolition of the death penalty" and Article 2 titled "Death penalty in 
time of war" of Protocol No. 6 of the ECHR; 
-and is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .8. "Abolition of the Death Penalty". 
An additional paragraph which reads "Findings obtained in a manner not in 
accordance with the law may not be admitted as evidence" is added to Article 38. 
This amendment is a safeguard against the use of evidence obtained through such means 
as maltreatment and torture .. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 1 of the ECHR titled "Obligation to respect human rights" and Article 3 of the 
ECHR titled "Prohibition of torture"; 
-Political Criteria Section 2.1. and Section 2.1.3. "Fight Against Torture" 
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Furthermore, a new paragraph which reads "No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
merely on the grounds of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation" is added to this 
article. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article l titled "Prohibition of imprisonment for debt" of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR. 
Article 16  
This article amends Article 40 under the heading "Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms." 
The sentence ''the State must determine the legal course of action and authorities 
that may be applied to by persons concerned" is added as the second paragraph, 
thereby facilitating the citizens' access to the judicial system. 
This amendment is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 .  7. "Improving the 
Functioning and the Effectiveness of the Judiciary". 
Article 17 
This article amends Article 41 under the heading "Protection of the Family." 
The phrase "and is based on the equality of spouses" is added to the first paragraph, 
following the sentence "The Family is the foundation of Turkish society". This 
amendment is undertaken in the context of improving equality between men and women. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 14 of the ECHR titled "Prohibition of discrimination"; 
-Article 5 titled "Equality between spouses" of Protocol No. 7 of the ECHR; 
-Article 1 titled "General prohibition of discrimination" of Protocol No. 12  of the ECHR; 
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-and is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2.1.11. "Full Enjoyment by All 
I ndividuals All Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". 
Article 18  
This article amends Article 46 of the Constitution under the heading "Expropriation". 
The amended Article 46 reads: 
"The state and public corporations shall be entitled, where the public interest requires it, 
to expropriate privately owned real estate wholly or in part or impose administrative 
servitude on it in accordance with the principles and procedures prescribed by law, 
provided that compensation in real terms is paid in advance. 
Compensation and the amount of additional compensation as finalized by court judgment 
shall be paid in cash and in advance. However, the procedure to be applied in paying 
compensation for land expropriated in order to carry out land reform, major energy and 
irrigation projects, and housing and resettlement schemes and afforestation, and to protect 
the coasts and to build tourist facilities shall be regulated by law. I n  previous cases where 
the law may allow payment in installments, the payment period shall not exceed five 
years; whence payment shall be made in equal installments. 
Compensation for land expropriated from the small farmer who cultivates his own land 
shall in all cases be paid in advance. 
For the remainder of the installments provided for in the second sub-paragraph, and in 
cases of any standing expropriation payments not honored for any reason, an interest rate 
equivalent to the highest interest paid on the public debt shall be paid." 
Article 19 
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This article amends the second paragraph and deletes the third paragraph of Article 49 
under the heading "Right and Duty to Work." 
The phrase "and the unemployed" is added after "workers" to the following sentence: 
"The State shall take the necessary measures to raise the standard of living of 
workers, to protect them in order to improve the general conditions of labor, to 
promote labor and to create suitable economic conditions for the prevention of 
unemployment." 
With this amendment, the State assumes the obligation to protect the unemployed as well 
as the workers; this is an improvement in the area of state social policy. 
This amendment is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 . 10. "Alleviating Regional 
Disparities to Increase Economic, Social and Cultural Opportunities for All Citizens". 
Article 20 
This article amends Article 5 1  under the heading "Right to Organize Labor Unions." 
"Employees and employers have the right to form labour unions and employers' 
associations and higher organizations, without prior permission, in order to safeguard and 
develop their economic and social rights and the interests of their members in their labor 
relations and shall be free to become a member of, or withdraw from membership in, a 
union. No one shall be compelled to become a member, remain a member, or withdraw 
from membership of a union. 
The right to form labor unions and employers' associations and higher 
organizations shall only be restricted on grounds of national security, public order, 
prevention of crime, public health and morals and the protection of the freedoms of 
others. 
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The formalities, conditions, and procedures governing the exercise of the right to form 
labor unions and employers' associations and higher organizations shall be prescribed by 
law. 
It is not allowed to hold concurrent memberships in more than one labor union or 
employers' association. 
The scope and exceptions of and limitations in this field to the rights of public employees 
who do not have the worker status, shall be prescribed by law in accordance with the 
nature of the service that they provide. 
The regulations, management and functioning of labor unions and their higher bodies 
shall not violate the fundamental characteristic of the Republic and the principles of 
democracy." 
The second paragraph which reads "In order to form unions and their higher bodies, 
it shall suffice to submit the information and documents prescribed by law to the 
competent authority designated by law. If this information and documentation is 
not in conformity with law, the competent authority shall apply to the appropriate 
court for the suspension of activities or the dissolution of the union or the higher 
body" is deleted from the text of Article 5 1 .  This amendment extends the scope of the 
right to organize labor unions. 
Specific grounds for restriction of this right, ''national security, public order, the 
prevention of crime, protection of public health, public morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others", are added to this article. 
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Furthermore, the phrase "Workers and employers" in the first paragraph of Article 51 
has been replaced by "Employees and employers". This amendment extends the 
safeguards in Article 51 to a larger group. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 11 of the ECHR titled " Freedom of assembly and association;" 
-Political Criteria Section 2.1.2. Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly, and the 
Civil Society, particularly Turkey's commitment to "review any restrictions there may be 
on rights of labour unions and employers' associations" in the medium term. 
Article 21 
This article amends the last paragraph of Article 55 under the heading "Guarantee of Fair 
Wage". 
The amendment adds the phrase "the minimum living standards of employees" to the 
third paragraph defining factors to be taken into consideration when setting the minimum 
wage, thereby reinforcing the social function of the State. 
This amendment is relevant to the introductory paragraph of Political Criteria Section 2.1. 
Article 22 
This article amends Article 65 of the Constitution along with the heading. The new 
heading is "The Limitations of the Social and Economic Duties of the State." 
The amended article reads: ''The State shall fulfill its duties as laid down in the 
Constitution in the social and economic fields within the limits of its financial resources, 
taking into consideration the priorities in line with the objectives of these duties." 
Article 23 
This article amends Article 66 under the heading "Turkish Citizenship". 
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The amendment deletes the sentence "The citizenship of a child of a foreign father and 
a Turkish mother shall be defined by law" on the grounds that this provision violates 
the principle of equality between men and women . 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 14 of the ECHR titled "Prohibition of discrimination"; 
-Article 5 titled "Equality between spouses" of Protocol No. 7 of the ECHR; 
-Article 1 titled "General prohibition of discrimination" of Protocol No. 12  of the ECHR; 
-and is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 . 1 1 .  "Full Enjoyment by All 
Individuals All Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". 
Article 24 
This article amends Article 67 under the heading "Right to Vote, to be Elected and to 
Engage in Political Activity." 
The amended Article 67 now reads: 
"In conformity with the conditions set forth in the law, citizens have the right to vote, to 
be elected, and to engage in political activities independently or in a political party, and 
to take part in a referendum. 
Elections and referenda shall be held under the direction and supervision of the judiciary, 
in accordance with the principles of free, equal, secret, and direct, universal suffrage, and 
public counting of the votes. However, the conditions under which the Turkish citizens 
who are abroad shall be able to exercise their right to vote, are regulated by law. 
All Turkish citizens over 1 8  years of age shall have the right to vote in elections and to 
take part in referenda. 
The exercise of these rights shall be regulated by law. 
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Privates and corporals serving in the armed services, students in military schools, and 
convicts in penal institutions,  with the exception of those convicted for negligent 
conduct, cannot vote. �e Supreme Election Council shall determine the measures to be 
taken to ensure the safety of voting and the counting of votes; such voting i s  done under 
the on-site direction and supervision of authorized judge. 
When there is less than one year for elections, amendments made to electoral laws 
shall come into force for the second consecutive elections." 
The phrase ''with the exception of those sentenced for negligence" is added after the 
phrase "convicts in penal institutions" to the sentence "Privates and corporals serving 
in the armed services, students in military schools and convicts in penal institutions 
cannot vote." According to the new version of Article 67, persons sentenced for 
negligence will be allowed to vote. This provision is an improvement on the exercise of 
democratic rights and freedoms. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 3 titled "Right to free elections" of the Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR; 
-and is relevant to the introductory paragraph of the Political Criteria Section 2 . 1 .  
Article 25 
This article amends Artic1e 69 under the heading "Provisions Relating to Political 
Parties." 
Amendments to this article introduce criteria for determining whether the political party 
has become a center for the execution of prohibited activities. 
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The following sentence is added to the sixth paragraph of Article 69: "A political party 
will be considered to have become the center of execution when actions of this type 
are undertaken intensively by the members of that party and when these actions are 
discreetly or openly approved by the general assembly or the chairman or the 
central decision-making or administrative organs or by the General Council of the 
Party Group at the Turkish Grand National Assembly or by the administrative 
board of that Group, or when these actions are directly and intentionally committed 
by party organs." 
This provision introduces a series of criteria for the dissolution of a party, such as the 
frequency and the intensity of actions undertaken by party members, and the approval of 
these activities by central party organs. This provision extends the scope of the exercise 
of the freedom of thought and expression. 
After the sixth paragraph of Article 69, a new paragraph is added which reads "The 
Constitutional Court may take the decision to deprive the party of State funds, 
either partially or in full, instead of permanently dissolving the party, according to 
the gravity of the actions brought before the Court", thereby enabling the 
Constitutional Court to impose sanctions on political parties other than dissolution. This 
provision extends the scope of the exercise of the freedom of thought and expression . 
The last paragraph of Article 69 now reads: "The foundation and activities of political 
parties, their supervision and dissolution or the denial of state funds to them partially 
or in full , as well as the election expenditures and procedures of the political parties and 
candidates, are regulated by law in accordance with the above- mentioned principles." 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
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-Article 17 of the ECHR titled "Prohibition of abuse of rights"; 
-and is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of Thought and 
Expression". 
Article 26 
This article amends Article 74 under the heading "Right of Petition". 
The amended version of the article now reads: 
"Citizens, and foreigners resident in Turkey in accordance with the principle to 
reciprocity, have the right to apply in writing to the competent authorities and to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly with regard to requests and complaints concerning 
themselves or the public. 
The result of the application concerning himself shall be made known without delay to 
the petitioner in writing. 
The way of exercising this right shall be determined by law." 
The right of petition is extended to foreign nationals, with the phrase ''foreigners 
resident in Turkey", provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed added to the 
first paragraph of Article 74. 
This amendment is undertaken in light of: 
-Article 10 of the ECHR titled "Freedom of Expression"; 
-Article 14 of the ECHR titled "Prohibition of discrimination"; 
-and is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of Thought and 
Expression" and Section 2. 1 . 1 1 .  "Full Enjoyment by All Individuals All Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms". 
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Article 27 
This article amends the heading of Article 86 of the Constitution and its first paragraph. 
The new heading is "Payments, Allowances, Pensions and Social Rights." 
The amended first and second paragraphs read: 
"The payments and allowances as well as social rights, pensions and indemnity payments 
of the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be regulated in its special 
law.  
The monthly amount of the salary shall not exceed the salary of the most senior active 
civil servant; the travel allowance shall not exceed half of that salary; pensions cannot be 
less than half of the total of that salary and travel allowances. The present and retired 
members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be associated with the Pension 
Fund of the Republic of Turkey and those who are no longer members of parliament may 
continue to be associated with the Fund upon their request. 
The salaries and allowances paid to the members of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly shall not necessitate the suspension of payments of pensions by the Pension 
Fund and similar benefits ." 
Article 28 
This article amends Article 87 of the Constitution . 
The amended article now reads: 
"The functions and powers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly comprise the 
enactment, amendment, and repeal of laws; the supervision of the Council of Ministers 
and the Ministers; authorization of the Council of Ministers to issue governmental 
decrees having the force of law on certain matters; debating and approval of the budget 
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draft and the draft law of the final accounts, making decisions regarding printing of 
currency and declaration of war; ratifying international agreements, deciding on the 
proclamation of amnesties and pardons with the majority decision of 3/5 of the total 
number of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly; confirming death 
sentences passed down by the courts; and exercising the powers and executing the 
functions envisaged in the other articles of the Constitution." 
The phrase ''with the majority decision of 3/5 of the total number of members of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly" is added and the phrase "excluding those 
individuals convicted for activities set out in Article 14 of the Constitution" is deleted 
from the text of Article 87. 
Article 29 
Article 29 amends Article 89 under the heading "Promulgation of Laws by the 
President of the Republic" 
The amended second paragraph reads: 
"He shall, within the same period, refer to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for 
further consideration, laws which he deems partially or fully unsuitable for 
promulgation, together with a statement of his reasons. Budget laws shall not be subject 
to this provision." 
A new penultimate sentence is added, which reads: "In case the President deems these 




Article 30 amends the fourth paragraph of Article 94 and replaces the phrase "in ten 
days" with "in five days." This amendment speeds up the election of the Speaker of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
Article 31 
Article 31 amends Article 100 under the heading "Parliamentary Investigation". These 
amendments are undertaken to speed up the process and to discourage politicization. 
The first paragraph is amended as follows: "Parliamentary investigation concerning the 
Prime Minister or other ministers may be requested through a motion tabled by at least 
one-tenth of the total number of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The 
Assembly shall consider and decide on this request with secret ballot within one month 
at the latest." 
The second paragraph is amended as follows: "In the event of a decision to initiate an 
investigation, this investigation shall be conducted by a commission of fifteen members 
chosen by lot on behalf of each party from among three times the number of members the 
party is entitled to have on the commission, representation being proportional to the 
parliamentary membership of the party. The commission shall submit its report on the 
result of the investigation to the Assembly within two months. If the investigation is not 
completed within the time allotted, the commission shall be granted a further and final 
period of two months. This report shall be submitted to the Speakership of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly by the end of this duration." 
The third paragraph now reads: ''The report shall be distributed within ten days after the 
date of submission to the Speakership and it will be discussed in ten days after its 
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distribution, and if necessary, the decision may be taken to bring the person involved 
before the Supreme Court. The decision to bring a person before the Supreme Court shall 
be taken by secret ballot only by an absolute majority of the total number of members." 
Article 32 
This article amends Article 1 1 8 under the heading "The National Security Council". 
The first paragraph of Article 1 18  now reads: The National Security Council shall be 
composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime 
Ministers, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of the 
Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air 
Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the 
President of the Republic. 
The first amendment to this article replaces the phrase "its views on taking decisions" in 
the third paragraph with the phrase "the advisory decisions it has taken and its views 
on", thereby emphasizing the advisory nature of the National Security Council decisions. 
The second amendment to this article replaces the phrase "give priority consideration 
to" in the third paragraph with ''take into consideration", thereby reinforcing the 
advisory role of the NSC. 
These amendments are relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2.1 .1 5 .  ''The National 
Security Council". 
Article 33 
This article amends Article 149 related to procedures of the Constitutional Court, under 
the heading "Functioning and Trial Procedure". 
The amended version of Article 149 now reads: 
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"The Constitutional Court shall convene with its president and ten members, and shall 
take decisions by absolute majority. Decision of annulment of Constitutional 
amendments and on the dissolution of parties shall be taken by a three fifths majority. 
The Constitutional Court shall give priori ty to the consideration of, and to decisions on, 
applications for annulment on the grounds of defect in form. 
The organization and trial _procedures of the Constitutional Court shall be determined by 
law; its method of work and the division of labor among its members shall be regulated 
by the Rules of Procedure made by the Court. 
The Constitutional Court shall examine cases on the basis of written evidence, except 
where it acts as the Supreme Court. However, when it deems necessary, it may call on 
those concerned and those having knowledge relevant to the case, to present oral 
explanations (Annexed sentence: 23 .7. 1995 - 4121/14 Article) and in lawsuits on whether 
to permanently dissolve a political party or not, the Constitutional Court shall hear the 
defense of the chairman of the party whose dissolution is in process or of a proxy 
appointed by the chairman, after the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic. ', 
The first amendment adds the phrase "and the dissolution of political parties" to the 
first paragraph of Article 149. The phrase ''two-thirds majority" is replaced by the 
phrase ''three-fifths majority". This amendment makes it more difficult to dissolve a 
party and extends the scope for the exercise of the freedom of thought and expression. 
These amendments are undertaken in light of: 
-Article 10 of the ECHR titled "Freedom of Expression',. 
-and is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1 and Section 2. 1 . 1 .  "Freedom of 
Thought and Expression". 
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Article 34 
This article deletes the last paragraph of Provisional Article 15 from the text of the 
Constitution, which is: "No allegation of unconstitutionality shall be made in respect of 
decisions or measures taken under laws or decrees having the force of law enacted during 
this period or under Act No. 2324 of the Constitutional Order." 
This amendment enables laws and decree laws and other legislation enacted between 12 
September 1980 and 6 December 1983 to be brought before the Constitutional Court on 
grounds of conflict with the Constitution, and is a step foiward in the process of 
democratization. 
This amendment is relevant to the Political Criteria Section 2. 1. 
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, Secretariat General for European Affairs 
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